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Abstract
A flexible hypergame methodology is designed and implemented for modeling misper-
ceptions by participating decision makers (DMs) in a conflict having two or more DMs
within the framework of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR). This com-
prehensive approach allows one or more of the DMs to have misunderstandings about the
actual situation. Moreover, the methodology can account for misperceptions founded upon
other misunderstandings such that di↵erent levels of misperception exist. This improved
methodology can handle a DM’s misperception about itself as well as its perceptions about
its opponents. To accomplish this, the options or courses of action of each DM in a conflict
are categorized according to various types of misperceptions that can occur either due to
others or the particular DM. Furthermore, the union of all possible kinds of option percep-
tions creates the universal set of options for each DM, which in turn can be extended across
all DMs in the dispute to generate the universal set of states or possible scenarios for the
hypergame. The universal set of states permits the DMs to experience and view the dispute
independently, yet allows an analyst to distinguish between the states that are commonly
recognized by all DMs and those that are individually misperceived. Furthermore, DMs’
preferences are expressed in a relative fashion by pairwise comparisons between any pair
of states, thereby allowing the hypergame in graph form to accommodate both transitive
and intransitive preference structures.
A general stability analysis procedure is developed to analyze a hypergame under any
level of perception. Within this approach, two techniques are developed: one to analyze
each DM’s subjective game or hypergame and another to analyze and predict the equilibria
for the overall hypergame. Moreover, to study the e↵ects of DMs’ misperceptions on the
outcomes of the dispute, the overall hypergame equilibria are categorized based on the
type of misperceptions into eight classes of equilibria. To test and refine the hypergame
methodology as well to apply it in practice, three case studies are investigated. In partic-
ular, the 2011 conflict between North and South Sudan over South Sudanese oil exports,
as well as the 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal dispute, are investigated within the
iv
paradigm of a first-level hypergame in graph form, which is a decision situation in which
at least one DM has a misperception about the conflict situation, and neither the DM
who misperceives the circumstance nor any of the other DMs are aware of this misunder-
standing. Additionally, a detailed case study about the hydropolitical conflict among the
Eastern Nile Countries over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is investigated within
the structure of a second-level hypergame in graph form, in which at least one DM is aware
of another DM’s misperception. Interesting strategic insights found in these case studies
confirm the distinct advantages of utilizing the new hypergame methodology in graph form.
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Gji DM j’s game as seen by DM i
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gs1n DM n’s strategies associated with state s1, which is represented by
mn-dimensional column vector
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HEhGMR set of hyper GMR equilibria for an h-level hypergame
HE1Nash set of hyper Nash equilibrium states a the first-level hypergame
HE2Nash set of hyper Nash equilibria for a second-level hypergame
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HEhSEQ set of hyper SEQ equilibria for an h-level hypergame
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HE2SMR set of hyper SMR equilibria for a second-level hypergame
HEhSMR set of hyper SMR equilibria for an h-level hypergame
i, j, k, p, q DMs in a conflict
mi total number of options for DM i
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Ni set of DMs as seen by DM i
Nji set of DMs as seen by DM j and then as contemplated by DM i
Njw set of DMs as perceived by DM j and then by w, a sequence of
DMs
Nkw set of DMs as perceived by DM k and then by w, a sequence of
DMs, within Gkw
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Ô1 universal set of options for a first-level hypergame
Ô2 universal set of options for a second-level hypergame
Ôh universal set of options for an h-level hypergame
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Ö1j DM j’s universal set of options for a first-level hypergame
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OIipq set of options of DM i that are imagined by DM p as perceived by
DM q
OIiw set of DM i’s options that are imagined by w, a sequence of DMs
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OIqkw set of DM q’s options that are imagined by DM k and then by w,
a sequence of DMs
OMii set of DM i’s options that are misunderstood in meaning by itself
OMij set of DM i’s options misunderstood by DM j
OMiw set of DM i’s options that are misunderstood in meaning by w, a
sequence of DMs
OMipq set of options of DM i that are misunderstood in meaning by DM p
as perceived by DM q
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ORi set of DM i’s correctly perceived options that are recognized by all
DMs in N .
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R+qi(s1) set of DM q’s unilateral improvements starting from s1 as seen by
DM i
Rqjw(s1) set of DM q’s UMs from the initial state s1 as seen by DM j and
then contemplated by w, a sequence of DMs
S set of states or scenarios for a dispute
Ŝ1 universal set of states for a first-level hypergame
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SEQpji
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S
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SCHGMR1 self-contingent hyper GMR equilibrium state for a first-level hy-
pergame
SCHGMR2 self-contingent hyper GMR equilibrium state for a second-level hy-
pergame
SCHNash1 self-contingent hyper Nash equilibrium state for a first-level hyper-
game
SCHNash2 self-contingent hyper Nash equilibrium state for a second-level hy-
pergame
SCHNashh self-contingent hyper Nash equilibrium state for an h-level hyper-
game
SCHSEQ1 self-contingent hyper SEQ equilibrium state for a first-level hyper-
game
SCHSEQ2 self-contingent hyper SEQ equilibrium state for a second-level hy-
pergame
SCHSMR1 self-contingent hyper SMR equilibrium state for a first-level hyper-
game
SCHSMR2 self-contingent hyper SMR equilibrium state for a second-level hy-
pergame
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SHGMR2 a steady hyper GMR equilibrium state for a second-level hyper-
game
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STHNashh stealthy hyper Nash equilibrium state for an h-level hypergame
STHSEQ1 stealthy hyper SEQ equilibrium state for a first-level hypergame
STHSEQ2 stealthy hyper SEQ equilibrium state for a second-level hypergame
STHSMR1 stealthy hyper SMR equilibrium state for a first-level hypergame
STHSMR2 stealthy hyper SMR equilibrium state for a second-level hypergame
UCHGMR1 unsteady contingent hyper GMR equilibrium state for a first-level
hypergame
UCHGMR2 unsteady contingent hyper GMR equilibrium state for a second-
level hypergame
UCHNash1 unsteady contingent hyper Nash equilibrium state for a first-level
hypergame
UCHNash2 unsteady contingent hyper Nash equilibrium state for a second-
level hypergame
xxxiii
UCHNashh unsteady contingent hyper Nash equilibrium state for an h-level
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UCHSEQ1 unsteady contingent hyper SEQ equilibrium state for a first-level
hypergame
UCHSEQ2 unsteady contingent hyper SEQ equilibrium state for a second-level
hypergame
UCHSMR1 unsteady contingent hyper SMR equilibrium state for a first-level
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UCHSMR2 unsteady contingent hyper SMR equilibrium state for a second-
level hypergame
UHGMR1 an unsteady steady hyper GMR equilibrium state for a first-level
hypergame
UHGMR2 an unsteady steady hyper GMR equilibrium state for a first-level
hypergame
UHNash1 an unsteady steady hyper Nash equilibrium state for a first-level
hypergame
UHNash2 an unsteady steady hyper Nash equilibrium state for a second-level
hypergame
UHNashh an unsteady steady hyper Nash equilibrium state for an h-level
hypergame
UHSEQ1 an unsteady steady hyper SEQ equilibrium state for a first-level
hypergame
UHSEQ2 an unsteady steady hyper SEQ equilibrium state for a second-level
hypergame
xxxiv
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hypergame
UHSMR2 an unsteady steady hyper SMR equilibrium state for a second-level
hypergame
USTHGMR1 unsteady stealthy hyper GMR equilibrium state for a first-level
hypergame
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hypergame
USTHNash1 unsteady stealthy hyper Nash equilibrium state for a first-level
hypergame
USTHNash2 unsteady stealthy hyper Nash equilibrium state for a second-level
hypergame
USTHNashh unsteady stealthy hyper Nash equilibrium state for an h-level hy-
pergame
USTHSEQ1 unsteady stealthy hyper SEQ equilibrium state for a first-level hy-
pergame
USTHSEQ2 unsteady stealthy hyper SEQ equilibrium state for a second-level
hypergame
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hypergame
USTHSMR2 unsteady stealthy hyper SMR equilibrium state for a second-level
hypergame
w an ordered string of decision makers in a hypergame




Conflict is pervasive for individuals, organizations, nations, to name but a few. The Graph
Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) (Kilgour et al., 1987; Fang et al., 1993) is a com-
prehensive methodology that systematically models and analyzes real-life disputes under
the assumption of complete information (i.e., stakeholders have the same understanding
of each other’s courses of action, strategies, potential scenarios, and preferences). This
consideration of completely shared perceptions among decision makers (DMs) may not
always be true in reality. In fact, many conflicts are found to have an inconsistency of
perceptions among DMs, which may not only alter the outcomes of the conflicts but also
lead to surprising results. For example, in the Eastern Nile countries (Egypt, Ethiopia,
and Sudan) dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), on April 11,
2011 the Ethiopian government surprised both Egypt and Sudan by violating 1929 and
1959 agreements and started the construction of the GERD project within the Blue Nile
River without obtaining Egypt and Sudan’s approval. To avoid any direct and harsh con-
frontation with Egypt and Sudan, Ethiopia announced its surprise decision to build the
dam while Egypt and Sudan were preoccupied by critical political situations. Egypt was in
the middle of the Egyptian revolution that began on January 25, 2011; and Sudan lost the
southern region of the country due to the independence of South Sudan, which occurred
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in 2011. In Chapter 6, the GERD dispute, which is strategically modeled and analyzed
within the paradigm of a hypergame for capturing misperceptions in graph form, expressed
itself in several rounds at distinct points in time. In fact, because hypergame or games
of misperceptions arise so often in practice, a key objective of this research is to design
a comprehensive hypergame methodology within GMCR and refine this methodology by
applying it to three actual disputes including the GERD controversy.
1.1 Motivation
Among the formal ways to model and analyze misperception in conflicts, the Bayesian
(Harsanyi, 1967, 1968a,b) and the hypergame (Bennett, 1977, 1980; Takahashi et al., 1984;
Hipel et al., 1988; Wang et al., 1988, 1989) approaches are two widely used platforms.
These two approaches are di↵erent, and each has its strengths and weaknesses in modeling
and analyzing real-world conflicts. The Bayesian approach is a quantitative methodology
that models conflicts with incomplete information by assigning a probability distribution
to its uncertain parameters, whereas the hypergame approach is a qualitative platform
that considers inconsistency of perceptions among DMs by constructing a group of games,
each of which represents a particular DM’s viewpoint of the conflict circumstance. This
framework allows DMs to formally represent and utilize misperception about their oppo-
nents’ options, strategies, scenarios, and preferences. DMs’ preferences in the hypergame
are usually constructed by using an ordinal ranking of scenarios or states which means that
classical hypergame analysis is designed for employment with only transitive preferences.
However, a number of questions can be raised. Which types of option misperception are
encountered in conflict models? Can a DM’s misperception about itself be modeled and
analyzed within the traditional hypergame structure? Will the modeling of a hypergame
be informative if all perceived courses of action are collected together to make a unified
set and used to formulate possible scenarios or states? Can DMs’ relative preferences
in the hypergame handle both transitive and intransitive preference relationships? What
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strategic insights can be obtained from the hypergame equilibria? Can DMs learn from
the current hypergame equilibria to improve their perception for future uses? Can the
hypergame analysis be incorporated into the paradigm of GMCR?
Although the GMCR methodology relies on complete information, its e ciency in mod-
eling scenarios based on DMs’ courses of action, strategies, states, preferences, as well as
its strength in qualitative analysis, motivated the author to incorporate hypergames into
the current graph model structure. The modeling platform of GMCR can be used to con-
struct states for a hypergame by using the concept of an option, which is the standard
way a state is defined in the option form design of a dispute. A unified set of options can
be constructed for a hypergame by including all possible DMs’ courses of action (correct
or incorrect) in a conflict under investigation. This new design permits the buildings of
a hypergame in a very general fashion and allows the potential states to be divided into
five disjoint classes. Moreover, based on these disjoint sets of states, one can classify the
hypergame equilibria into meaningful categories to provide better results and insights.
1.2 Objectives
The goal of this research is to allow GMCR to model and analyze not only conflicts with
complete information but also disputes having misperceptions among the engaging DMs.
To accomplish this goal, the hypergame theory developed by Hipel et al. (1988) and Wang
et al. (1988, 1989) needs to be refined and incorporated into the GMCR framework. In
summary, the research objectives are to:
• Identify the common sources of misperception in a real-life conflict.
• Formally define hypergames within the paradigm of GMCR;
• Investigate hypergames starting at the option level rather than at the higher state
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level, by (1) developing the universal set of options for a hypergame, and (2) con-
structing the universal set of states for a hypergame;
• Allow for a particular DM to have misperceptions about itself;
• Handle both transitive and intransitive preference relationships;
• Clearly define for 2-DM and n-DM cases hypergame models at any level of DMs’
perception, for which the number of DM n > 2;
• Precisely explain and define how to carry out stability analyses for any level of hy-
pergame in graph form;
• Precisely show how to calculate the overall hypergame equilibria;
• Develop a procedure to classify overall hypergame equilibria into eight classes based
on the types of misperception; and
• Apply the new modeling and analysis technique of the hypergame in graph form to
three actual case studies.
1.3 Organization of the Thesis
This dissertation is divided into eight chapters, as shown in Figure 1.1. The first chapter
describes the motivation and objectives of this thesis. The paradigm of GMCR methodol-
ogy is summarized in the first part of Chapter 2, while in the second part the concept of
perception, as well as games with incomplete information, are discussed. The key original
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Figure 1.1: Outline of the Thesis
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Chapter 3 puts forward a new modeling and analysis technique for a first-level hy-
pergame in a dispute having two or more DMs within the framework of GMCR. This
comprehensive approach consists of individual games, each of which represents a single
DM’s viewpoint of a conflict situation, thereby, enabling DMs to see the dispute based on
their own perceptions. The chapter also includes the development of the universal sets of
options and states for a first-level hypergame. Additionally, a stability analysis method is
designed and implemented to calculate the equilibria for a first-level hypergame in graph
form. Moreover, a classification of the first-level hypergame equilibria is developed to gen-
erate better strategic insights about the first-level hypergame situation under investigation.
This foundational methodology facilitates the development of a second-level hypergame in
graph form as well as the h-level hypergame, h > 1, in graph form presented in Chapters 5
and 6, respectively. Chapter 3 is based on three published papers by Aljefri et al. (2014a,
2015, 2017a)
Chapter 4 provides two case studies about the first-level hypergame in graph form.
The first case study is about the 2011 conflict between North and South Sudan over South
Sudanese oil exports; and the second one is about the 1956 Suez Canal nationalization
dispute between Egypt and Britain/ US partnership. The chapter is based on the work
published by Aljefri et al. (2013, 2014b, 2016a).
Chapter 5 designs a fresh concept of a second-level hypergame with two or more DMs
within the GMCR model. A second-level hypergame is a decision-making situation in which
each DM is playing a di↵erent game and at least one DM think that he or she possesses
knowledge of the misperceptions of the other DMs. This advancement extends GMCR’s
usefulness by allowing it to examine not only conflicts with complete information, but
also those with misperceptions. This novel technique investigates the misunderstanding
of a DM about itself, its adversaries, and its competitors as contemplated by the DM. To
achieve this, the sets of options and states for a first-level hypergame are extended to the
universal sets of options and states for a second-level hypergame. Consequently, not only
the real options and states for the dispute are included but also the misperceived ones that
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are thought to exist by the participating DMs. Furthermore, stability analysis procedures
are introduced to analyze each DM’s game or hypergame as well as the overall second-level
hypergame. Moreover, a framework to classify the second-level hypergame equilibria is
proposed to help an analyst to understand the source of misperceptions that exist in the
dispute, the possible reactions of the DMs after they become aware of their misperceptions,
and the possible ways for the DMs to successfully execute a strategic surprise. This research
is largely based on the work developed by Aljefri et al. (2016b, 2017b).
In Chapter 6, a methodology is developed to capture DMs’ various kinds of misper-
ceptions in a conflict setting within the framework of GMCR. This technique models and
analyzes DMs’ di↵erent levels of perception in a real-life situation. It also handles a DM’s
misperception about itself as well as misperception about its opponents. A hypergame in
graph form is a framework that consists of subjective hypergames, each of which illustrates
a given player’s viewpoint of the hypergame situation under investigation. Each DM’s sub-
jective hypergame is constructed in a hierarchical fashion to depict its understanding of the
conflict situation and its opponents’ perceptions of the situation as contemplated by that
particular DM. The universal sets of options and states for the hypergame, which include
all possible perceptual options and states for the conflict, are used to construct each DM’s
subjective hypergame. To gain strategic insights from the overall hypergame analysis, the
overall hypergame equilibria are classified based on the types of misperceptions and the
awareness of DMs with respect to eight classes of resolutions.
In Chapter 7, hydropolitical conflicts between the Eastern Nile countries over the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) are systematically analyzed at three points in time:
just before the announcement of construction by Ethiopia on April 11, 2011, and before
the negotiations in early January 2014 and late August 2014, respectively. Hypergame
theory within the framework of GMCR is used to gain strategic insights into these conflicts
and to ascertain the possible resolutions of the disputes. In all of these disputes, the
key decision makers are Egypt and Sudan, the downstream countries, and Ethiopia, the
upstream nation. The analyses demonstrate the significant utilization of strategic surprise,
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a decisive act in which a decision maker intentionally exercises a course of action in the
dispute that is hidden to its opponents to achieve a firm outcome, in a conflict setting.
The conflict investigations also show that the geopolitical and economic changes in Egypt,
Sudan, and Ethiopia allow Ethiopia to construct the dam without any harsh confrontation
with Egypt and Sudan. Chapter 7 is partially based on the published extended abstract
by Aljefri et al. (2016c). Finally, in Chapter 8, a summary of contributions and future




Conflict arises in almost every field of study in which people interact because individuals
have di↵erent goals or value systems to satisfy when some issue occurs. Regardless of the
type of dispute, it often can be described as a game by using game theoretical methods,
such as metagame analysis (Howard, 1971), conflict analysis (Fraser and Hipel, 1984),
and the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) (Kilgour et al., 1987; Fang et al.,
1993; Kilgour and Hipel, 2005; Hipel, 2009a,b; Kilgour and Eden, 2010). These techniques
can be used to calculate the possible equilibria or resolutions of the real-world conflict
and provide valuable strategic insights. These methods are considered to be qualitative
because each DM’s preference between any two states is expressed in a relative fashion
by pairwise comparisons (Fraser and Hipel, 1984; Fang et al., 1993; Hipel, 2009a,b). In
contrast, classical game theory is interpreted as being quantitative because it uses a cardinal
utility function to capture each DM’s preferences among the set of possible states (Nash,
1950, 1951; Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). For a summary of the aforementioned
methodologies, the reader is referred to the work detailed by Kilgour and Eden (2010) and
Hipel (2009a,b). Due to GMCR’s simplicity and flexibility, it is widely used to model and
analyze a large range of real-life conflicts. However, it models and investigates disputes
only under the assumption of complete knowledge and common perception among the
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engaging DMs. Since the objective of this research is to incorporate misperception into
GMCR, the structure of GMCR is presented next.
2.1 The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution
GMCR is a tool for systematically analyzing real-life disputes (Kilgour et al., 1987; Fang
et al., 1993; Kilgour and Hipel, 2005). In GMCR, the possible compromise resolutions for
the conflict are ascertained by examining the participating DMs’ moves and counter-moves
according to a range of solution concepts (also called stability definitions). The overall
architecture of GMCR is shown in Figure 2.1, and described below (Kilgour et al., 1987;
Fang et al., 1993; Kilgour and Hipel, 2005).
2.1.1 Procedures
As can be seen in Figure 2.1, GMCR consists of two modules: modeling and analysis. The
modeling of a conflict starts by identifying all DMs, their options (also called courses of
action), and their preference information. Next, a set of feasible states for the model is
constructed. Finally, each DM’s state transitions and its relative preference over the set
of feasible states are identified. In the analysis module, the stability of each state for each
DM is determined by using range of solution concepts. State that is stable for all DMs
according to a particular solution concept constitutes a possible equilibrium for the dispute.
Then a sensitivity analysis is performed to verify the robustness of the equilibria of the
model. Computerized decision support systems called GMCR II (Fang et al., 2003a,b) or
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Figure 2.1: Architecture of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution
2.1.2 Notation and Definition
The main elements of GMCR are a set of decision makers (DMs), a set of states that
depict the possible scenarios of a real-life dispute, each DM’s possible moves among the
states, and each DM’s relative preferences over the states. A directed graph is constructed
to depict a DM’s allowable state-to-state movement. The states represent the nodes in
all DMs’ directed graphs, and the arc represents the DMs’ possible movements. In graph
form, DMs’ preferences over the set of states are given by a binary relation.
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Let N = {1, 2, ..., i, ..., n} be a non-empty, finite set that denotes the set of DMs. S
is the set of states for a dispute, that denote all possible scenarios of a real life conflict
and are represented by the vertices in a directed graph. Ai signifies DM i’s allowable
state transitions from one state to another in one step, which are represented by arcs in
a directed graph. Lastly, the script %i expresses DM i’s weak preference relations over
the set of possible states, where s1 %i s2 means that state s1 is more preferred or equally
preferred to state s2 by DM i. s1  i s2 indicates that s1 is more preferred to s2 by DM i,
and s1 ⇠i s2 means that s1 is equally preferred to s2 by DM i. With the notation given
above, the graph model G, which represent a real-life conflict under the assumption of
shared perception among DMs, can be expressed as
G = hN,S, {Ai : i 2 N}, {%i: i 2 N}i (2.1)
As indicted in Eq. 2.1, a basic unit of a graph model is a state. A convenient way
to define a state is to utilize the concept of an option (Howard, 1971), which is the way
a state is defined in option form representation of a conflict (Kilgour et al., 1987). More
specifically, in a given conflict, each DM has under its control a set of one or more di↵erent
options, each of which can be selected or not by the DM. When a particular DM decides
upon which options to choose or not, the resulting choice is called a strategy for the DM.
When all of the DMs participating in the conflict have selected a strategy, the result is
referred to as a state. The definition of a state using option form is given as follows.
For each DM i 2 N , the set Oi = {oik̄ : k̄ = 1, 2, ...,mi} is DM i’s set of options, in which
oi
k̄
is DM i’s k̄th option and mi represents the total number of options for DM i. Mathemat-
ically, a strategy for DM i can be represented by a mapping function gi : Oi  ! {0, 1},









Furthermore, let O = [i2NOi denote the set of options for all DMs. A state is mapping







1, if DM i selects option oi
k̄
, for i = 1, 2, ..., n,
0, otherwise
A state is represented by a  -dimensional column vector, where   is the total number of










T . Since each option can either be selected or not
by the DM who controls it, total number of states for a dispute can be mathematically
calculated by 2 . The set of mathematically possible states is denoted and expressed as
S = {s1, s2, ..., s2 }. However, some states are removed from the model because they
are categorized according to four types of option conditions to be infeasible: mutually
exclusive options, at least one option, option dependence, and direct specification (Fang
et al., 2003a,b). Consequently, the remaining states are considered as feasible states for
the dispute. For N = {1, 2, ..., i, ..., n}, DMs’ strategies associated with state s1 2 S are






n . Thus, s1 = ((g
s1
1 )
T , (gs12 )
T , ..., (gs1i )
T , ..., (gs1n )
T )T .
The definition in Eq. 2.1 specifies the conflict model under complete information. Hence,
stakeholders are entirely aware of each other’s options and preferences. That is, the zero-
level hypergame, H0, (Bennett, 1977, 1980; Takahashi et al., 1984; Hipel et al., 1988; Wang
et al., 1988, 1989; Aljefri et al., 2017a,b) in graph form, which describes the game under
complete information, can be represented by Eq. 2.1.
2.1.3 Stability Definitions
A range of solution concepts are defined within the paradigm of GMCR to predict the
possible compromise resolution for the dispute. These stability definitions answer what-if
questions in term of what can happen when DMs strategically interact using moves and
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counter-moves. The four solution concepts that evaluate the stability of a state for each DM
are Nash stability (Nash, 1950, 1951), sequential stability (SEQ) (Fraser and Hipel, 1979,
1984), general metarationality (GMR) (Howard, 1971), and symmetric metarationality
(SMR) (Howard, 1971). To perform a stability analysis for an n-DM graph model, the
concepts of reachable list and unilateral improvement by a group of DMs must be defined
first.
Let H ✓ N , H 6= ;, be any subset of DMs in N . For s1 2 S and q 2 N , let Rq(s1)
represents the set of DM q’s unilateral moves (UMs) starting from s1. Let RH(s1) denote
the set of all UMs from s1 by one or more DMs in H through a valid sequence of moves
starting from s1. A sequence of moves by DMs in H is considered valid if no DM makes
two consecutive moves. For s2 2 RH(s1), let ⌦H(s1, s2) denote the set of all last DMs in
H in the valid sequences of moves from s1 to s2. The reachable list by H ✓ N can now be
formalized as follows.
Definition 2.1.3.1 (Reachable List by H ✓ N). Let s1 2 S. Then, RH(s1) can be
defined as follows:
• If q 2 H and s2 2 Rq(s1), then s2 2 RH(s1) and q 2 ⌦H(s1, s2);
• If s2 2 RH(s1), q 2 H, and s3 2 Rq(s2), then
(a) if |⌦H(s1, s2)|= 1 and q /2 ⌦H(s1, s2), then s3 2 RH(s1) and q 2 ⌦H(s1, s3).
(b) if |⌦H(s1, s2)|> 1, then s3 2 RH(s1) and q 2 ⌦H(s1, s3).
The induction stops when there is no new state s3 that can be added to RH(s1) and
no change from | ⌦H(s1, s2) |= 1 to | ⌦H(s1, s2) |> 1 for any s2 2 RH(s1). Any
state in RH(s1) is a UM from s1 by H.
A state is considered as a unilateral improvement (UI) from a prespecified state by a
particular DM if the state is reachable by the DM and is preferred to the initial state. The
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set of all UIs from a state s1 by DM q is referred to as the unilateral improvement list
(UIL) from s1 by DM q, denoted by R+q (s1). Let R
+
H(s1) denote the set of UIs from s1 by
a group of DMs, H ✓ N and H 6= ;. Also, let ⌦+H(s1, s2) represent the set of all last DMs
in valid sequences of unilateral improvements from s1 to s2. R
+
H(s1) is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1.3.2 (Unilateral Improvement List by H ✓ N). Let s1 2 S. The UIL
R+H(s1) is constructed inductively as follows:
• If q 2 H and s2 2 R+q (s1), then s2 2 R+H(s1) and q 2 ⌦+H(s1, s2);
• If s2 2 R+H(s1), q 2 H, and s3 2 R+q (s2), then
(a) if | ⌦+H(s1, s2) |= 1 and q /2 ⌦+H(s1, s2), then s3 2 R+H(s1) and q 2 ⌦+H(s1, s3),
(b) if | ⌦+H(s1, s2) |> 1, then s3 2 R+H(s1) and q 2 ⌦+H(s1, s3).
The induction stops when there is no new state s3 that can be added to R
+
H(s1) and
no change from | ⌦+H(s1, s2) |= 1 to | ⌦+H(s1, s2) |> 1 for any s2 2 R+H(s1). Any
state in R+H(s1) is a UI from s1 by a group of DMs H.
Now that the concepts of reachable list and UIL by a set of DMs H ✓ N have been
introduced, one can formally define stability concepts in G with more than two DMs. The
stability definitions put forward here are Nash stability, SEQ stability, GMR stability, and
SMR stability.
Definition 2.1.3.3 (Nash Stability). A state s1 2 S is Nash stable (Nash) for DM q
2 N in G () R+q (s1) = ;. The set of all Nash stable states for DM q in G is denoted by
SNashq .
Definition 2.1.3.4 (SEQ Stability). A state s1 2 S is sequentially stable (SEQ) for
DM q 2 N in G () for each s2 2 R+q (s1), 9 s3 2 R+N {q}(s2) such that s3 -q s1. The set
of all SEQ stable states for DM q in G is denoted by SSEQq .
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Definition 2.1.3.5 (GMR Stability). A state s1 2 S is general metarational stable
(GMR) for DM q 2 N in G () for each s2 2 R+q (s1), 9 s3 2 RN {q}(s2) such that
s3 -q s1. The set of all GMR stable states for DM q in G is denoted by SGMRq .
Definition 2.1.3.6 (SMR Stability). A state s1 2 S is symmetric metarational stable
(SMR) for DM q 2 N in G () for each s2 2 R+q (s1), 9 s3 2 RN {q}(s2) such that
s3 -q s1, and s4 -q s1, 8 s4 2 Rq(s3). The set of all SMR stable states for DM q in G is
denoted by SSMRq .
Having defined the aforementioned stabilities, one can now define the equilibria for the
conflict. A state is considered as an equilibrium under a specific stability definition i↵ it is
stable for every DM under the same stability notion. Formally,
Definition 2.1.3.7 (Equilibrium). A state s1 2 S that is stable for every DM according
to a particular solution concept is an equilibrium for the game under that particular solution
concept. The set of all equilibrium states in G is denoted by E.
2.2 Perception and Conflict Analysis
Perception is the process of transforming real-life reality into a self-centered context (Rum-
mel, 1975; Passer et al., 2011). People’s perception of reality is formed based on their
particular beliefs, motivations, interests, experiences, and knowledge, among other factors.
Accordingly, di↵erent people sometimes have inconsistent understandings about a particu-
lar situation. People’s experience of reality does not operate as a one-to-one correspondence
with what occurs in the real world; instead, di↵erent perceptions are obtained by di↵erent
people (Jervis, 1968, 1976; Passer et al., 2011). People’s inner thought processes act as a
filter that determine which aspect of a real-life situation is observed. Based on the ideas
presented by Jervis (1968, 1976) and Passer et al. (2011), Figure 2.2 shows the system of
perception.
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When DMs have complete information about a conflict situation, the dispute is modeled
and analyzed as one game. However, under misperception, the modeling and analysis
of a real-life dispute become more challenging (Jervis, 1968, 1976; Passer et al., 2011).
More specifically, under misperception, DMs have di↵erent views of the conflict situation
and may not be fully aware of each other’s options, or courses of action, and preferences
(Bennett, 1977; Bennett and Dando, 1979; Wang et al., 1988, 1989). Therefore, the dispute
is modeled as a collection of games, each of which depicts a focal DM’s viewpoint of the
circumstances. A hypergame approach is designed to examine conflicts that have some
kind of misperception by one or more DMs (Bennett, 1977, 1980; Takahashi et al., 1984;
Hipel et al., 1988; Wang et al., 1988, 1989). This methodology allows one to predict the

















Figure 2.2: Perception System (Jervis, 1968, 1976; Passer et al., 2011)
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In this thesis, a perceptual-based approach is utilized rather than a knowledge-founded
method to model DMs’ di↵erent understandings and interpretations of a particular situ-
ation. The reasons behind selecting the perceptual-based procedure to incorporate mis-
perception into GMCR are as follows. First, the word perception is based on the idea of
interpretation and understanding, whereas the word knowledge is founded on information,
or experience one can obtain through education or training. Second, based on the top-down
approach to the concept of perception that is presented by Passer et al. (2011) and shown
in Figure 2.2, one can see that DMs’ internal factors, such as knowledge and culture, alter
their interpretation of a real-life situation which may lead to an incorrect or incomplete
understanding of the circumstance under investigation. Third, in classical game theory,
knowledge is regarded as the information available to DMs about a particular situation.
Finally, the literature on hypergame theory starting from the work of Bennett (1977) all
the way to the improved hypergame analysis developed by Wang et al. (1988, 1989), the
terminologies of perception and misperception are used to label DMs’ di↵erent viewpoints
about a real-life situation. The study of misperception in conflict analysis is reviewed in
the next section.
2.2.1 Misperception in Conflict
Classical game theory provides a set of methods for modeling and analyzing conflicts. The
notion of the theory goes back to Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), and has been
widely utilized to examine disputes in many fields of study such as economics, environ-
mental management, energy, military science, and information security. Although game
theory has been demonstrated to be a useful methodology for analyzing a range of con-
flict situations, there are nevertheless limitations to the approach, thereby restricting its
application in modeling real-life situations. The assumption of complete information (i.e.,
that participants have full knowledge about the situation they are facing) has been shown
to be a shortcoming by many scholars, who have pointed out the need for incorporating
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incomplete information into the game theory framework (Von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944; Bennett, 1977, 1980; Takahashi et al., 1984; Hipel et al., 1988; Wang et al., 1988,
1989; Luce and Rai↵a, 1957; Harsanyi, 1967, 1968a,b; Brams, 1977; Aumann and Maschler,
1995; Inohara et al., 1997; Obeidi et al., 2005, 2009; Sasaki and Kijima, 2008; Gharesifard
and Cortes, 2011, 2012; Sasaki et al., 2015; Walker et al., 2013; Rêgo and dos Santos,
2015; Kuang et al., 2015). If the participants’ preferences and other parameters of the
game are represented by numerical payo↵ functions, then the game is modeled quantita-
tively. A significant amount of research has been conducted in this area. For example, the
work of Harsanyi (1967, 1968a,b) formulated a Bayesian approach to handle incomplete
information within the structure of game theory. Under the assumption of cardinal utility
values and uncertain parameters modeled by probability distributions, DMs are assumed
to take actions that maximize their payo↵s. Drawbacks of Harsanyi’s approach include
high mathematical complexity and the assumption of having cardinal utility values which
may be di cult to obtain in practice.
On the other hand, if the game is constructed according to the set of DMs, set of options
for each DM, and each DM’s relative preferences among the set of possible outcomes, then
the game is analyzed qualitatively. In the direction of qualitative analysis and incomplete
information, Brams (1977) and Stein (1982) developed methods that account for the role of
deception and misperception for 2-DM strictly ordinal games. In their work, the possible
circumstances for deception and preference misperception are introduced into the game in
normal form. For instance, under asymmetry of information, the deceiver is assumed to
have more information than its opponent and is trying to utilize this gap to achieve better
results. However, under misperception, the real-life situation is misunderstood by each
DM, leading them to face unexpected results. The work of Brams (1977) and Stein (1982)
provides the primary foundation for the development of hypergame analysis.
Although quantitative analysis is widely used in modeling real-life disputes, its appli-
cation has been found to be limited as it requires a large amount of numerical information
regarding the game parameters which is not easy to find in real-life circumstances. Thus,
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this research is in the direction of qualitative analysis, and particularly focuses on im-
proving the hypergame modeling and analysis procedures. In the next section, hypergame
analysis is discussed.
2.2.2 Hypergames
Since GMCR is based on a qualitative analysis, it is appropriate to look at the hypergame
which is also based on the qualitative analysis. A hypergame is a comprehensive procedure
that investigates di↵ering perception (correct, incorrect, or incomplete) in conflict. It is
constructed in a hierarchical fashion to account for di↵erent levels of DMs’ perception
about the real-life situation. This methodology permits one to evaluate the consequences
of a DM’s misperception in a real-life situation. It also provides solutions for a complex
decision situation that may include ambiguity (Song et al., 2009), lack of information,
and asymmetry of perception among DMs. A hypergame can be used as a mediation,
negotiation, or consulting tool. Furthermore, when a given DM is not sure of its opponents’
true preferences and options under their control in the conflict, then a hypergame can
be used to represent the conflict situation as seen by the focal DM (Rosenhead, 1989;
Rosenhead and Mingers, 2001).
The notion of a hypergame was first proposed by Bennett (1977), using the normal
form of the game, which was applied by Bennett and Dando (1979) to the Battle of France
in 1940. Bennett (1980) extended his theory of hypergames in normal form to account for
levels of misperception. However, this early research in hypergames represented in normal
form only considered Nash stability as used by Howard (1971) in metagame analysis.
Additionally, although a given DM could have misperceptions about himself or herself, this
aspect of misperception was not pursued in detail and hence the focus was on misperception
by opponents.
Takahashi et al. (1984) incorporated the conflict analysis of Fraser and Hipel (1984,
1979) into the paradigm of a hypergame to study and analyze strategic conflict and predict
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the possible compromise resolutions for any type of hypergame. Each DM’s subjective
game in a hypergame is represented in option form (Howard, 1971) and DMs’ preferences
among the set of possible scenarios are expressed by an ordinal ranking. Takahashi et al.
(1984) approach has been utilized to model many real-life conflicts, such as the Normandy
invasion of 1945, the US-USSR nuclear confrontation (Fraser et al., 1983), and the Lake
Biwa conflicts (Okada et al., 1985). In addition, Hipel et al. (1988) and Wang et al.
(1988, 1989) provide mathematical definitions for both the modeling and the analysis
procedures for hypergame analysis, thereby extending its applicability in investigating
real-life disputes. Also, various levels of a hypergame are constructed in a hierarchical
order to represent DMs’ order of expectation. For instance, if the participants are assumed
to be playing the same game and aware of each other’s options, strategies, and preferences,
then the game is a simple game or a zero-level hypergame, denoted as H0. If, on the
other hand, some DMs misperceive the real-life situation, then a set of subjective games
is constructed to represent each DM’s viewpoint of the conflict situation. In this case, the
game is called a first-level hypergame, denoted H1. Moreover, if at least one DM is aware
of its opponents’ subjective games, then it will consider them in analyzing the dispute,
and the game is a second-level hypergame, denoted H2. In other words, a given DM is
aware of its opponent’s misperception. Furthermore, if at least one DM is aware of other
DMs’ second-level hypergames, then the game is a third-level hypergame, indicated as
H3. In fact, based on a DM’s perception, the level of hypergame can be extended to any
level of expectation. Moreover, a range of solution concepts (Nash, 1950, 1951; Howard,
1971; Fraser and Hipel, 1984) was introduced into hypergame analysis. DMs’ preferences
among the set of possible states are represented in an ordinal fashion. Additionally, the
hypergame approach of Hipel et al. (1988) and Wang et al. (1988, 1989) can be utilized
to model any finite number of DMs and options, and can be modeled in both normal
and option forms. In their mathematical theory of hypergames, Wang et al. (1988, 1989)
recognized that a DM could have misperceptions about himself or herself but decided not
to take this into account in the development of their theory. Therefore, it only models a
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given DM’s misperception about its opponents. For instance, a DM can misperceive other
DMs’ preferences, options, and strategies. Under option misperception developed by Hipel
et al. (1988) and Wang et al. (1988, 1989), a DM can imagine some potential and/or unreal
options for its opponents, misunderstand some of its opponents’ options, and be unaware
of one or more courses of action available to its opponents.
Although this improved hypergame analysis is found to be useful in modeling real-life
disputes, it nevertheless has some shortcomings that may limit its applicability. For in-
stance, in a hypergame, each DM’s subjective game is modeled independently and, as a
result, the states in each subjective game are defined separately. Therefore, one cannot
distinguish between the states that are correctly perceived or misperceived among all DMs
and those that are perceived individually. This in turn places limitations on the analysis
of the model. Also, the modeling of a hypergame is only provided for ordinal preferences,
which means that transitive preferences are assumed. Moreover, as just mentioned, al-
though the hypergame procedure of Wang et al. (1988, 1989) as well as the normal form
definition of hypergames provided by Bennett (1977, 1980) could have been appropriately
expanded mathematically to handle in detail self-misperceptions, this was not the case.
Therefore, the mathematical theory of hypergames can be appropriately extended to more
explicitly account for self-misperception. In other words, the types of misperceptions that
a DM can have about itself and the method used for mathematically defining them were
not fully addressed in their work. Also, situations like common moves and irreversible
moves cannot be modeled and graphically represented within their hypergame approach.
Furthermore, hypergame analysis was not formally defined within the paradigm of GMCR,
which can formally model disputes and graphically represent all DMs’ possible moves and
counter-moves among the set of possible states.
The classification of hypergame equilibria by Wang et al. (1988, 1989) is limited in
scope. In particular, they classified the hypergame equilibria into two broad categories:
hypergame preserving and destroying equilibria. These two equilibrium classes cannot
specify explicitly the types of misperceptions that a↵ect the hypergame. Also, they can-
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not di↵erentiate between the equilibrium states that constitute strategic surprise and the
other di↵erent equilibrium classes. Moreover, they do not take into account a DM’s self-
misperception as stated by them. Also, Sasaki and Kijima (2008) developed the concept
of a stable hyper Nash equilibrium within the framework of Wang et al. (1988, 1989). This
definition is limited to the Nash solution concept and to preference misperception.
More recently, Obeidi et al. (2005, 2009) put forward a method, within the paradigm
of GMCR, to study and analyze the e↵ect of DMs’ emotions on strategic conflicts. The
primary components of this technique were derived from the standard GMCR framework.
Based on a particular DM’s emotion, a set of feasible states in the standard GMCR ap-
proach, which models a real-life dispute under the assumption of complete information,
is partitioned into the following three groups: (1) hidden states, (2) potential states, and
(3) recognizable states. Hidden states cannot be observed because of the DM’s negative
emotion, and a DM cannot recognize potential states because of the absence of positive
emotion. Lastly, if a state is not categorized as either hidden or potential, then the DM is
aware of it. Because DMs do not share the same emotions, a system of integrated graph
models is introduced to represent each DM’s perception of the conflict situation. Although
the sets of a DM’s state transitions and relative preferences in the standard GMCR struc-
ture are considered to be preserved, discrepancies in recognizing the set of feasible states
in the standard GMCR model alter the sets of state transitions and relative preferences
perceived by the DM. Perceptual stability analysis is then used to calculate the possible
compromise resolutions for the dispute.
Although the applicability of the perceptual graph method of Obeidi et al. (2005, 2009)
has been tested in real-life case studies, certain limitations are associated with it and need
to be addressed. For instance, this method investigates misperception caused by DMs’
emotions starting at the level of a state rather than the option level. As a result, various
types of option misperceptions cannot be modeled within its current structure. Since DMs’
subjective games are mapped from the standard GMCR structure, only misperception of
unknown real options can be accommodated within this paradigm. Also, this method
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classifies the standard GMCR’s set of feasible states into three categories: hidden, potential,
and recognized states. However, it does not provide any criteria for classifying them
mathematically. Moreover, this approach assumes that a DM’s sets of state transitions
and relative preferences are altered only when the DM misperceives the set of feasible
states of the standard GMCR. In real-life disputes, however, it is possible for a DM to
perceive the standard GMCR set of feasible states correctly but still misperceive another
DM’s relative preferences.
In summary, all the reviewed papers studied and analyzed hypergame analysis under
either a game theory framework or an improved conflict analysis. Either cardinal utility
function or ordinal ranking (which restricts the hypergame approach to transitive prefer-
ences) was used to represent DMs’ preferences among the set of possible states. A DM’s
misperception about itself was never addressed in the reviewed literature. Finally, hyper-
game analysis was not incorporated into the structure of GMCR.
There is a stream of publications in the literature that looked at the study of learning
within the context of hypergame theory to understand how DMs’ can update their percep-
tion after they become aware of the true situation. For instance, Sasaki et al. (2007), Sasaki
and Kijima (2008), and Sasaki et al. (2015) introduced a new solution concept, called a
stable hyper Nash equilibrium, within the paradigm of hypergame theory. The objective
of the new definition is to study the e↵ect of hypergame equilibria on DMs’ perceptions.
If a state is classified as a stable hyper Nash equilibrium for the dispute, then DMs’ mis-
perception are preserved and the equilibrium state is considered as a final resolution for
the conflict. However, if a state is not classified as a stable hyper Nash equilibrium for
the conflict, then new information may be accessible to DMs which may motivate them to
escalate the situation if they can. Drawbacks of Sasaki et al. (2007), Sasaki and Kijima
(2008), and Sasaki et al. (2015) approach include the following. This approach is limited
to preference misperceptions (i.e other sources of misperception is not addressed). Addi-
tionally, the approach did not provide any mathematical procedure that enable DMs to
update their perception about their opponents’ preferences. Finally, this method is limited
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to Nash equilibria (i.e. other solution concepts are not taking into account). Furthermore,
Gharesifard and Cortes (2011, 2012) presented a new definition of learning under perfect
observation within the structure of a first-level hypergame developed by Wang et al. (1988,
1989). The new concept, designated as swap learning, allows DMs to improve their per-
ceptions about their opponents’ preferences after they realize that their perceptions about
their opponents are incorrect. Subsequently, Gharesifard and Cortes (2014) utilized the
notion of swap learning to model deceptive situations within a second-level hypergame of
Wang et al. (1988, 1989). Within their technique, if at least one DM is aware of the in-
consistency of beliefs among DMs, then the DM may take advantage of this discrepancy of
information and try to deceive its opponents by revealing erroneous information to them.
This approach is limited to preference misperceptions and to the Nash solution concept.
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Chapter 3
First-Level Hypergame in Graph
Form
Conflicts can vary from gentle di↵erences of opinion of the decision makers (DMs) to violent
confrontations (Fraser and Hipel, 1984; Fang et al., 1993; Hipel, 2009a,b). Conflicts arise
when DMs hold dissimilar goals about the situation under investigation. These incompat-
ible goals of the DMs may quickly change from being conflicts of interest to rigid hostile
actions as a consequence of the (correct or incorrect) perception of the circumstances by
the di↵erent DMs. Situations in which the DMs, also known as players, have a common
understanding, can be modeled and analyzed as a single game using the framework of
GMCR (Fang et al., 1993; Kilgour et al., 1987). This methodology, which is described
in Section 2.1, investigates the possible moves and counter-moves of DMs by employing
a collection of solution concepts, also called stability definitions, which replicate the ways
in which humans may interact in a conflict situation (Nash, 1950, 1951; Howard, 1971;
Fraser and Hipel, 1979, 1984). However, in certain real-world conflicts, the involved DMs
may not have a common understanding about the actual situation. This may be due to
incomplete information, the experience gained and lessons learned by a DM that alter his
or her perception, which may contain misunderstandings. Thus, a conflict situation can be
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captured via a number of subjective games, each of which depicts the perception of a given
DM about the real-life conflict. The framework of a first-level hypergame investigates a
conflict situation having misperception among DMs in which no one is aware of the other
DMs’ misperceptions.
In this chapter, a first-level hypergame for the case of two- and n-DM (n > 2) conflicts is
introduced for the first time within the structure of GMCR. The new modeling and analysis
approach for a first-level hypergame in graph form permits one to model for the first time
self misperception. The procedures also explores the common sources of misperception that
may occur in real-life conflicts. It also handles both transitive and intransitive preference
relationships. Additionally, refined stability definitions are introduced and implemented
to calculate the equilibria for a first-level hypergame. Also, a classification of the first-
level hypergame equilibria is presented to capture the source of misperception that causes
the dispute as well as the way DMs are expected to behave after they become aware of
their misperception in reality. This chapter is based on three publications by Aljefri et al.
(2014a, 2015, 2017a)
3.1 Decision Makers’ Levels of Perception in
Hypergames
A game with complete information in graph form is viewed as a face-to-face confrontation.
More specifically, the DMs engaging in the dispute are found to be playing the same
game; the DMs see the same sets of DMs, states, preferences, and state transitions. As a
consequence, the equilibria of the game are anticipated by every DM in the dispute.
Unlike a game with complete knowledge and perception among DMs, when mispercep-
tions or hypergames exist players are not viewing the same conflict situation. Rather, they
perceive di↵erent games, each of which reflects a player’s viewpoint of the situation under
investigation. A hypergame in graph form is designed to construct a conflict situation
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under di↵erent levels of DMs’ perceptions. Figure 3.1 depicts the relationship between a
real-life situation and the perceived conflict up to a third level of perceptions for a 3-DM
hypergame.
Starting from the far left of Figure 3.1, G depicts a zero-level hypergame H0. G is
identical to the graph model defined in Section 2.1 as it expresses a conflict situation
under complete information. As a result, DMs have no misperception about the conflict
situation. Hence, a conflict’s parameters such as the preference relations %i, 8 i 2 N , are
correctly comprehended by all DMs engaging in the dispute. %i denotes DM i’s preference
relations over the set of states. The subscript, i, in %i indicates the ownership of the
set, which as mentioned earlier represents DM i’s set of preferences in G. With only one
subscript, the level of DMs’ perception is equals to zero.
As can be seen in Figure 3.1, the design of a first-level hypergame H1 starts by construct-
ing each player’s subjective game, each DM’s subjective game is a zero-level hypergame.
As a result of the asymmetry of viewpoints among DMs, each subjective game describes a
particular player’s perception of the conflict situation. For instance, DM i’s subject game
Gi reflects the conflict condition as contemplated by itself. That is, DM i perceives all
the information of the dispute, such as the DMs’ preferences in a subjective manner. Let
%ji, 8 j 2 Ni, denote DM j’s preference relations as seen by DM i, where Ni ✓ N denotes
the set of DMs as seen by DM i. There are two subscripts in %ji. The first indicates the
ownership of the set; the second depicts the DM who perceives the set. Hence, in H1,
the level of perception equals 1. Within H1, DMs are not aware of any misperception
happening and they assume that their games are the actual ones.
In a second-level hypergame H2, at least one or more DMs know that they are playing
di↵erent subjective games. DM i, for example, will try to predict not only its opponents’
parameters in its subjective game Gi but also try to predict how its opponents view of
the conflict parameters. For example, in DM j’s game as seen by DM i, Gji, let %kji,
8k 2 Nji, j 2 Ni, reflect how DM i sees DM j’s view about DM k’s preference relations,































































































































































































The subscript “kji” in %kji has two parts: the first subscript, k, represents the ownership
of the set; the other subscripts, ji, accounts for the order of DMs’ perception. In H2 the
level of perception equals two. In fact, the level of a hypergame can be increased to any
h-levels of DMs’ perception. For N = {1, 2, ..., i, ..., n}, DM i’s hth-level of perception can
be described as follows:
Definition 3.1.0.1 (DM i’s hth-level of Perception). DM i’s hth-level of perception in
an n-DM hypergame is expressed as what DM i sees DM j’s (h   1) level of perception of
DM k’s (h   2) level of perception... of DM q’s understanding of the conflict situation to
be. Let %q...kji stand for DM i’s hth-level of perception of DM q’s preferences. The string
q...kji contains (h+1) items and the level of perception is h.
The five types of misperceptions that can be taken into account utilizing the hypergame
framework in graph form are:
• Option misperceptions held by and about a player and its adversaries.
• Preference misperceptions held by and about a player and its adversaries.
• A lack of knowledge of the number of players engaging in the dispute.
• Wrong interpretation of the level of players’ perceptions.
• Any collection of the above.
Remark 3.1.0.1. Self misperception is permitted within hypergame theory in graph form.
Hence, it is assumed that %i 6=%ii whenever DM i misconceives its actual capability in a
real-life situation. It is also assumed that a DM will maintain its misperception about itself
at any level of hypergame beyond the first level. Therefore, %ii=%iiii...i. Moreover, it is
assumed that a DM will hold its perception about its adversaries at any level of hypergame.
Hence, %jji=%ji.
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3.1.1 Hypergame Formal Definition in Graph Form
In this subsection, the formal definition of an h-level hypergame Hh for the case of n-DM
conflict in graph form is put forward. Hh represents a conflict condition in which each DM
perceives a di↵erent game, and the greatest level of perception involved in the subjective
games is h   1. For N = {1, 2, ..., i, ..., n}, the formal definition of Hh is furnished as
follows:
Hh = hHh 1i : 8i 2 N, h = 1, 2, 3, ...i (3.1)
where, Hh 1i is DM i’s (h   1)-level hypergame. Further information about the modeling
of the game Hh 1i is provided in Subsection 6.1.3. By utilizing Eq. 3.1, a hypergame model
in graph form can be written at any given level.
3.2 First-Level Hypergame with Two Decision
Makers in Graph Form
In a first-level hypergame, at least one DM has a misperception about the conflict situation,
and neither the DM who misperceives the circumstance nor the other DM is aware of this
misunderstanding. Misperception of preferences by DMs is the basic type of misperception
in a first-level hypergame. In this circumstance, at least one DM misperceives preferences
in the dispute. In this instance, all DMs consider the same set of feasible states in their
subjective game. Hence, under preference misperception, the set of feasible states is not
sensitive to any change (Aljefri et al., 2014a) and the same integrated graph model can be
used among all DMs’ subjective games (Aljefri et al., 2014a). However, misperception of
options by DMs alters the sets of options, states, and preferences that are perceived by each
DM in its subjective game. The overall architecture of a first-level hypergame procedure
with two DMs within GMCR is shown in Figure 3.2. More specifically, the proposed graph
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model for a first-level hypergame analysis consists of three modules: one to generate the
universal set of states for a first-level hypergame, a second to model each DM’s subjective
game, and a third to carry out analyses, as indicted on the left in Figure 3.2.
Starting in the top part of Figure 3.2, the universal set of states for a first-level hyper-
game is a combination of all viable scenarios of DMs’ perceptions in a conflict. States in
a particular conflict circumstance are determined from the universal set of options for a
first-level hypergame. In particular, a given DM’s universal set of options in a first-level
hypergame includes all of the options that are correctly recognized by the DM or mistak-
enly perceived by itself and/or its opponent. The combination of DMs’ universal sets of
options for a first-level hypergame generates the universal set of states for the first-level
hypergame, which can then be used to specify states in each DM’s subjective game. In the
central part of Figure 3.2, the modeling of a DM’s subjective game within the first-level
hypergame structure starts by dividing the universal set of states for a first-level hyper-
game based on a DM’s perception into two disjoint subsets, which are the collection of
states that are (1) hidden to the DM in its subjective game, and (2) recognized by the
DM in its subjective game. Hidden states, on the one hand, describe the states that are
not considered by the DM in its game as they represent the other DM’s perception of
the conflict situation. Recognizable states, on the other hand, represent the states that
are included in the DM’s subjective game as they capture its perception of the conflict
situation. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 3.2, a DM’s set of recognizable states is further
divided into two groups: infeasible states and feasible states. Infeasible states are the col-
lections of states that are removed from the model because they are categorized according
to four types of option conditions to be infeasible: mutually exclusive options, at least one
option, option dependence, and direct specification (Fang et al., 2003a,b). Consequently,
the remaining states are considered as feasible states for the dispute. Within these feasible
states, a DM can cause the conflict to move from one state to another. This process is
called state transition.
As explained earlier in Section 2.1.2, option form (Howard, 1971) is utilized in GMCR
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to encode states in a conflict model. States or possible scenarios for a real-life conflict are
formed when each DM chooses its own strategy. A strategy of a DM, on the other hand, is
a particular selection of options or courses of action from the set of options it controls. If
there is a total of   options across all of the DMs the number of possible states is 2 , since
each option can be selected or not. As   increases, the number of states or the size of the
conflict will become quite large. In practice, analysts or users of GMCR methodology tend
to over-specify a conflict by having too many options. Suppose, for example, a decision
maker has two options it controls. Doing nothing can be represented by both options not
being taken. However, a user may feel more comfortable in having a third option called
“do nothing”. Because this will result in having more infeasible states to remove before
carrying out a stability analysis, exactly the same stability results will be obtained for the
more complicated model as the simple one.
As depicted in the bottom portion of Figure 3.2, the analysis module is further composed
of a standard stability analysis and a first-level hypergame analysis, which is followed by
an informative classification of the first-level hypergame equilibria. The standard stability
analysis is utilized to ascertain the equilibrium states for each DM’s graph model. Then a
first-level hypergame analysis is conducted among all DMs’ games, by taking the Cartesian
product of all DMs’ strategies arising from their equilibrium states within their subjective
games, to ascertain the equilibrium states for a first-level hypergame. Finally, the first-level
hypergame equilibria are further investigated and classified into eight categories to study
the e↵ect of DMs’ misperception on the outcome of the conflict.
The outline of this section is as follows. First, the modeling procedure for the universal
set of options for a first-level hypergame with two DMs in graph form is addressed in
Section 3.2.1. After that, the universal set of states for a first-level hypergame with two
DMs in graph form is constructed in Section 3.2.2. Moreover, the modeling and analysis


















































































Figure 3.2: Architecture of a First-Level Hypergame Approach for Modeling and Analysis
within the Graph Model
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3.2.1 Universal Set of Options in a Two-Decision Maker
First-Level Hypergame
As noted earlier, states in graph form are usually defined using option form (Howard, 1971).
In GMCR, the available options for each DM are specified, and all DMs in the conflict are
aware of them. Under misperception, however, a visualization of the real-life situation is
established based on each DM’s viewpoint (Jervis, 1968, 1976; Wang et al., 1988, 1989).
That is, the set of options for a particular DM may be altered, not only by the DM itself
(Levy, 1983; Betts, 2000; Trivers, 2000; Stoessinger, 2008), but also by its opponent. For
instance, a DM can correctly perceive some of its courses of action but misperceive others.
Similarly, a DM’s opponent can misperceive some of its options while correctly perceiving
others.
To take into account all possible perceptions (correct or incorrect) of options for a DM
in a conflict model, the concept of a universal set of options for a DM in a 2-DM first-level
hypergame is introduced. The universal set of options for a first-level hypergame consists
of the universal sets of options of the participating DMs. An option in the universal set
of options for a DM in a first-level hypergame can be explained using the following ideas:
(1) correctly recognized by itself and possibly recognized by its opponent, (2) misperceived
by the DM itself, and (3) misperceived by the DM’s opponent. In fact, the DMs are not
aware of their misperception, and, as a result, they cannot distinguish between the options
that are correctly perceived and the courses of action that are misperceived. Hence, the
grouping of options is performed by an external expert, who is aware of the asymmetry of
perception among DMs. Since the varied perceptions are defined for a 2-DM graph model,
until otherwise specified, assume that N = {i, j}.
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A Decision Maker’s Set of Options That Are Correctly Recognized by Itself
and Possibly Recognized by Its Opponent
The set of these options represents a particular DM’s correctly perceived options. Some of
these courses of action may also be recognized by the DM’s opponent (Wang et al., 1988,
1989). The sets of these options can be defined formally for a 2-DM model as follows, and
are illustrated in Figure 3.3.
Definition 3.2.1.1 (Set of a DM’s Correctly Perceived Options). Let ORii denote the
set of DM i’s options that are correctly identified by DM i itself. Also, let ORij represent the
set of DM i’s options that are correctly identified by DM i itself and recognized by DM j.
Then, ORi = O
R
ii \ ORij represents the set of DM i’s correctly perceived options that are
recognized by both DMs.
Note that ORij ✓ ORii by definition. Also note that ORii \ ORij is the set of options that are








Figure 3.3: DM i’s Correctly Perceived Options
As can be seen in Figure 3.3, DM i has four correctly perceived options: x1, x2, x3, and
x4. Option x1 is a commonly perceived course of action, and, hence, will be considered
by both DMs i and j. Also, one can see that x2, x3, and x4 are recognized by only DM i
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and will remain under its control. In other words, these options will only be considered by
DM i. DM j does not recognize options x2, x3, and x4 because of many reasons, such as
lack of information or underestimating DM i’s capabilities with regard to exercising these
courses of action (Jervis, 1968, 1976; Wang et al., 1988; Ben-Zvi, 1995).
The Yom Kippur War, also called the Arab-Israeli war, constitutes a good example
for the circumstances mentioned above (Ben-Zvi, 1995). In summary, the Arab coalition
started with a stealth attack on Sinai and the Golan Heights for the purpose of expelling
the Israeli forces who were controlling them. The war ended with the signing of the Camp
David Accord in 1978, according to which Israel agreed to return Sinai to Egypt and part
of the Golan Heights to Syria. In fact, Israel was aware of the Arab coalition’s intention
to launching an attack on Sinai and the Golan Heights, but it chose not to mitigate this
risk because it underestimated its opponents’ capability in regard to launching an attack.
More specifically, Israel did not predict that Egypt would launch an attack on Sinai without
obtaining bombers capable of o↵setting Israeli air capability. Furthermore, because Israel
did not predict an attack by Egypt on Sinai, it also did not expect an attack by Syria
on the Golan Heights. That is, Israel had a mistaken belief and encountered a strategic
surprise in the conflict (Ben-Zvi, 1995).
A Decision Maker’s Set of Options That Are Misperceived by Itself
The DM’s perception of itself is based on a combination of factors, such as emotion, race,
ethnicity and culture, which may ultimately lead to a misperception (Stoessinger, 2008).
Two classes of options can illustrate the DM’s misperception: (a) options that are imagined
by the DM itself and (b) options that are misunderstood by the DM itself. These two groups
are formally defined below, and are illustrated in Figures 3.4 and 3.5, respectively.
Definition 3.2.1.2 (Set of a DM’s Imagined Options). Options that are assumed by a
DM itself because of its misperception, such as overestimating its capabilities (Levy, 1983),
mistaken beliefs (Stoessinger, 2008) or the impression of greatness (Betts, 2000; Trivers,
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Figure 3.4: DM i’s Options that are Imagined by Itself in Comparison with its Correctly
Perceived Options
As can be seen in Figure 3.4, the options in ORii are correctly perceived by DM i and are
under its control. The options included in OIii are the courses of action imagined by DM i,
and, hence, do not have any connection with the options in ORii . Although the options
in OIii are fictitious, DM i, because of its perception, will consider them as being viable
courses of action for itself (Bluth, 2004; Kaufmann, 2004; Pollack, 2004).
The conflict between North and South Vietnam during the time period from 1957 to
1975 can be used as a good illustration for the aforesaid situation. In the war, North
Vietnam was supported by both China and the Soviet Union, whereas South Vietnam
was supported by the US and other anti-communist allies. The US participated in the
war to prevent the communist expansionism led by the Soviet Union. The Vietnamese
conflict was the first major defeat for the US in modern times. The US believed it had an
upper hand in the dispute as its economy was in excellent condition, and it had the most
advanced military technology (Levy, 1983; Tuchman, 1985; Trivers, 2000). The illusion of
superiority caused the US to act aggressively and go to war. However, other options, such
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as economic sanctioning could have been used instead of going to actual war. In this case,
the US’s imagined option was to act aggressively and to go to war against North Vietnam.
Definition 3.2.1.3 (Set of a DM’s Misunderstood Options). Let OR̄i denote the
set of DM i’s options that exist in reality, but are misinterpreted by DM i. Also, let OMii
represent the set of DM i’s options that are misunderstood in meaning by itself. Then, for









Figure 3.5: Options Misinterpreted by DM i
As can be seen in Figure 3.5, OR̄i contains three options: x7, x8, and x13. DM i
misunderstands the meaning of x7 and x8, mistaking them as x9 and x10, respectively.
Hence, x9 and x10 belong to OMii . Also, x13 is interpreted by DM i as ;, which means that
DM i is not aware of the existence of x13. As DM i cannot perceive x7, x8, and x13 as its
options, they will be hidden to it, and, therefore, are not listed in ORii . Moreover, because of
DMs’ varied perceptions, DM j may consider x7, x8, and x13 in its game or misunderstand
their meaning (Jervis, 1968, 1976). Because of DM i’s self-misperception, its set of options
Oi for the standard GMCR defined in Section 2.1.2 is partitioned into two sets, ORii and O
R̄
i .
As a hypothetical example to the situation as mentioned above, consider a possible conflict
between a criminal and a police o cer. Assume that the criminal attacks the o cer and
the o cer acts in self-defense. The o cer, intending to pull out a gun, realizes that the
weapon is not a gun but a baton. In this case, the actual option “baton” is misunderstood
by the o cer as “gun”.
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Remark 3.2.1.1. A misunderstood option is the course of action that is considered by
a DM because of exaggerating the ability and capacity of the option than it really is. In
comparison, an imagined option is the course of action that cannot be exercised in reality
because a DM does not actually possess it. Also, ORii includes DM i’s options that are
correctly perceived by the DM itself. That is, ORii is free from any misperception, and
hence, has no connection with OIii and O
M







and OMii are assumed to be pairwise disjoint sets. Therefore, O
R
ii \ OR̄i = ORii \ OIii =
ORii \ OMii = OR̄i \ OIii = OR̄i \ OMii = OIii \ OMii = ;. These relationships are illustrated in
Figure 3.8.
A Decision Maker’s Set of Options That Are Misperceived by Its Opponent
An option that is not correctly perceived by the DM itself but is considered by its opponent
in its subjective game can either be an imagined or misunderstood course of action as
perceived by the opponent (Jervis, 1968, 1976; Wang et al., 1988, 1989). These two groups
of options are defined below in Definitions 3.2.1.4 and 3.2.1.5, and are illustrated in Figures
3.6 and 3.7.
Definition 3.2.1.4 (Set of a DM’s Options Imagined by its Opponent). DM i’s
options that are imagined by DM j, denoted as OIij, are composed of two types:
• Options in OR̄i that are still considered by DM j as courses of action for DM i, and
• Options for DM i that are completely unknown to itself because it has no idea about
them but they are still assumed by DM j as possible courses of action for DM i.
As can be seen in Figure 3.6, x5, x7, and x11 belong to OIij, and, hence, remain in
DM j’s imagination. DM j considers them as they represent its viewpoint of the actual
circumstances of the conflict. DM j may wrongly assume one or more courses of action











Figure 3.6: DM i’s Options That Are Imagined by DM j in Comparison with DM i’s
Correctly Perceived Options
1983). Also, its experience from other situations may influence it to assume that the
current conflict resembles earlier disputes, when no similarity, in fact, exists. Moreover, by
investigating the information in Figures 3.4 and 3.6, one can see that x5 is considered by
both DMs i and j as an imagined option. In this case, one can conclude that both DMs
share the same misperception. Hence, in this research, it is assumed that the expression
OIii \OIij 6= ; may or may not hold. Also, by comparing the information in Figures 3.5 and
3.6 one can see that DM j captures x7. This option is not recognized by DM i because he
or she misunderstood its meaning. Because x7 will not be considered by DM i, according
to Definition 3.2.1.4, x7 will be classified as an imagined option by DM j. Hence, in this
research, it is assumed that the expression OR̄i \ OIij 6= ; may or may not hold. This
relationship is shown in Figure 3.8.
The decision made by the US and Britain leaders to attack Iraq in 2003 can serve as
a good example of the situation described above. The US and Britain firmly believed
that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and considered this to be a
significant threat to international security. The report made by the UN International
Atomic Energy Agency, however, stated that Iraq was far from obtaining WMD. As a
result, the agency concluded that an attack on Iraq was unwarranted. According to this
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finding, many researchers questioned the justification of the US and Britain’s decision to
attack Iraq (Bluth, 2004; Kaufmann, 2004). However, the US and Britain did not believe
the report by the UN International Atomic Energy Agency and still assumed that Iraq
possessed WMD. This mistaken belief motivated these two allies to go to war with Iraq.
In this circumstance, the assumption that Iraq had WMD at its disposal was an imagined
option for Iraq by the US and Britain.
Definition 3.2.1.5 (Set of a DM’s Options Misunderstood by Its Opponent).
Options in ORii and O
R̄
i that are misperceived by DM j are referred to as DM i’s options













Figure 3.7: DM i’s Options Misunderstood by DM j in Comparison with ORii and O
R̄
i
As can be seen in Figure 3.7, DM j misunderstands the meaning of x4 and assumes it
to be x12. That is, DM j recognizes DM i has x12. By investigating the data in Figures 3.5
and 3.7, one can identify that x8, which is a member of OR̄i , is misunderstood in meaning
by both DMs i and j and is assumed to be x10 . In this situation, one can conclude that
both DMs have the same misperception. It is important to note that DM j can, in fact,
misunderstand the meaning of option x8 di↵erently than DM i. However, for this case,
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both DMs share the same misperception to show that this kind of perception is allowed in
the proposed methodology. Therefore, in this research, it is assumed that the expression
OMii \ OMij 6= ; may or may not hold. This relationship is depicted in Figure 3.8.
The Japanese attack against the US at Pearl Harbor can be used as an insightful
example to illustrate the aforesaid circumstance. The US had broken the Japanese code
prior to its attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 (Wohlstetter, 1962). Washington
advised General Short in Pearl Harbor to anticipate hostile actions from Japan, by which
it meant a surprise attack. General Short misunderstood this phrase as sabotage. As a
result, General Short did not expect a surprise attack from Japan (Levy, 1983). In this
case, Japan’s actual option was launching a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor and the
misunderstood option by the US was to expect sabotage from the Japanese.




ij are assumed, in this research,
to be pairwise disjoint sets. Therefore, ORij \ OIij = ORij \ OMij = OIij \ OMij = ;. These
relationships are illustrated in Figure 3.8.
Remark 3.2.1.3. For a given situation a DM can only misperceive an option in one way.




ii . Also, an element in O
M
ij cannot
exist in ORii , O
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ij \ORii = OIij \OMii = ; and OMij \ORii = OMij \OR̄i =
OMij \ OIii = ;. These relationships are illustrated in Figure 3.8.
As the definitions of various types of options have now been introduced, one can char-
acterize the universal set of options for a DM in a first-level hypergame. DM i’s universal
set of options is defined below, and is illustrated in Figure 3.8.
Definition 3.2.1.6 (DM i’s Universal Set of Options in a First-Level Hyper-
game). Let Ö1i denote DM i’s universal set of options for a first-level hypergame. Then,
Ö1i = O
R
ii [ OR̄i [ OIii [ OIij [ OMii [ OMij .
Note that all the elements in Ö1i are known to the analyst. However, because of DMs’



















Figure 3.8: DM i’s Universal Set of Options
or both. DM i’s options that are unknown to itself are denoted by OUii and can be expressed
as OUii = Ö
1
i \ (ORii [ OIii [ OMii ). Analogously, DM i’s options that are unknown to DM j,




i \ (ORij [ OIij [ OMij ).
DM j’s universal set of options for a first-level hypergame, Ö1j , can be analogously
defined. The universal set of options for the entire first-level hypergame, Ô1, can be
formally defined as follows.
Definition 3.2.1.7 (Universal Set of Options for the First-level Hypergame). The
union of the universal set of options of DMs i and j is referred to as the universal set of
options for the first-level hypergame, and is denoted by Ô1. Mathematically, Ô1 = Ö1i [ Ö1j .
44
3.2.2 Universal Set of States in a Two-Decision Maker
First-Level Hypergame
After defining Ô1, one can now formally define the universal set of states for a first-level
hypergame. The universal set of states is the collection of all possible scenarios of all DMs’
perceptions of a conflict under study. Generally, a state is formed after each DM selects
its own strategy. A specific strategy for a DM, on the other hand, is a choice of its own
options which are within its control: 1 if the option is chosen, and 0 if the option is not
chosen (Howard, 1971).
Based on the mathematical definition of option form for which there are no mispercep-
tions (Fang et al., 2003a,b; Xu et al., 2017), expressing states in option form for a first-level
hypergame can be developed. Formally, let the universal set of options for a first-level hy-
pergame be expressed by Ô1 = Ö1i [ Ö1j , where Ö1i = {oik̄ : k̄ = 1, 2, ....,mi} is DM i’s
universal set of options in a first-level hypergame, in which oi
k̄
is DM i’s k̄th option and mi
represents the total number of options for DM i. An option can either be chosen or not by
the DM who possesses it. A strategy for a given DM is formed when it decides which of
its options to choose or not. Mathematically, a strategy for DM i can be represented by a





1, if DM i selects option oi
k̄
0, otherwise
A state, in option form, can be constructed by a  -dimensional column vector, where
  is the number of options in Ô1. Such a vector represents each DM’s strategy selection.







1, if DM l selects option ol
k̄
, 8 l = {i, j}
0, otherwise
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))T . The collection of all such states is the universal set of states for
a first-level hypergame and is denoted by Ŝ1.
A state in Ŝ1 can be represented by s. The total number of states in Ŝ1 is 2 , where
  = mi +mj. Given a state s 2 Ŝ1, let DM i’s strategy associated with it be denoted by
an mi-dimensional column vector, gsi . Thus, s = ((g
s
i )
T , (gsj )
T )T .
States in a Decision Maker’s Subjective Game
In a first-level hypergame situation (Wang et al., 1988, 1989), a dispute is expressed by a
number of games, where each game represents a specific DM’s perception of the conflict.
In fact, each DM’s game must be constructed using its recognizable set of states. Some
states in Ŝ1 may not be considered by a focal DM as they are based on the opponent’s
viewpoint of the dispute, which is di↵erent from the focal DM’s perspective. Let the
recognizable set of states for DM i be denoted by Si. To formally define Si, the universal
set of options, Ô1, must be partitioned into four disjoint sets based on DM i’s perception.
In particular, DM i’s universal set of options for a first-level hypergame, Ö1i , is partitioned
into two disjoint sets (ORii [ OIii [ OMii ) and OUii . Likewise, based on DM i’s perspective,
DM j’s universal set of options for a first-level hypergame, Ö1j , must be partitioned into
two disjoint sets (ORji [ OIji [ OMji ) and OUji.
Based on DM i’s perspective, the aforementioned disjoint sets of options can be used
to partition Ŝ1 into two disjoint sets: (1) the set of states that are recognized by DM i in
its game, denoted by Si, and (2) the set of states that are hidden to DM i in its game, to
be denoted by SHi . These disjoint sets of states are formally defined below.
Definition 3.2.2.1 (Set of Recognizable States in a DM’s Game). Let Si ✓ Ŝ1
denote the set of states considered in DM i’s game. Then, a state s 2 Si () there is








satisfying f(o) = 0 , 8 o 2 OUii [ OUji.
46
Definition 3.2.2.2 (Set of Hidden States in a DM’s Game). Let SHi ✓ Ŝ1 denote the
set of states that are hidden to DM i in its game. Then, a state s 2 SHi () there is a








satisfying 9 o 2 OUii [ OUji, f(o) = 1.
Now Si is partitioned into five subsets representing DM i’s perception of the conflict
situation. DM i is not aware of its misperception and, as a result, cannot distinguish
between the group of states that are correctly perceived and the class of states that are
misperceived. For this reason, the classification of states is performed by an external
expert who is aware of the asymmetry of perceptions among DMs. The analyst can, in
fact, distinguish the states that are correctly perceived from those that are misperceived by
DM i. Furthermore, the analyst can find the group of states that are accurately perceived
or misperceived by all DMs.
Classification of States in a Decision Maker’s Subjective Game
To deal with DM i’s perception in a conflict situation, Si is divided into five disjoint sets,
which are the groups of states that are: (1) correctly perceived by both DM i and DM j,
denoted as SR, (2) correctly perceived by only DM i, denoted as SPi , (3) imagined by
DM i, denoted as SIi , (4) misunderstood by DM i, symbolized by S
M
i , and (5) imagined
and misunderstood by DM i, symbolized by SI,Mi . These subsets of states are formally
defined below, and are displayed in Figure 3.9.
Definition 3.2.2.3 (Set of Correctly Perceived States by Both DMs). Choose
DM i 2 N . A state s 2 Si is correctly perceived by both DMs, that is, s 2 SR ✓






))T satisfying f(o) = 0, 8 o 2 Ô1 \ (ORi [ ORj ).
Definition 3.2.2.4 (Set of a DM’s States Correctly Perceived by Itself Only). A












Figure 3.9: Classification of DM i’s Set of Recognizable States








satisfying 9 o 2 ORii \ ORi , f(o) = 1 and f(o
0
) = 0, 8 o0 2 Ô1 \ (ORii [ ORj ).
Definition 3.2.2.5 (Set of a DM’s States Imagined Only). Choose DM i 2 N . A
state s 2 Si is imagined by DM i, such that s 2 SIi ✓ Si () there is a mapping








9 o 2 OIii [ OIji, f(o) = 1 and f(o
0
) = 0, 8 o0 2 Ô1 \ (OIii [ OIji [ ORii [ ORj ).
Definition 3.2.2.6 (Set of a DM’s States Misunderstood Only). Choose DM i
2 N . A state s 2 Si is recorded in DM i’s misunderstood scenarios, such that s 2 SMi ✓






))T satisfying 9 o 2 OMii [ OMji , f(o) = 1 and f(o
0
) = 0, 8 o0 2
Ô1 \ (OMii [ OMji [ ORii [ ORj ).
Definition 3.2.2.7 (Set of a DM’s States Imagined and Misunderstood). Choose
DM i 2 N . A state s 2 Si is recorded in DM i’s imagined and misunderstood scenarios,











))T satisfying 9 o 2 OIii [ OIji, f(o) = 1,
9 o0 2 OMii [OMji , f(o
0
) = 1, and f(o
00
) = 0, 8 o00 2 Ô1 \ (OIii [OIji [OMii [OMji [ORii [ORj ).
48
3.2.3 Modeling and Analysis of a First-Level Hypergame with
Two Decision Makers in Graph Form
In this subsection, the modeling and analysis procedures of a first-level hypergame with
two DMs in graph form are put forward.
Mathematical Modeling of a First-level Hypergame with Two Decision Makers
After defining and classifying Si, one can now define DM i’s subjective game in a first-level
hypergame as shown below.
Gi = hN,Si, {Aii, Aji}, {%ii,%ji}i (3.2)
where N = {i, j}, Gi is the conflict situation as seen by DM i, and Si denotes DM i’s
set of possible states, representing allowable distinct circumstances of the dispute. These
scenarios are based on DM i’s perception, and are thought of as vertices in DM i’s graph.
The subsets Aii, Aji ✓ Si ⇥ Si represent the sets of state transitions for DMs i and j,
respectively, as perceived by DM i. More specifically, (s1, s2) 2 Aii i↵ DM i perceives
that it can cause the dispute to move from state s1 to s2. Finally, the preference relations
%ii and %ji denote DM i’s perceived preferences for itself and DM j, respectively. DM j’s
subjective game, Gj, can by defined analogously. Then, the collection of Gi and Gj defines
a first-level hypergame, H1, as follows.
H1 = hGi, Gji (3.3)
Stability Analysis of a First-Level Hypergame with Two Decision Makers
A number of methods are available to analyze a first-level hypergame (Bennett, 1977, 1980;
Takahashi et al., 1984; Wang et al., 1988, 1989). In the present research, the authors choose
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to advance the concepts developed by Wang et al. (1988, 1989) as they provide a better
understanding and enhanced results. Three steps are needed to determine a first-level
hypergame equilibrium.
• First, analyze DM i’s and DM j’s games separately by using GMCR stability definitions
(Fraser and Hipel, 1984; Fang et al., 1993; Howard, 1971; Fraser and Hipel, 1979; Nash,
1950, 1951) to obtain the sets of DM i’s and DM j’s equilibrium states, respectively.
• Second, identify DM i’s strategies from its equilibrium states obtained in its perceived
game. Likewise, find DM j’s strategies from its equilibrium states identified from its
perceived game. Then, the first-level hypergame equilibria are determined by taking the
Cartesian product of the sets of DM i’s and DM j’s individual equilibrium strategies.
• Third, the first-level hypergame equilibria are categorized into eight distinct classes to
provide better insights into the dispute. The classification of the first-level hypergame
equilibria is provided in Section 3.4 for the case of an n-DM (n > 2) conflict.
Step 1: Equilibrium States in a Decision Maker’s Subjective Game
In order to determine the equilibria in each subjective game, the standard GMCR solu-
tion concepts, namely Nash (Nash) stability (Nash, 1950, 1951), sequential (SEQ) stability
(Fraser and Hipel, 1984, 1979), general metarationality (GMR) (Howard, 1971), and sym-
metric metarationality (SMR) (Howard, 1971), are now defined within the structure of
a first-level hypergame to identify the equilibrium states in DM i’s game. Each state in
DM i’s game is checked for stability under various stability definitions, mentioned above,
for DM i and DM j. When a state is stable for both DMs i and j under the same solution
concept in Gi, it constitutes a possible resolution in Gi. The equilibrium results in Gi
represent DM i’s perception of the conflict situation. To perform the stability analysis for
the states in Gi, the concepts of reachable list and unilateral improvement list for the case
of 2-DM conflict must be defined first based on DM i’s perception.
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Definition 3.2.3.1 (Reachable List by a DM). Let q 2 N = {i, j}. The reachable list
from s1 2 Si by DM q in Gi is defined as Rqi(s1) = {s2 2 Si : (s1, s2) 2 Aqi}. Rqi(s1)
represents the set of DM q’s unilateral moves (UMs) starting from s1.
Definition 3.2.3.2 (Unilateral Improvement List by a DM). A state s2 2 Si is
a unilateral improvement (UI) from s1 2 Si for DM q 2 N in Gi () s2 2 Rqi(s1)
and s2  qi s1. The set of all UIs from s1 2 Si by DM q is regarded as DM q’s unilateral
improvement list (UIL), and is denoted by R+qi(s1).
Definition 3.2.3.3 (Nash Stability). A state s1 2 Si is Nash stable (Nash) for DM q




Definition 3.2.3.4 (Sequential Stability). A state s1 2 Si is sequentially stable (SEQ)
for DM q 2 N in Gi () for each s2 2 R+qi(s1), 9 s3 2 R+q0i(s2) such that s3 -qi s1, where




Definition 3.2.3.5 (General Metarationality). A state s1 2 Si is general metarational
stable (GMR) for DM q 2 N in Gi () for each s2 2 R+qi(s1), 9 s3 2 Rq0i(s2) such that
s3 -qi s1, where q0 symbolizes the opponent of q in N . The set of all GMR stable states for
DM q in Gi is denoted by S
GMRqi
i .
Definition 3.2.3.6 (Symmetric Metarationality). A state s1 2 Si is symmetric meta-
rational stable (SMR) for DM q 2 N in Gi () for each s2 2 R+qi(s1), 9 s3 2 Rq0i(s2) such
that s3 -qi s1, and s4 -qi s1, 8 s4 2 Rqi(s3), where q0 denotes the opponent of q in N . The
set of all SMR stable states for DM q in Gi is denoted by S
SMRqi
i .
After defining the aforementioned solution concepts, one can now determine the equi-
librium states in Gi. A state is considered as an equilibrium in Gi under a specific stability
concept if it is stable for every DM in Gi under that stability definition. Formally, the set
of equilibria in Gi can be defined as follows.
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Definition 3.2.3.7 (Equilibria). A state s1 2 Si that is stable for both DMs i and j in
Gi according to a particular stability concept is an equilibrium in Gi under that stability
definition. The set of all equilibrium states in Gi is denoted by Ei. The set of equilibrium
states in DM j’s subjective game, Gj, is constructed analogously, and is denoted by Ej.
Step 2: First-Level Hypergame Equilibria for Two Decision Makers in Graph
Form
Once the equilibrium states in each DM’s subjective game are identified, then the pos-
sible compromise resolutions of the first-level hypergame can be determined by combining
both DMs’ strategies obtained from the equilibrium states in their perceived games. First,
a hyper Nash equilibrium state for a 2-DM model is defined according to each DM’s strate-
gies, to be called Nash strategies, which are derived from the DM’s Nash equilibrium states
in its subjective game.
Definition 3.2.3.8 (Hyper Nash Equilibrium). Let ENashi denote the set of Nash
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j }, where ⌘j 6 "j, be the
set of DM j’s distinct Nash strategies obtained from ENashj . Then, the set of hyper Nash
equilibrium states for the first-level hypergame can be defined as follows:
HE1Nash = g⇤Nashii ⇥ g
⇤Nashj
j (3.4)
Any member of HE1Nash is a hyper Nash equilibrium state of the dispute.
In fact, there are up to a total of "i"j hyper Nash equilibrium states. As explained earlier,
there are two steps to calculate the elements in HE1Nash for a 2-DM first-level hypergame.
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In the first step, one uses Definition 3.2.3.3 to compute ENashi and E
Nash
j in Gi and Gj,
respectively. A state is a Nash equilibrium in Gi if it is stable for both DMs i and j under
the Nash solution concept. In the second step, one uses Definition 6.1.5.9 to compute
HE1Nash for a 2-DM first-level hypergame. This can be done by first isolating DM i’s
and DM j’s Nash strategies from ENashi and E
Nash
j , respectively, and then by taking the
Cartesian product of DM i’s and DM j’s distinct Nash strategies. The sets of hyper SEQ
equilibrium states (HE1SEQ), hyper GMR equilibrium states (HE1GMR), and hyper SMR
equilibrium states (HE1SMR) can be defined analogously.
3.3 First-Level Hypergame with n Decision Makers
(n > 2) in Graph Form
To strategically model and analyze a conflict with more than two DMs, at least one of
whom misperceives others’ sets of options or preferences, a general structure for a first-
level hypergame in graph form is put forward in this section. In particular, the ideas of
the universal set of options and states for a 2-DM first-level hypergame in graph model,
as well as the corresponding first-level hypergame stability analysis, are extended to an
n-DM (n > 2) graph model in Sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 3.3.3, respectively.
3.3.1 Universal Set of Options in an n-Decision Maker
First-Level Hypergame
In Section 3.2.1, the definition for a given DM’s universal set of options for a first-level
hypergame is provided only for a 2-DM graph model. In this subsection, a given DM’s
universal set of options for an n-DM first-level hypergame in graph form is introduced to
handle more than two DMs’ perceptions in a conflict situation. The options put forward
here to define a given DM’s universal set of options are: (1) correctly identified by the DM
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itself and possibly recognized by some of its opponents, (2) misperceived by the DM itself,
and (3) misperceived by some of the DM’s opponents.
The set of a given DM’s options that are correctly identified by the DM itself and pos-
sibly recognized by some of its opponents, formalized for a two-DM graph model in Defini-
tion 6.1.1.3, is defined first. Let the set of DMs in the hypergame be N = {1, 2, ..., i, ..., n},
n > 2. For i 2 N , let ORii denote the set of DM i’s options that are correctly identified by
DM i itself. For j 2 N   {i}, let ORij be the set of DM i’s correctly perceived options that
are recognized by DM j. Then, the set of DM i’s options that are correctly perceived by
all the DMs can be expressed as ORi = \nj=1ORij.
Note that ORi ✓ ORii and ORii \ ORi is the set of DM i’s correctly perceived options
that may be recognized by some of its opponents but not all. If ORij is the same for each
j 2 N   {i}, then, ORi = ORij. In this circumstance, ORii \ ORi contains DM i’s correctly
perceived options that are recognized by itself only.
The second collection of options is the set of a given DM’s options misperceived by itself.
As explained in Section 3.2.1, three classes of options can illustrate DM i’s misperception:
(a) options that are imagined by DM i itself, denoted as OIii, (b) options that exist in reality,
but are misinterpreted by DM i, symbolized as OR̄i , and (c) options that are misunderstood
by DM i itself, denoted as OMii . Since the two classes of imagined and misunderstood
options describe only DM i’s misperception of itself and are not a↵ected by any of its
opponents’ perception, they are not restrained by the number of DMs in the dispute.
Thus, Definitions 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.1.3 remain the same for an n-DM model.
Like in Section 3.2.1, one or more of a DM’s options may be misperceived by some of
its opponents. This misperception can be because of opponents’ imagination or misunder-
standing. The two types of misperception are formally defined below.
Let i 2 N . For j 2 N   {i}, let OIij and OMij represent the sets of DM i’s options
that are imagined and misunderstood, respectively, by DM j. Then, [j2N {i}OIij and
[j2N {i}OMij represent DM i’s options that are imagined and misunderstood, respectively,
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by its opponents. In fact, [j2N {i}OIij contains DM i’s options that are imagined by
at least one of its opponents. Similarly, [j2N {i}OMij contains DM i’s options that are
misunderstood by at least one of its opponents.
Now that the definitions of di↵erent types of option perception have been introduced
for the case of n-DM graph model, one can define DM i’s universal set of options for a
first-level hypergame as follows.
Ö1i = O
R
ii [ OR̄i [ ([j2NOIij) [ ([j2NOMij ). (3.5)
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, all courses of action in Ö1i are known to the analyst.
Nonetheless, because of DMs’ varied perceptions, some options in Ö1i may be unknown to
some DMs or all. For j 2 N , let OUij = Ö1i \ (ORij [ OIij [ OMij ) represent the set of DM i’s
options that are unknown to DM j.
Remark 3.3.1.1. Similar to Section 3.2.1, the following relationships are assumed in this
research:
• ([j2N {i}ORij) ✓ ORii .
• OIii \ OR̄i = ([j2NORij) \ OR̄i = ([j2NORij) \ ([j2NOIij) = ([j2NORij) \ ([j2NOMij ) =
([j2NOIij) \ ([j2NOMij ) = ([j2NOMij ) \ OR̄i = ;.
• \j2NOIij 6= ; may or may not hold.
• ([j2N {i}OIij) \ OR̄i 6= ; may or may not hold.
• \j2NOMij 6= ; may or may not hold.
The union of all DMs’ universal sets of options generates the universal set of options
for a first-level hypergame. As in the case of a 2-DM graph model having varied percep-
tion among DMs, let Ô1 also denote the universal set of options for an n-DM first-level
hypergame. Then, Ô1 = [i2N Ö1i .
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3.3.2 Universal Set of States in an n-Decision Maker First-Level
Hypergame
Now that the universal set of options for a first-level hypergame with n DMs is defined,
a procedure similar to the one defined in Section 3.2.2 is applied to formalize the univer-
sal set of states for a first-level hypergame with n-DM in graph form. Formally: let the
universal set of options for a first-level hypergame be expressed by Ô1 = [i2N Ö1i , where
Ö1i = {oik̄ : k̄ = 1, 2, ....,mi} is DM i’s universal set of options in a first-level hypergame.
Note that mi represents the total number of options for DM i. As explained in Section 3.2.2,





1, if DM i selects option oi
k̄
0, otherwise
A state, in option form, can be represented by a  -dimensional column vector, where
  = m1 + m2 + ... + mn. States in a first-level hypergame can be defined as follows.
Definition 3.3.2.1 (Universal Set of States for a First-Level Hypergame). A state







1, if DM i selects option oi
k̄
, for i = 1, 2, ..., n,
0, otherwise








2 ), ..., f(o
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T . The set of states defined above constitutes the universal set of
states for a first-level hypergame and is denoted as Ŝ1.




mi. Given a state s 2 Ŝ1, let DM i’s strategy associated with it be de-
noted by an mi-dimensional column vector, gsi . Thus, for N = {1, 2, ..., i, ..., n}, s =
((gs1)
T , (gs2)




States in a Decision Maker’s Subjective Game
States in a given DM’s subjective game for an n-DM first-level hypergame can be defined
in a similar fashion as formalized in a 2-DM first-level hypergame. The universal set of
options for a first-level hypergame, Ô1, is partitioned into two disjoint sets based on DM i’s
perception: the collections of options that are (1) recognized by DM i in its game, expressed
as ([j2NORji) [ ([j2NOIji) [ ([j2NOMji ), and (2) unknown to DM i in its game, expressed
as [j2NOUji. Now, one formally defines DM i’s sets of recognizable and hidden states in its
game as follows.
Definition 3.3.2.2 (Set of Recognizable States in a DM’s Game with n DMs).
Let Si ✓ Ŝ1 denote the set of states considered in DM i’s subjective game. Then, a state
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T satisfying f(o) = 0 , 8 o 2 [j2NOUji.
Definition 3.3.2.3 (Set of Hidden States in a DM’s Game with n DMs). Let
SHi ✓ Ŝ1 denote the set of states that are hidden to DM i in its game. Then, a state






), ..., f(on1 ), f(o
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2 ), ..., f(o
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mn))
T satisfying 9 o 2 [j2NOUji, f(o) = 1.
Classification of States in a Decision Maker’s Subjective Game
Section 3.2.2 provides criteria to classify a given DM’s set of recognizable states into five
disjoint sets of states for a 2-DM graph model. In this section, a given DM’s set of
recognizable states is divided into five categories to accommodate more than two DMs’
perceptions in the model. For DM i 2 N , its set of recognizable states, Si, is categorized
as follows: (1) correctly perceived by all DMs, denoted as SR, (2) correctly perceived by
DM i itself and possibly by some of its opponents but not all of them, symbolized as SPi ,
(3) imagined by DM i itself, denoted as SIi , (4) misunderstood by DM i itself, denoted as




Definition 3.3.2.4 (Set of Correctly Perceived States by all DMs). Choose DM i
2 N . A state s 2 Si is correctly perceived by all DMs, that is, s 2 SR ✓ Si () there is










2 ), ..., f(o
n
mn))
T satisfying f(o) = 0, 8 o 2 Ô1 \ ([i2NORi ).
Definition 3.3.2.5 (Set of a DM’s States Correctly Perceived by Itself and Pos-
sibly by Some of Its Opponents but Not by All). Choose DM i 2 N . A state
s 2 Si is correctly perceived by DM i itself and possibly by some of its opponents but
not by all, that is, s 2 SPi () there is a mapping f : Ô1 ! {0, 1} such that
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9 o 2 [j2N(ORji \ ORj ), f(o) = 1 and f(o
0
) = 0, 8 o0 2 Ô1 \ ([j 2 NORji).
Definition 3.3.2.6 (Set of a DM’s States Imagined Only). For i 2 N , a state s 2 Si
is imagined by DM i in its game, that is, s 2 SIi () there is a mapping f : Ô1 ! {0, 1}
















satisfying 9 o 2 [j2NOIji, f(o) = 1 and f(o
0
) = 0, 8 o0 2 Ô1 \ [([j2NOIji) [ ([j2NORji)].
Definition 3.3.2.7 (Set of a DM’s States Misunderstood Only). For i 2 N , a
state s 2 Si is misunderstood by DM i in its game, that is, s 2 SMi () there is a










2 ), ..., f(o
n
mn))
T satisfying 9 o 2 [j2NOMji , f(o) = 1 and f(o
0
) = 0, 8 o0 2
Ô1 \ [([j2NOMji ) [ ([j2NORji)].
Definition 3.3.2.8 (Set of a DM’s States Imagined and Misunderstood). For
i 2 N , a state s 2 Si is included in DM i’s imagined and misunderstood scenarios, that is,






), ...,f(on1 ), f(o
n
2 ), ..., f(o
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mn))
T satisfying 9 o 2 [j2NOIji, f(o) = 1,
9 o0 2 [j2NOMji , f(o
0
) = 1, and f(o
00
) = 0, 8 o00 2 Ô1\ [([j2NOIji)[([j2NOMji ) [([j2NORji)].
In summary, the states formalized in Definition 3.3.2.4 are free from any misperception
and recognized by all DMs in their subjective games. But the states in Definition 3.3.2.5
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are unknown to at least one DM. Keep in mind that the condition 9 o 2 [j2N(ORji \ ORj )
in Definition 3.3.2.5 implies that there exists at least one option which is unknown to at
least one DM. That is, the states related to the option being selected by the DM who
possesses it are unknown to at least one DM. Moreover, according to Remark 4, a common
misperception across all DMs is possible in this framework. Therefore, if s 2 SIi , s 2 SMi ,
or s 2 SI,Mi , then either (1) it is known to DM i only, (2) it is known to DM i and some
other DMs but not to all, or (3) it is known to all DMs depending on the hypergame
situation under investigation.
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Proof: Assume that SR \ SPi 6= ;. Let s 2 SR \ SPi . This implies that s 2 SR
and s 2 SPi . As characterized in Definition 3.3.2.4, s 2 SR ✓ Si () there is a










2 ), ..., f(o
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T satisfying f(o) = 0, 8 o 2 Ô1\([i2NORi ). But since ([j2NORj ) ✓
([j2NORji), the condition f(o) = 0, 8 o 2 Ô1\([i2NORi ) can be expressed as f(o) = 0, 8 o 2
[Ô1 \ ([j2NORji)] [ [[j2N(ORji \ ORj )]. Hence, a state s 2 SR implies that f(o) = 0, 8 o 2
[j2N(ORji \ORj ). This contradicts with the fact that s 2 SPi in which 9 o 2 [j2N(ORji \ORj ),
f(o) = 1, as can be found in Definition 3.3.2.5. Hence, the assumption that SR
T
SPi 6= ; is
not true. This proves by contradiction that SR
T


































3.3.3 Modeling and Analysis of a First-Level Hypergame with
n Decision Makers in Graph Form
As in Section 3.2.3, the modeling and analysis techniques of a first-level hypergame with
n DMs in graph form are addressed here.
Mathematical Modeling of a First-Level Hypergame with n Decision Makers
As in Section 3.2.3, a first-level hypergame with more than two DMs can be represented
by a number of subjective games, each of which takes into account a particular DM’s view
point of the conflict situation. For i 2 N , DM i’s subjective game in graph form, Gi, can
be formalized as follows.
Gi = hNi, Si, {Aji : j 2 Ni}, {%ji: j 2 Ni}i (3.6)
where Ni ✓ N is the set of DMs as perceived by DM i in Gi, Si is the set of feasible
states, Aji represents the set of state transitions controlled by DM j as perceived by DM i,
and %ji represents DM j’s preferences over Si as perceived by DM i. Then, a first-level
hypergame with more than two DMs in graph form can be represented as:
H1 = hGi : i 2 Ni (3.7)
As can be seen in Eq 3.6, a particular DM may not be aware that one or more DMs are
involved in a conflict. If DM i is not aware of the presence of DM j, for example, then all
of DM j’s options are hidden to DM i. Consequently, the states related to these options
being selected by DM j are also unknown to DM i.
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Stability Analysis of a First-Level Hypergame with n Decision Makers
The stability analysis procedure for a first-level hypergame with more than two DMs in
graph form can be formalized in a similar fashion as was carried out for a first-level hyper-
game with two DMs in Section 3.2.3. One can recall that there are three steps to determine
the first-level hypergame equilibria. In the first step, one identifies the equilibrium states in
each DM’s subjective game. This can be accomplished by checking each state for stability
using a range of solution concepts defined within the original GMCR structure. In the next
step, one ascertains the first-level hypergame equilibria. This can be done by first isolating
each DM’s strategy from each of its equilibriuam states in its subjective game and then by
taking the Cartesian product of all the DMs’ strategy sets, each of which is constructed
from a particular DM’s equilibrium states in its subjective game. The resulting Cartesian
product constitutes the set of first-level hypergame equilibria. In the third step, the first-
level hypergame equilibria are classified into eight categories, as explained in Section 3.4,
to provide better insights into the conflict.
Step 1: Equilibrium States in a Decision Maker’s Subjective Game
The solution concepts presented in Section 3.2.3 are precisely defined for a first-level
hypergame with two DMs in graph form in which a given DM has only one opponent.
However, in a first-level haypergame with more than two DMs, the focal DM has more than
one opponent. Thus, the stability definitions provided in Section 3.2.3 are not adequate
for checking each state for stability in a first-level hypergame with more than two DMs.
Accordingly, stability definitions for a general n-DM first-level hypergame in graph form
are put forward to identify the equilibrium states in each DM’s subjective game. For
i 2 N , the stability definitions for DM i’s subjective game, Gi, require the extension of the
concepts of reachable list and unilateral improvement list (UIL) by a single DM, formalized
in Definitions 3.2.3.1 and 3.2.3.2, respectively, to those by a group of DMs.
Assume that the set of DMs in Gi is Ni = {1, 2, ..., i, ..., ni}. Let H ✓ Ni, H 6= ;, be
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any subset of DMs in Ni. For s1 2 Si, recall that Rqi(s1) represents the set of DM q’s
unilateral moves (UMs) starting from s1. Let RHi(s1) denote the set of all UMs from s1
by one or more DMs in H through a valid sequence of moves starting from s1. A sequence
of moves by DMs in H is considered valid if no DM makes two consecutive moves. For
s2 2 RHi(s1), let ⌦Hi(s1, s2) denote the set of all last DMs in H in the valid sequences of
moves from s1 to s2. The reachable list by H ✓ Ni can now be formalized.
Definition 3.3.3.1 (Reachable List by H ✓ Ni). Let s1 2 Si. Then, RHi(s1) can be
defined as follows:
• If q 2 H and s2 2 Rqi(s1), then s2 2 RHi(s1) and q 2 ⌦Hi(s1, s2);
• If s2 2 RHi(s1), q 2 H, and s3 2 Rqi(s2), then
(a) if |⌦Hi(s1, s2)|= 1 and q /2 ⌦Hi(s1, s2), then s3 2 RHi(s1) and q 2 ⌦Hi(s1, s3).
(b) if |⌦Hi(s1, s2)|> 1, then s3 2 RHi(s1) and q 2 ⌦Hi(s1, s3).
The induction stops when there is no new state s3 that can be added to RHi(s1) and
no change from | ⌦Hi(s1, s2) |= 1 to | ⌦Hi(s1, s2) |> 1 for any s2 2 RHi(s1). Any
state in RHi(s1) is a UM from s1 by H.
Recall from Definition 3.2.3.2 that a state is considered as a unilateral improvement
(UI) from a prespecified state by a particular DM if the state is reachable by the DM and
is preferred to the initial state. As the concept of a reachable list by a set of DMs for the
case of n DMs has now been introduced, one can define the idea of UIL by a group of DMs.
For s1 2 Si, recall that R+qi(s1) denotes the set of DM q’s UIL from s1 in Gi. Let R+Hi(s1)
denote the set of UIs from s1 by a group of DMs, H ✓ Ni and H 6= ;, and ⌦+Hi(s1, s2)
represent the set of all last DMs in valid sequences of unilateral improvements from s1 to
s2;
Definition 3.3.3.2 (Unilateral Improvement List by H ✓ Ni). Let s1 2 Si. The UIL
R+Hi(s1) is constructed inductively as follows:
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• If q 2 H and s2 2 R+qi(s1), then s2 2 R+Hi(s1) and q 2 ⌦+Hi(s1, s2);
• If s2 2 R+Hi(s1), q 2 H, and s3 2 R+qi(s2), then
(a) if | ⌦+Hi(s1, s2) |= 1 and q /2 ⌦+Hi(s1, s2), then s3 2 R+Hi(s1) and q 2 ⌦+Hi(s1, s3),
(b) if | ⌦+Hi(s1, s2) |> 1, then s3 2 R+Hi(s1) and q 2 ⌦+Hi(s1, s3).
The induction stops when there is no new state s3 that can be added to R
+
Hi(s1) and
no change from | ⌦+Hi(s1, s2) |= 1 to | ⌦+Hi(s1, s2) |> 1 for any s2 2 R+Hi(s1). Any
state in R+Hi(s1) is a UI from s1 by a group of DMs H.
Now that the concepts of reachable list and UIL by a set of DMs H ✓ Ni have been
introduced, one can formally define stability concepts in Gi with more than two DMs. The
stability definitions put forward here are Nash stability, SEQ stability, GMR stability, and
SMR stability. Note that a state is considered Nash stable for DM q in Gi if DM q has
no UI from that particular state. That is, Nash stability does not take into account the
responses by the opponents of a focal DM. Therefore, Definition 3.2.3.3 in Section 3.2.3
remains the same for the n-DM case. However, SEQ, GMR, and SMR stability definitions
depend on the responses by the opponents of the focal DM. Hence, the definitions of these
stabilities are generalized below:
Definition 3.3.3.3 (SEQ Stability). A state s1 2 Si is sequentially stable (SEQ) for
DM q 2 Ni in Gi () for each s2 2 R+qi(s1), 9 s3 2 R+(Ni {q})i(s2) such that s3 -qi s1. The
set of all SEQ stable states for DM q in Gi is denoted by S
SEQqi
i .
Definition 3.3.3.4 (GMR Stability). A state s1 2 Si is general metarational stable
(GMR) for DM q 2 Ni in Gi () for each s2 2 R+qi(s1), 9 s3 2 R(Ni {q})i(s2) such that
s3 -qi s1. The set of all GMR stable states for DM q in Gi is denoted by SGMRqii .
Definition 3.3.3.5 (SMR Stability). A state s1 2 Si is symmetric metarational stable
(SMR) for DM q 2 Ni in Gi () for each s2 2 R+qi(s1), 9 s3 2 R(Ni {q})i(s2) such that
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s3 -qi s1, and s4 -qi s1, 8 s4 2 Rqi(s3). The set of all SMR stable states for DM q in Gi
is denoted by S
SMRqi
i .
Theorem 3.3.3.1. In a first-level hypergame in graph form, the stability of states for DM q















Proof. The relationships in (3.8) and (3.9) are proven below.
• For the inclusion relationships in (3.8), if s1 2 S
Nashqi
i , then R
+
qi(s1) = ;. This mean
that there are no UIs from s1 by DM q. Therefore, Definition 3.3.3.5 satisfied and
s1 2 S
SMRqi




i . Next, in light of Definition 3.3.3.5, if
s1 2 S
SMRqi
i , it implies that all UIs for DM q are sanctioned by its opponents and
DM q itself cannot escape from the sanctions. Any sanction in Definition 3.3.3.5











i ✓ SGMRqi are true.
• For the inclusion relationships in (3.9), if s1 2 S
Nashqi
i , then R
+
qi(s1) = ;, which







i . Next, from Definition 3.3.3.3, one can observe that R
+
(Ni {q})i(s2) ✓
R(Ni {q})i(s2). That is, s1 2 S
SEQqi














As various stability definitions for the n-DM case have now been introduced, one can
determine the equilibrium states for DM i’s subjective game. A state is considered as
an equilibrium in Gi under a specific solution concept if it is stable for every DM in Ni
under that stability concept. Hence, Definition 3.2.3.7 remains the same for the n-DM case.
Step 2: First-Level Hypergame Equilibria for n Decision Makers in Graph Form
In this step, first-level hypergame equilibria are identified. This can be done by de-
termining each DM’s strategy from each of its Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR equilibrium
states. Next, one takes the Cartesian product of all the DMs’ strategy sets for each of
the above mentioned solution concepts. Note that the Cartesian product of all DMs’ Nash
strategy sets, each of which is obtained from a given DM’s Nash equilibrium states within
its subjective game, is referred to as the set of hyper Nash equilibrium states for a first-level
hypergame.
Definition 3.3.3.6 (Hyper Nash Equilibrium). For i 2 N , recall that ENashi and
g⇤Nashii denote the sets of DM i’s Nash equilibrium states and distinct Nash strategies,
respectively, as perceived by DM i in its subjective game Gi. Then, the set of hyper Nash





Any member of HE1Nash is a hyper Nash equilibrium state of the dispute. In fact, there
are up to a total of "i"j..."n hyper Nash equilibrium states.
HE1SEQ, HE1GMR, and HE1SMR can be constructed analogously.
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3.4 Classification of First-Level Hypergame
Equilibria
The classification of first-level hypergame equilibria is the final step of the analysis of a
conflict with misperception. The classification of the hypergame equilibria is not accom-
plished by the participants of the conflict, but instead by an insightful external analyst
who is aware of the asymmetry of viewpoints of the DMs. As a result, the analyst can, in
fact, distinguish between the states that are correctly perceived and misperceived by the
DMs. These equilibrium classes provide information with regards to the types of DMs’
misperception and the consequences of misperception on resolutions of the dispute. The
equilibrium classes put forward here are steady hyper equilibrium, unsteady hyper equilib-
rium, stealthy hyper equilibrium, unsteady stealthy hyper equilibrium, contingent hyper
equilibrium, unsteady contingent hyper equilibrium, self-contingent hyper equilibrium, and
emergent hyper equilibrium.
For an n-DM hypergame (n > 2), a hypergame equilibrium state that is recognized by
all DMs as a correctly perceived state in their subjective games and is also an equilibrium
scenario under a specific solution concept (Nash, 1950, 1951; Howard, 1971; Fraser and
Hipel, 1984; Fang et al., 1993) in their subjective games, is considered as a steady hyper
equilibrium state for the dispute. Formally, a steady hyper Nash (SHNash1) equilibrium
state for a first-level hypergame can be defined as follows:
Definition 3.4.0.7 (SHNash1 Equilibrium). A hyper Nash equilibrium state, s 2
HE1Nash, is called SHNash1 equilibrium i↵ s 2 SR and s 2 \i2NENashi .
Please notice that the superscript 1 in SHNash1 indicates that it is an equilibrium for
a first-level hypergame. In this situation, even though the hyper Nash equilibrium state
is obtained from subjective games, DMs’ misperception does not a↵ect the equilibrium
state as no information about misperception is included in the state. In such a case, DMs’
misperceptions are found to be preserved and all DMs may not be motivated to move the
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dispute into future rounds and, as a result, the equilibrium state can be considered as a
final resolution of the dispute (Sasaki and Kijima, 2008; Aljefri et al., 2014a,b).
A steady hyper SEQ (SHSEQ1) equilibrium, a steady hyper GMR (SHGMR1) equi-
librium, and a steady hyper SMR (SHSMR1) equilibrium for a first-level hypergame can
be defined analogously.
In contrast with the idea of an SHNash1 equilibrium state, if a hyper Nash equilibrium
state is recognized by all DMs as a feasible scenario in their subjective games and not
predicted by at least one DM as a Nash equilibrium in its subjective game, the state is an
unsteady hyper Nash (UHNash1) equilibrium. Formally:
Definition 3.4.0.8 (UHNash1 Equilibrium). A hyper Nash equilibrium state, s 2
HE1Nash, is called a UHNash1 equilibrium i↵ s 2 SR and s /2 \i2NENashi .
In this circumstance, the conflict may evolve into future rounds, as some information
concerning DMs’ preference misperception may be revealed to some DMs. For instance,
if a hyper Nash equilibrium state is not a Nash equilibrium in DM i’s game, then DM i
believes that it has a UI from the hyper Nash equilibrium state to another state, or it
assumes that some DMs can move to a more preferred state.
An unsteady hyper SEQ (UHSEQ1) equilibrium, unsteady hyper GMR (UHGMR1)
equilibrium, and unsteady hyper SMR (UHSMR1) equilibrium for a first-level hypergame
can be defined in a similar way.
If a hypergame equilibrium state under a specific solution concept is correctly recognized
by a given DM and possibly by some of its opponents but not by all, then the state is a
stealthy hyper equilibrium under that specific stability definition for those DMs who are
unaware of the existence of this particular state in reality. Formally:
Definition 3.4.0.9 (Stealthy Hyper Nash (STHNash1) Equilibrium). A hyper Nash
equilibrium state, s 2 HE1Nash, is called an STHNash1 i↵ 9 i 2 N , s 2 SPi \ ENashi .
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A hyper Nash equilibrium state is called an STHNash1 equilibrium state for a first-
level hypergame (Aljefri et al., 2014a,b) whenever it is a surprise for at least one DM and
constitutes a Nash equilibrium by the other DMs who correctly perceived the state in their
subjective games. In fact, a DM can fail to correctly perceive one or more real scenarios
in its opponents’ subjective games because of underestimating opponents’ capability in
exercising certain courses of action in reality (Jervis, 1968, 1976; Levy, 1983; Ben-Zvi,
1995). These courses of action are strategic surprises for the DMs who are unaware of the
existence of this particular state in reality. Once the STHNash1 equilibrium state occurs
in a dispute, then at least one DM will acquire some information about its misperception,
motivating it to evolve the dispute into a future round.
A stealthy hyper SEQ (STHSEQ1) equilibrium, a stealthy hyper GMR (STHGMR1)
equilibrium, and a stealthy hyper SMR (STHSMR1) equilibrium for a first-level hyper-
game can be defined in a similar way.
If the hypergame equilibrium state under a specific solution concept is unknown to at
least one DM and does not constitute an equilibrium for at least one of the DMs who
correctly perceive the state in their subjective games under that specific solution concept,
then the state is an unsteady stealthy hyper equilibrium for the dispute. Formally:
Definition 3.4.0.10 (Unsteady STHNash1 (USTHNash1) Equilibrium). A hyper
Nash equilibrium state, s 2 HE1Nash, is called a USTHNash1 equilibrium for a first-level
hypergame i↵ s 2 SPi \ ENashi for at least one i 2 N .
This equilibrium is unsustainable for DMs. For example, DMs who fail to perceive this
state in their subjective games will face a strategic surprise, and the conflict may evolve
after they obtain updated information about their misperception. Other DMs, on the other
hand, who are aware of the state in their subjective games, but fail to predict it as a Nash
equilibrium in their subjective games, may believe that either they or the other DMs may
have a UI from this state to a more preferred state. After DMs filter their misperception,
a new round of the conflict may occur.
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An unsteady STHSEQ1 (USTHSEQ1) equilibrium, unsteady STHGMR1 (USTHGMR1)
equilibrium, and unsteady STHSMR1 (USTHSMR1) equilibrium for a first-level hyper-
game can be defined analogously.
If the hypergame equilibrium state under a specific solution concept is recognized by
DMs as a misperceived state and it constitutes an equilibrium in their individual games
under that specific solution concept, then the state is called a contingent hyper equilibrium
under that stability definition for the dispute. Formally:
Definition 3.4.0.11 (Contingent Hyper Nash (CHNash1) Equilibrium). A hyper
Nash equilibrium state, s 2 HE1Nash, is called a CHNash1 equilibrium () either s 2
\i2NSIi , s 2 \i2NSMi , or s 2 \i2NS
I,M
i and s 2 \i2NENashi .
Despite the fact that all DMs consider a CHNash1 equilibrium as an possible resolution
in their subjective games, this state is considered as an illusionary equilibrium for the
dispute (Jervis, 1976; Betts, 2000). As a hypothetical example to the situation mentioned
above, consider a possible military confrontation between countries “A” and “B”. Suppose
that A’s actual option is to exercise a weak military attack against B. However, because
A overestimated its capabilities and B underestimated its strength, both countries believe
that A can launch a possible massive attack against B. In this circumstance, one can
conclude that both DMs share the same misperception. If all DMs find this state as an
acceptable outcome, the state is considered as a final resolution of the dispute. However,
if at least one DM is not satisfied with this equilibrium, then the conflict may evolve into
a future round. In this case, a new analysis is required.
A contingent hyper SEQ (CHSEQ1) equilibrium, a contingent hyper GMR (CHGMR1)
equilibrium, and a contingent hyper SMR (CHSMR1) equilibrium for a first-level hyper-
game can be defined in a similar fashion.
If a hypergame equilibrium state under a specific solution concept is recognized by all
DMs as a misperceived state and it is not an equilibrium in at least one DM’s game, then
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it is called an unsteady contingent hyper equilibrium for the dispute under that specific
solution concept. Formally:
Definition 3.4.0.12 (Unsteady CHNash1 (UCHNash1) Equilibrium). A hyper Nash
equilibrium state, s 2 HE1Nash, is called an UCHNash1 equilibrium () either s 2
\i2NSIi , s 2 \i2NSMi , or s 2 \i2NS
I,M
i and s /2 \i2NENashi .
An unsteady CHSEQ1 (UCHSEQ1) equilibrium, unsteady CHGMR (UCHGMR1)
equilibrium, and unsteady CHSMR1 (UCHSMR1) equilibrium for a first-level hypergame
can be defined in a similar way.
If a hypergame equilibrium state under a specific solution concept is recognized as (1)
a misperceived state by at least one DM but not by all of them, and (2) an unknown state
by the remaining DMs, then it is called a self-contingent hyper equilibrium for the dispute
under that solution concept. Formally:
Definition 3.4.0.13 (Self-CHNash1 (SCHNash1) Equilibrium). A hyper Nash equi-
librium state, s 2 HE1Nash, is called an SCHNash1 equilibrium for the dispute i↵ there
is a DM i 2 N such that s 2 (SIi [ SMi [ S
I,M
i ) \ \j2N(SIj [ SMj [ S
I,M
j ).
An SCHNash1 equilibrium is an illusionary and unrealistic outcome for the DM who
perceives it (Betts, 2000; Trivers, 2000). Because of uncertainty of the impact of exercising
imagined or misunderstood, or imagined and misunderstood options by a DM, the DM
may either improve its position relative to that of its opponents or put itself into a worse
position (Betts, 2000). If this possible resolution is exercised, any DM may obtain new
information, motivating it to evolve the dispute into a future round, thereby making an
SCHNash1 equilibrium state unstable, and further analysis may be needed.
A self-CHSEQ1 (SCHSEQ1) equilibrium, self-CHGMR1 (SCHGMR1) equilibrium,
and self-CHSMR1 (SCHSMR1) equilibrium for a first-level hypergame can be defined in
a similar fashion.
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If a hypergame equilibrium state under a specific solution concept is hidden to all DMs,
then it is called an emergent hyper equilibrium state under that solution concept for the
conflict. Formally:
Definition 3.4.0.14 (Emergent Hyper Nash (EHNash1) Equilibrium). A hyper
Nash equilibrium state, s 2 HE1Nash, is called an EHNash1 equilibrium i↵ s /2 [i2NSi.
An EHNash1 equilibrium constitutes a possibility of surprise to all DMs. In particular,
a state possesses a possibility of shock if each DM exercises a strategy that is only recognized
by itself. The combination of these strategies forms a state that is hidden to all DMs.
This circumstance may occur in a real-life conflict under either asymmetry of information
between the DMs or their misperception of the dispute. From the equilibrium state, DMs
are expected to obtain additional information about each other’s options, strategies, and
preferences. This new knowledge may motivate DMs to cause the dispute to change by
invoking possible moves.
An emergent hyper SEQ (EHSEQ1) equilibrium, emergent hyper GMR (EHGMR1)
equilibrium, and emergent hyper SMR (EHSMR1) equilibrium for a first-level hypergame
can be defined in a similar fashion.
In summary, the eight types of first-level hypergame Nash equilibria as defined in Def-
initions 37 to 44 are mutually exclusive and cover every possible first-level hypergame
equilibrium. If a hypergame equilibrium state is recognized by all DMs in their subjec-
tive games, then the state is either a steady hyper, unsteady hyper, contingent hyper, or
unsteady contingent hyper equilibrium for the first-level hypergame. However, if a hy-
pergame equilibrium state is limited to at least one DM’s perception, then it is either a
stealthy, unsteady stealthy, or self-contingent hyper equilibrium for the hypergame. If, on
the other hand, a hypergame equilibrium is hidden to all DMs, then it is an emergent
hyper equilibrium for the dispute.
Theorem 3.4.0.2. SHNash1, UHNash1, STHNash1, USTHNash1, CHNash1, UCHNash1,
SCHNash1, and EHNash1 are pairwise disjoint.
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Proof: Let s 2 HE1Nash be a hyper Nash equilibrium state for a first-level hypergame.
Assume that SHNash1 \ UHNash1 6= ;. Let s 2 SHNash1 \ UHNash1. This implies
that s 2 SHNash1 and s 2 UHNash1. As formalized in Definition 3.4.0.7, s 2 HE1Nash
is called a SHNash1 if s 2 SR and s 2 \i2NENashi . Hence, a state s 2 SHNash1
implies that s 2 \i2NENashi . This contradicts with the fact that s 2 UHNash1 in which
s /2 \i2NENashi , as can be found in Definition 3.4.0.8. Therefore, the assumption that
SHNash1 \ UHNash1 6= ; is not true. This proves by contradiction that SHNash1 \
UHNash1 = ;. In a similar way, the other relationships can be proven.
3.5 Chapter Summary
The first-level hypergame in graph form is developed in this research for 2-DM and n-DM
conflicts. The main objectives of this new hypergame approach are to predict the possi-
ble compromise resolutions for real-life conflicts that have misperceptions by participating
DMs, and to investigate the strategic consequences of various types of equilibria that could
occur. More specifically, the new method of a first-level hypergame in graph form provides
better insights about a dispute as it categorizes the first-level hypergame equilibria into
eight classes, each of which provides di↵erent understandings about the type of misper-




Application of the First-Level
Hypergame Methodology to Two
Real-Life Conflicts
To test the applicability and e cacy of the first-level hypergame in graph form defined
in Chapter 3 as well as to show how to apply it in practice, two real-life case studies are
investigated. In particular, the 2011 conflict between North and South Sudan over South
Sudanese oil exports and the dispute over the unexpected nationalization of the Suez Canal
in 1956 by Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser are studied within the structure of a
2-DM first-level hypergame in graph form. The contents of this chapter are based on the
hypergame analyses of the South Sudan conflict by Aljefri et al. (2013, 2014b) and the
Suez Canal crisis by Aljefri et al. (2016a).
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4.1 Case Study I: The Oil Export Pipeline Conflict
between North and South Sudan
4.1.1 Historical Background
South Sudan gained its independence on July 9, 2011 from the Republic of North Sudan.
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005 (Brosché, 2008) stipulated im-
portant settlements that facilitated South Sudanese independence (Oil and Energy Trends,
2011). Within the agreement, desperate to stop the long civil war, South Sudan agreed to
give more than 48% of the southern region’s oil revenue to the government of North Sudan.
The situation was very di↵erent, however, after South Sudan gained its independence (Oil
and Energy Trends, 2011). South Sudan attempted to negotiate reducing North Sudan’s
revenue to about 25%. North Sudan rejected the proposal and demanded more than 50%
of the income from the southern region’s oil revenue. In August 2011, North Sudan im-
posed an exorbitant fee for the use of its export pipeline to Port Sudan, which is the only
available route for South Sudanese oil exports. South Sudan’s response was to reject the
overpriced fee but keep using the North Sudanese export pipeline and begin looking for an
alternative export route (Oil and Energy Trends, 2011; Aljefri et al., 2013).
According to (Oil and Energy Trends, 2011), South Sudan is examining the possibility
of constructing a new route for oil exports. The plan is to build a new pipeline with a
capacity of 450,000 barrels per day (bpd) to Kenya, which can then be connected with the
existing Kenyan pipeline to the port of Mombasa (Oil and Energy Trends, 2011). Under
the current economic conditions, however, it is doubtful that South Sudan can finance the
project.
On December 1, 2011, North Sudan escalated the situation by taking 23% of South
Sudan’s oil as compensation for South Sudan’s failure to pay the stipulated fee for using
its pipeline, without obtaining South Sudan’s approval (Sudan Tribune, 2011b,a). The
conflict between North and South Sudan is studied using a first-level hypergame in a
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graph model to explain the e↵ect of DMs’ perceptions on the outcomes of the dispute.
4.1.2 Modelling the Dispute
The conflict between North and South Sudan encountered a type of hypergame, which
is a game in which one or more of the DMs fails to perceive his or her opponent’s true
set of options and preferences. As a result, an individual game and an integrated graph
model must be developed for each DM to represent his or her viewpoint of the dispute.
The conflict between North and South Sudan is modeled as a first-level hypergame, as
none of the DMs are aware of the occurrence of any misperception. The architecture of
the first-level hypergame in a graph form is displayed in Figure 3.2. The modeling of the
universal set of states for the dispute is put forward in the next subsection.
Modelling the Universal Set of States for the Dispute
The DMs and options for the conflict are given in Table 4.1. Note that two DMs are
identified for the oil export conflict (Oil and Energy Trends, 2011; Aljefri et al., 2013;
Sudan Tribune, 2011b,a): North Sudan (denoted by C) and South Sudan (denoted by
D). As of December 1, 2011, North Sudan had three options: request exorbitant fee, shut
down the oil export pipeline, or self-reimburse by taking 23% of South Sudan’s oil without
South Sudan’s approval. South Sudan also had three options: accept the exorbitant fee,
explore alternative independent oil export route, or stop oil production. As can be found
in Table 4.1, South Sudan misperceives North Sudan’s options. As explained in Oil and
Energy Trends (2011); Sudan Tribune (2011a,b); Aljefri et al. (2013), South Sudan did not
expect North Sudan to self-reimburse for the unpaid exorbitant fees without first reaching
an agreement with South Sudan. That is, the option self-reimburse is unknown to South
Sudan and will not be considered in its game. Each option in Table 4.1 is labeled with
a number and can either be chosen (Y for yes) or not (N for no). For example, option 1
(request exorbitant fee) is the circumstance in which North Sudan imposes a high export
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fee for the use of its export pipeline. Choosing this option, as indicated by Y for yes, means
North Sudan imposes a high fee, while not selecting this course of action, N for no, implies
the situation in which North Sudan decides to charge South Sudan a reasonable fee for the
use of its export pipeline.
Table 4.1: Decision Makers and Options for the Dispute
!







Y North Sudan imposes an exorbitant fee for the use of 
its export pipeline to Port Sudan, which is the only 




  N North Sudan charges a reasonable fee for the use if its 
export pipeline. 
 
 2. Shut Down. Y Prevent South Sudan from using North Sudan’s 
Export pipeline.  
North and 
South Sudan 
  N Allow South Sudan to use North Sudan’s export 
pipeline. 
 
 3. Self- 
Reimburse. 
Y North Sudan takes 23% of South Sudan’s oil as 
compensation for South Sudan’s failure to pay the 
stipulated fee for using its pipeline.  
 
North Sudan 




4. Accept the 
Exorbitant Fee. 
Y South Sudan accepts paying the exorbitant fee. North and 
South Sudan 
  N South Sudan rejects paying the exorbitant fee.  
 5. Alternative 
Export Route. 
Y South Sudan explores an alternative export route. North and 
South Sudan 
  N South Sudan uses North Sudan’s pipeline.  
 6. Stop Oil 
Production. 
Y South Sudan stop producing oil. North and 
South Sudan 




The courses of action in Table 4.1 are considered in defining the universal set of states.
In option form, an option can be taken or not by the DM who controls it; therefore, the
total number of possible states in a conflict can be mathematically computed as 2 . In this
conflict, the total number of possible states comes to 26 = 64. These states represent the
total number of mathematical states for the universal set of states, | Ŝ1 |= 64. However,
some states are removed because they are categorized as being infeasible (Fang et al.,
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2003a,b). Note that there are two infeasible circumstances: mutually exclusive states are
not considered (e.g., South Sudan cannot accept the exorbitant fees and then stop oil
production), and logically infeasible states are not considered (e.g., the states in which
North Sudan does not request exorbitant fees and South Sudan accepts the charges are
removed). As a result, 49 states are removed from Ŝ1. Hence, 15 states are found to be
feasible for the dispute. The set of feasible states for a first-level hypergame is furnished
in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Universal Set of States for a First-level Hypergame
 States 
Decision Makers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
North Sudan                 
1. Request Exorbitant Fees N Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
2. Shut Down the Export Pipeline  N N Y Y N N N Y N N Y N N Y N 
3. Self-Reimburse N N N N Y Y N N Y N N Y N N Y 
South Sudan                
4. Accept the Exorbitant Fees N N N N N N Y Y Y N N N N N N 
5. Explore Alternative Export Route N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y N N N 
6. Stop Oil Production  N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y 
!
North Sudan’s Graph Model
North Sudan correctly capture the conflict situation and is aware of all the states in Ŝ1.
That is, the set of recognizable states in North Sudan subjective game SC is identical to Ŝ1.
SC is partitioned into two disjoint subsets: the class of states that are correctly perceived
by both North and South Sudan, SR = {1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14}, and the states that are
correctly perceived by only North Sudan and hidden to South Sudan, SPC = {5, 6, 9, 12, 15}.
State 2 is the status quo, at which the conflict started on December 1, 2011. Figure 4.1
shows the integrated graph model for the North Sudan game. The number in the nodes
refers to the state number as depicted in Table 4.2. The arcs between the nodes are the
possible moves that can be performed by the specified DM. The nodes and arcs that are
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shaded in Figure 4.1 indicate the states and their related state transitions that are only
perceived by North Sudan.
Figure 4.1: North Sudan’s Graph Model
North Sudan’s preference relationships among the set of feasible states SC is based
on the overwhelming desire to continue imposing exorbitant fees and for South Sudan
to accept the fees. Afterward, North Sudan is expected to rapidly escalate the dis-
pute by self-reimbursing if South Sudan rejects paying the overpriced fees. As a re-
sult, the preference relationships for North Sudan is expressed by ordinal preferences as
h7, 6, 12, 9, 2, 10, 8, 11, 14, 4, 1, 3, 5, 13, 15i (Oil and Energy Trends, 2011; Sudan Tribune,
2011a,b). Based on North Sudan’s perception, South Sudan wanted to keep producing
the oil and dispatch it to Port Sudan while ignoring paying the exorbitant fees. That is,
78
the preference relationships for South Sudan can be expressed by ordinal preferences as
h2, 10, 12, 6, 11, 4, 14, 13, 8, 15, 9, 7, 3, 1, 5i.
South Sudan’s Graph Model
South Sudan misperceives North Sudan’ options and preferences in the dispute. As a
result, some states in Ŝ1 are hidden to South Sudan. The states in which North Sudan
chooses to select the option of self-reimbursement are hidden to South Sudan. That is,
South Sudan set of recognizable states SD is a sub set of Ŝ1, SD ✓ Ŝ1. SD is depicted in
Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Feasible States for South Sudan’s Game
 States 
Decision Makers 1 2 3 4 7 8 10 11 13 14 
North Sudan            
1. Request Exorbitant Fees N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
2. Shut Down the Export Pipeline  N N Y Y N Y N Y N Y 
3. Self-Reimburse N N N N N N N N N N 
South Sudan           
4. Accept the Exorbitant Fees N N N N Y Y N N N N 
5. Explore Alternative Export Route N N N N N N Y Y N N 
6. Stop Oil Production  N N N N N N N N Y Y 
!
Because all the states in SD are recognized by North Sudan, SD = SR. Figure 4.2 shows
the integrated graph model for South Sudan’s game. As can be seen, the nodes with the
numbers 5, 6, 15, 9, and 12 in Figure 4.1 are not considered by South Sudan in its graph
model because of its failure to perceive them.
South Sudan’s preference relationships among the set of feasible states SD is based on
the overwhelming desire to continue producing oil and transfer it to Port Sudan by us-
ing North Sudan’s export pipeline without paying the overpriced fees. South Sudan’s
preferences over SD can be expressed by ordinal ranking (most to least preferred) as
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Figure 4.2: South Sudan’s Graph Model
h2, 10, 11, 4, 14, 13, 8, 3, 1, 7i. Furthermore, North Sudan’s preference relationships among
the set of feasible states SD is represented based on South Sudan’s viewpoint as h7, 2, 10,
13, 8, 14, 11, 4, 1, 3i. South Sudan expects a weak response from North Sudan regarding its
refusal to pay the overpriced export fees (Oil and Energy Trends, 2011; Sudan Tribune,
2011a,b). In addition, South Sudan believes that the only way North Sudan can escalate
the dispute is by shutting down the export pipeline to prevent South Sudan from using it.
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Stability Analysis and Equilibria
The objective of this section is determine the equilibrium states for a first-level hypergame.
The procedures explained in Subsection 3.2.3 can be used to ascertain a first-level hyper-
game equilibria. Three steps are needed to calculate the first-level hypergame equilibria.
In the first step, one need to analyze both North and South Sudan’s subjective games
utilizing GMCR’s solution concepts to identify the equilibria in each DM’s game. Next,
one isolate North Sudan’s strategies out of the equilibrium states obtained from North Su-
dan’s game. The same procedure applied for South Sudan’s game. Finally, the Cartesian
product of both North and South Sudan’s strategies, each of which is obtained from the set
of equilibrium states in a DM’s game, generate the equilibria for a first-level hypergame.
A computerized software called GMCR II (Fang et al., 2003a,b) can be used to obtain the
equilibrium states for North Sudan’s game and South Sudan’s game.
Table 4.4 shows the stability and equilibrium results for North Sudan’s game. As can
be seen, states 2, 6, 10, and 11 are found to be weak equilibria for the dispute; that is,
they are equilibria under GMR and SMR solution concepts. On the other hand, state
12 is found to be a strong equilibrium for the dispute; that is, it is an equilibrium under
Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR solution concepts. North Sudan’s strategy related to state 2 is
g2C = (Y NN)
T , its strategies for states 6 and 12 are g6C = g
12
C = (Y NY )
T , and its strategies
for states 10 and 11 are g10C = g
11
C = (Y Y N)







and g12C are found to be equilibria in North Sudan’s game under GMR and SMR solution








C 2 g⇤GMRC [ g⇤SMRC , in which g⇤GMRC and g⇤SMRC denote
the sets of North Sudan’s strategies that are equilibria under GMR and SMR, respectively.
Also, notice that the strategy g12C is found to be a resolution in North Sudan’s game under
Nash stability definition. Hence, g12C 2 g⇤NashC , in which g⇤NashC represents the set of North
Sudan’s strategies that are equilibria under the Nash solution concept.
Table 4.5 shows the individual stability and equilibria results for South Sudan game.
State 2 is found to be a strong equilibrium; that is, it is an equilibrium under Nash, SEQ,
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Table 4.4: Stability Analysis and Equilibria Results for North Sudan’s Game
! ! States&
! Solution&Concepts& 1! 2! 3! 4! 5! 6! 7! 8! 9! 10! 11! 12! 13! 14! 15!
!
North!Sudan!
Nash! /! /! /! /! /! YES! YES! /! /! /! /! YES! /! YES! /!
SEQ! /! /! /! /! /! YES! YES! YES! YES! /! /! YES! /! YES! /!
GMR! /! YES! /! YES! /! YES! YES! YES! YES! YES! YES! YES! /! YES! /!
SMR! /! YES! /! /! /! YES! YES! YES! YES! YES! YES! YES! /! YES! /!
!
South!Sudan!
Nash! YES! YES! YES! /! YES! /! /! /! /! /! YES! YES! /! /! /!
SEQ! YES! YES! YES! /! YES! /! /! /! /! YES! YES! YES! /! /! /!
GMR! YES! YES! YES! /! YES! YES! /! /! /! YES! YES! YES! /! /! /!
SMR! YES! YES! YES! /! YES! YES! /! /! /! YES! YES! YES! /! /! /!
!
Equilibrium!
Nash! /! /! /! /! /! /! /! /! /! /! /! E! /! /! /!
SEQ! /! /! /! /! /! /! /! /! /! /! /! E! /! /! /!
GMR! /! E! /! /! /! E! /! /! /! E! E! E! /! /! /!
SMR! /! E! /! /! /! E! /! /! /! E! E! E! /! /! /!
!
GMR, and SMR solution concepts, whereas state 10 is a weak equilibrium, because it is
a resolution under GMR and SMR stability definitions. South Sudan’s strategy related to
state 2 is g2D = (NNN)
T , and for state 10 is g10D = (NYN)
T . The strategy g2D is a Nash
strategy for South Sudan, g2D 2 g⇤NashD . The strategies g2D and g10D are GMR and SMR
strategies for South Sudan, such that g2D, g
10
D 2 g⇤GMRD [ g⇤SMRD .
Table 4.5: Stability Analysis and Equilibria Results for South Sudan Game
! ! States&
! Solution&Concepts& 1! 2! 3! 4! 7! 8! 10! 11! 13! 14!
!
North!Sudan!
Nash! /! YES! /! /! YES! /! YES! /! YES! /!
SEQ! /! YES! /! /! YES! /! YES! /! YES! /!
GMR! /! YES! /! /! YES! /! YES! /! YES! /!
SMR! /! YES! /! /! YES! /! YES! /! YES! /!
!
South!Sudan!
Nash! YES! YES! YES! /! /! /! /! YES! /! /!
SEQ! YES! YES! YES! /! /! /! /! YES! /! /!
GMR! YES! YES! YES! /! /! /! YES! YES! /! /!
SMR! YES! YES! YES! /! /! /! YES! YES! /! /!
!
Equilibrium!
Nash! /! E! /! /! /! /! /! /! /! /!
SEQ! /! E! /! /! /! /! /! /! /! /!
GMR! /! E! /! /! /! /! E! /! /! /!
SMR! /! E! /! /! /! /! E! /! /! /!
!
After determining the equilibrium results for North Sudan in its game in Table 4.4, and
for South Sudan in its game in Table 4.5, a first-level hypergame equilibria can be ascer-
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tained by taking the Cartesian product of North Sudan’s strategies that are identified from
its equilibrium states and South Sudan’s strategies that are obtained from its equilibrium
states. Table 4.6 shows the equilibrium results for a first-level hypergame.
Table 4.6: Cartesian Product of Decision Makers’ Stable Strategies!
!
  DM D’s Wining Strategies 
  (NNN) (NYN) 
DM C’s Wining 
Strategies 
(YNN) State 2 State 10 
(YNY) State 6 State 12 




! In Table 4.6, if North Sudan’s and South Sudan’s strategies related to a state are found
to be either Nash, SEQ, GMR, or SMR, then the state is either called hyper Nash equilib-
rium (HE1Nash), hyper SEQ equilibrium (HE1SEQ), hyper GMR equilibrium (HE1GMR)
or hyper SMR equilibrium (HE1SMR), respectively. Table 4.7 shows the equilibrium results
under a specific stability definition for a first-level hypergame. For example, because North
Sudan’s and South Sudan’s strategies related to state 2 are stable under GMR and SMR
solution concepts, state 2, which is identified as a resolution for a first-level hypergame in
Table 4.6, is considered as HE1GMR and HE1SMR equilibrium for a first-level hypergame.
A first-level hypergame equilibria are categorized into useful classes to address variation
in awareness among DMs. In Table 4.7, the results reveal that states 2 and 10, which are
resolutions under North Sudan’s and South Sudan’s subjective games, are considered as
steady hyper equilibria for a first-level hypergame. Thus, if either state 2 or 10 is achieved,
then the equilibrium states most likely constitute sustainable compromise resolutions for
the dispute because no information concerning misperception can be extracted from these
states.
In addition, states 4 and 11 are classified as unsteady hyper equilibria for a first-
level hypergame under GMR and SMR solution concepts. State 4 is recognized but does
not constitute a resolution in both North Sudan’s and South Sudan’s subjective games.
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2! 4! 6! 10! 11! 12!
North)Sudan) g*NashC! NO! NO! YES! NO! NO! YES!
g*SEQC! NO! NO! YES! NO! NO! YES!
g*GMRC! YES! YES! YES! YES! YES! YES!
g*SMRC! YES! YES! YES! YES! YES! YES!
South)Sudan’s)Strategy) g*NashD! YES! YES! YES! NO! NO! NO!
g*SEQD! YES! YES! YES! NO! NO! NO!
g*GMRD! YES! YES! YES! YES! YES! YES!




HENash! /! /! E! /! /! /!
HESEQ! /! /! E! /! /! /!
HEGMR! E! E! E! E! E! E!
HESMR! E! E! E! E! E! E!
!
Hence, if state 4 is attained, then both DMs will obtain new information about their
misperception, which may motivate them to escalate the dispute. State 11 is identified by
both DMs but does not constitute a resolution in South Sudan’s game. South Sudan will
obtain some information about North Sudan’s preferences, which will ultimately ameliorate
South Sudan’s misperception and may motivate it to escalate the dispute.
Furthermore, states 6 and 12 are classified as stealthily equilibria for South Sudan.
These states constitute resolutions for North Sudan in its game. State 6 is a stealthy hyper
equilibrium under Nash solution concept, whereas state 12 is a stealthy hyper equilibrium
under GMR and SMR stability definitions. Thus, if either state 6 or 12 is attained, South
Sudan would be given some information about North Sudan’s option that is unknown to
itself in its game. This observed evidence would motivate South Sudan to escalate the
dispute once it learns about the new option.
Historically, state 12, the stealthy equilibrium, was the resolution for the dispute in
December 2011. State 12 represents the scenario in which North Sudan requested a higher
charge for the use of it export pipeline, and self-reimbursed by taking 23% of South Sudan’s
oil, while South Sudan kept producing the oil and exploring the possibility of having an
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independent oil export route. After South Sudan become aware of its misperception, it
escalated the conflict by stop oil production.
4.2 Case Study II: The Suez Canal Conflict
In the 1956 Suez Canal conflict (Shupe et al., 1980; Fraser and Hipel, 1984), the Egyptian
President Gamal Abdul Nasser surprised both Britain and the US by nationalizing the
Suez Canal. President Nasser chose this course of action after Britain and the US had
withdrawn their o↵er to provide a series of loans and grants to Egypt to help build the
High Aswan Dam on the Nile River. This action caused the termination of the trade
relationship between Egypt and Britain with regard to operating the Suez Canal. The
British wanted to control the Suez Canal as it handled a significant amount of British
marine tra c and was a main gateway of the oil supply from the Middle East to European
countries. Further information about the dispute can be found in Shupe et al. (1980);
Wright et al. (1980); Fraser and Hipel (1984).
4.2.1 Modeling the Universal Set of States of the Suez Canel
Conflict
The conflict between the Britain/ US partnership, and Egypt can be represented as a
specific type of hypergame. In particular, Britain and the US misperceived Egypt’s actual
set of options and preferences. Hence, a separate game must be constructed for each DM
to represent his or her understanding of the dispute. Because none of the DMs are aware
of the misunderstanding, the Suez Canal dispute is modeled as a first-level hypergame.
As of February 9, 1956, the DMs and options for the conflict are given in Table 4.8.
Note that two DMs are identified for the Suez Canal conflict (Shupe et al., 1980; Fraser
and Hipel, 1984): Britain and the US (denoted by BS) which are represented as one DM
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because of shared interests and goals, and Egypt (denoted by EG). As explained in Shupe
et al. (1980); Fraser and Hipel (1984), Britain and the US were not aware of President
Gamal Abdul Nasser’s course of action to nationalize the Suez Canal. Thus, this option is
hidden to both Britain and the US and will not be considered in their subjective game.
Table 4.8: DMs and Options for the Dispute
	




1. Grant loan with original 
terms 
Britain and US and 
Egypt 
2. Grant loan on Nasser’s 
conditions 





3. Negotiate loan with 
original terms 
Britain and US and 
Egypt 
 
4. Negotiate loan on 
Nasser’s conditions 
Britain and US and 
Egypt 
5. Mitigate Britain and US Britain and US and 
Egypt 
 
6. Seek loan with Russians Britain and US and 
Egypt 
7. Pursue loan from 
Russians and, if this does 






The courses of action in Table 4.8 are considered in defining the universal set of states
for a first-level hypergame, Ŝ1. In option form, an option can be selected or not by the
focal DM who possesses it; as a result, the mathematical number of states in Ŝ1 is equal to
2  where   is the number of options in the conflict. Some of the mathematically possible
states are infeasible and need to be removed from Ŝ1. For instance, the circumstance in
which Egypt decided to negotiate both loan conditions are infeasible (mutually exclusive).
A complete list of infeasible states can be found in Shupe et al. (1980); Fraser and Hipel
(1984). Table 4.9 shows the feasible states for the Suez Canal conflict. Each option in
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Table 4.9 is labeled with a number and can either be chosen (Y for yes) or not (N for no).
Table 4.9: Universal Set of States, Ŝ1
Decision Makers and Options
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Britain and US
1. Grant original loan  N  Y  N  Y  N  Y  N  N  Y  N  Y  N  N  Y  N  Y
2. Agree to Nassr's conditions  N  N  N  N  N  N  Y  N  N  N  N  Y  N  N  N  N
Egypt
3.  Negotiate original loan  N  N  Y  Y  N  N  N  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  N  N  N
4. Negotiate Nasser's terms  N  N  N  N  Y  Y  Y  N  N  Y  Y  Y  N  N  N  N
5. Mitigate West  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  N  N  N  N
6.  Russian loan  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  Y  Y  N  N
7. Russian loan/ Nationalization N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N Y  Y
Possible Scenarios (States)
4.2.2 Stability Analysis of the Suez Canel Conflict
Equilibrium Results for Britain and US’s Game
The set of possible states in Britain and the US’s game is SBS = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14}. Note that some states in the universal set of states Ŝ1 are hidden to Britain
and the US. The states in which Egypt chooses to select the option of nationalizing the
Suez Canal are hidden to Britain and the US. As a result, states 15 and 16 in Table 4.9
are not considered by Britain and the US in their game.
To perform the stability analysis for Britain and the US’s game, states are put in
sequence of preference for both DMs as perceived by Britain and the US. To begin with,
Britain and the US’s preference relationships are expressed by ordinal ranking as {9   8 ⇠
10 ⇠ 11   1 ⇠ 2 ⇠ 3 ⇠ 5 ⇠ 6   4   12   13 ⇠ 14   7} (Shupe et al., 1980; Fraser
and Hipel, 1984). As can be seen, the most preferred state for Britain and the US is state
9. This scenario represents the circumstance in which Britain and the US along with the
World Bank proposed to grant Egypt a series of loans to build the High Aswan Dam in the
Nile River, and Egypt agreed to negotiate the proposed loans under Britain and the US’s
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terms. The least preferred scenario for Britain and the US is state 7. This state represents
the situation in which Britain and the US o↵ered a loan to Egypt under President Nasser’s
conditions, and Egypt decided to negotiate the o↵er.
Egypt’s preference relationships as perceived by Britain and the US are expressed by
an ordinal ranking as {7   4   13 ⇠ 14   1 ⇠ 2 ⇠ 3 ⇠ 5 ⇠ 6   8 ⇠ 10 ⇠ 11   12   9}
(Shupe et al., 1980; Fraser and Hipel, 1984). The most desirable scenario for Egypt is
state 7. This state, as mentioned before, is the least preferred state for Britain and the US.
The worst possible scenario for Egypt is state 9, which represents the situation in which
Britain and the US grant a loan to Egypt with their original conditions and President
Gamal Abdul Nassar negotiates in their terms.
Table 4.10 shows the stability and equilibrium results for Britain and the US’s game.
As can be seen, states 4 and 14 are found to be weak equilibria for the conflict because
they are equilibria under the SEQ, GMR and SMR solution concepts but not Nash. On
the other hand, state 13 is determined to be a strong equilibrium for the conflict because
it is an equilibrium under the Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR solution concepts. Britain and
the US’s strategies related to states 4 and 14 are g4BS = g
14
BS = (Y N)
T , and their strategy
for state 13 is g13BS = (NN)
T . Hence, one can obtain g⇤NashBS as follows:
• g⇤NashBS = {g13BS} = {(NN)T}.
The sets of strategies, g⇤SEQBS , g
⇤GMR
BS , and g
⇤SMR
BS , can be obtained analogously as follows:
• g⇤SEQBS = {g4BS, g13BS, g14BS} = {(NN)T , (Y N)T},
• g⇤GMRBS = {g4BS, g13BS, g14BS} = {(NN)T , (Y N)T}, and
• g⇤SMRBS = {g4BS, g13BS, g14BS} = {(NN)T , (Y N)T}.
These strategies are displayed in the top part of Table 4.12.
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Table 4.10: Stability Analysis and Equilibrium Results for Britain and US’s Game
States 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Nash YES YES YES NO YES YES NO NO YES YES YES NO YES YES
SEQ YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
GMR YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SMR YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Nash NO NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
SEQ NO NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO YES YES
GMR NO NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO YES YES
SMR NO NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO YES YES
Nash / / / / / / / / / / / / E /
SEQ / / / E / / / / / / / / E E
GMR / / / E / / / / / / / / E E
SMR / / / E / / / / / / / / E E
 Britain and US
 Egypt
 Equilibrium
Equilibrium Results for Egypt’s Game
President Nasser correctly perceived Britain and the US’s available courses of actions and
preferences; as a result, he correctly evaluated the consequences of the dispute and avoided
facing any strategic surprise (Shupe et al., 1980; Fraser and Hipel, 1984). The set of
possible states in Egypt’s game, SEG = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16}, is
identical to Ŝ1. However, based on Egypt’s perception, SEG is partitioned into two disjoint
sets: the class of states that are correctly perceived by Egypt as well as Britain and the
US, denoted as SR = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14}; and the group of states that
are correctly perceived by only Egypt and hidden to Britain and the US, expressed as
SPEG \ SHBS = {15, 16}.
Egypt’s preference relationships among the set of feasible states SEG are based on its
ambition to obtain a series of loans from the West without forfeiting its national inde-
pendence. However, if President Nasser fails to obtain a loan from the West, then he will
approach Russia, and if all of his e↵orts in securing a loan for constructing the High Aswan
Dam fail, then he will nationalize the Suez Canal. That is, Egypt’s preference relationships
are expressed by an ordinal ranking as 7   4   15 ⇠ 16   13 ⇠ 14   1 ⇠ 2 ⇠ 3 ⇠ 5 ⇠ 6  
8 ⇠ 10 ⇠ 11   12   9} (Shupe et al., 1980; Fraser and Hipel, 1984).
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Based on Egypt’s perspective, Britain and the US want to prevent Nasser from securing
a loan from Russia by o↵ering him a loan under the condition that Egypt shares some of its
sovereignty with the West with respect to managing the Suez Canal. The least preferred
scenario for Britain and the US is the state in which Egypt chooses to nationalize the
Suez Canal to secure funds for the High Aswan Dam. That is, the preference relationships
for Britain and the US as perceived by Egypt can be expressed by an ordinal ranking as
{9   8 ⇠ 10 ⇠ 11   1 ⇠ 2 ⇠ 3 ⇠ 5 ⇠ 6   4   12   13 ⇠ 14   7   15 ⇠ 16} (Shupe et al.,
1980; Fraser and Hipel, 1984).
Table 4.11 shows the stability and equilibrium results for Egypt’s game. As can be seen,
states 4, 7, and 16 are determined to be weak equilibria for the conflict because they are
equilibria under the SEQ, GMR and SMR solution concepts but not Nash. On the other
hand, state 15 is found to be a strong equilibrium for the conflict since it is an equilibrium
under the Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR solution concepts. Egypt’s strategies related to
states 4 and 7 are g4EG = (Y NNNN)
T , and g7EG = (NYNNN)
T , respectively. Moreover,
Egypt’s strategies for states 15 and 16 are g15EG = g
16
EG = (NNNNY )
T . Hence, one can
obtain g⇤NashEG as follows:
• g⇤NashEG = {g15EG}= {(NNNNY )T}.
In a similar fashion, one can obtain the sets of strategies, g⇤SEQEG , g
⇤GMR




• g⇤SEQEG ={g4EG, g7EG, g15EG, g16EG}=
{(Y NNNN)T , (NYNNN)T , (NNNNY )T},
• g⇤GMREG = {g4EG, g7EG, g15EG, g16EG}=
{(Y NNNN)T , (NYNNN)T , (NNNNY )T}, and
• g⇤SMREG = {g4EG, g7EG, g15EG, g16EG}=
{(Y NNNN)T , (NYNNN)T , (NNNNY )T}.
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These strategies are shown in Table 4.12.
Table 4.11: Stability Analysis and Equilibrium Results for Egypt’s Game
States 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Nash YES YES YES / YES YES / / YES YES YES / YES YES YES YES
SEQ YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
GMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Nash / / / YES / / YES / / / / / / / YES /
SEQ / / / YES / / YES / / / / / / / YES YES
GMR / / / YES / / YES / / / / / / / YES YES
SMR / / / YES / / YES / / / / / / / YES YES
Nash / / / / / / / / / / / / / / E /
SEQ / / / E / / E / / / / / / / E E
GMR / / / E / / E / / / / / / / E E
SMR / / / E / / E / / / / / / / E E
 Britain and US
 Egypt
 Equilibrium
Equilibrium Results for a First-level Hypergame
After determining the equilibrium results for Britain and the US in their game in Ta-
ble 4.10, and for Egypt in its game in Table 4.11, the first-level hypergame equilibria can
be ascertained by taking the Cartesian product of Britain and the US’s strategies that
are identified from its equilibrium states and Egypt’s strategies that are obtained from its
equilibrium states. Table 4.12 shows the results of equilibrium analysis for the first-level
hypergame. As can be seen in Table 4.12, states 3, 5, 4, 6, and 16 are found to be weak hy-
pergame equilibria (HE) for the first-level hypergame since they are equilibria under SEQ,
GMR, and SMR. However, state 15 is a strong hypergame equilibrium for the first-level
hypergame because it is a resolution under the Nash stability definition.
The first-level hypergame equilibria are categorized into useful classes to address vari-
ation in awareness among DMs. In Table 4.12, the results reveal that states 3, 5, and
6 2 SR are not a resolution in either Britain and the US’s game or Egypt’s game. That
is, states 3, 5, and 6 are considered as unsteady hyper equilibrium states under the SEQ,
GMR, and SMR for the first-level hypergame. States 3, 5, and 6 are recognized but do
not constitute resolutions in both DMs’ respective games. Hence, if either state 3, 5, or 6
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is attained, then both DMs will obtain new information about their misperception, which
may motivate them to escalate the dispute into future rounds.
Moreover, state 4, which is a hypergame equilibrium and also constitutes a resolution
under Britain and the US’s as well as Egypt’s subjective games, is considered to be a steady
hyper SEQ, GMR, and SMR equilibrium for the first-level hypergame. Thus, if state 4 is
reached, then this equilibrium most likely constitutes a sustainable compromise resolution
for the dispute because no information concerning misperception can be extracted from
state 4.
Furthermore, states 15 and 16 are classified as stealthy hypergame equilibria for the
first-level hypergame. These states are only recognized by Egypt in its game and also
constitute resolutions in its subjective game. State 15 is a stealthy hyper Nash equilib-
rium state for the first-level hypergame because it is a resolution under the Nash stability
concept, whereas state 16 is a stealthy hyper SEQ, SMR, and GMR equilibrium because
it is a resolution under the SEQ, SMR and GMR solution concepts. If either state 15 or
16 is attained, Britain and the US would be given some information about Egypt’s option
that is unknown to them in their game and would be facing a strategic surprise. This
observed evidence would motivate Britain and the US to escalate the conflict once they
learn about the new option. Britain and the US misperceived Egypt’s true set of options
and miscalculated the consequences of the conflict.
Historically, state 15, the stealthy hyper Nash equilibrium state, was the resolution of
the dispute. Table 4.13 outlines the evolution of the Suez Canal dispute. The conflict
evolves from the status quo (state 2) to the first transition state (state 6), in which Nasser
rejects the original proposal made by Britain and the US, and o↵ers alternative conditions.
This chain of events leads to another transitional state (state 5), in which Britain and the
US o cially withdraw their o↵er to provide Egypt with a series of loans to help construct
the High Aswan Dam. Britain and the US withdraw this o↵er because of a change in US
national politics, actions that Nasser took were hostile to the interests of Western countries,
and Russias inability to support the construction of the High Aswan Dam. These events
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Table 4.12: Equilibrium Results for a First-Level Hypergame
Stability NN NN NN YN YN YN
Nash YES YES YES NO NO NO
SEQ YES YES YES YES YES YES
GMR YES YES YES YES YES YES
SMR YES YES YES YES YES YES
Stability YNNNN NYNNN NNNNY YNNNN NYNNN NNNNY
Nash NO NO YES NO NO YES
SEQ YES YES YES YES YES YES
GMR YES YES YES YES YES YES
SMR YES YES YES YES YES YES
States 3 5 15 4 6 16
Nash / / HE / / /
SEQ HE HE HE HE HE HE
GMR HE HE HE HE HE HE
SMR HE HE HE HE HE HE
Nash UHNash UHNash STHNash UHNash /
SEQ UHSEQ UHSEQ STHSEQ SHSEQ UHSEQ STHSEQ
GMR UHGMR UHGMR STHGMR SHGMR UHGMR STHGMR










Britain and US (BS) 
Egypt (EG)
lead to a resolution in state 15, in which Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal on July 26,
1956. As a result, Egypt gains full control over the canal, secures the funds needed to build
the High Aswan Dam, and ends its association with the West.
State 15 represents the scenario in which Egypt decides to nationalize the Suez Canal
after it failed to secure a series of loans from the West and Russia. This circumstance
represents the occurrence of strategic surprise in a conflict situation. The resolution in
1956 (Shupe et al., 1980; Fraser and Hipel, 1984), as a matter of fact, was very risky as it
caused the Suez Canal invasion later in 1957 (Wright et al., 1980). In the dispute, Egypt
was invaded by Israel, Britain and France for the purpose of regaining control of the Suez
Canal and to remove President Nasser from the power (Wright et al., 1980).
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Table 4.13: Evolution of the Suez Canal Conflict
Decision Makers and Options Status Quo Transition State I Transition state II Equilibrium State
Britain and US
1. Grant original loan Y Y N N
2. Agree to Nassr’s conditions N N N N
Egypt
3. Negotiate original loan N N N N
4. Negotiate Nasser’s terms N Y Y N
5. Mitigate West N N N N
6. Russian loan N N N N
7. Russian loan/ Nationalization N N N Y
State 2 6 5 15
1 4.3 Chapter Summary
The first-level hypergame in graph form has been utilized to model and analyze the 2011
conflict between North and South Sudan over South Sudanese oil exports as well as the 1956
nationalization of the Suez Canal dispute to predict the possible compromise resolutions,
and to investigate the resilience of these equilibrium states after DMs learn about their
misperception in reality. In both conflicts, the historical equilibrium state were under the
definition of the stealthy hyper equilibrium concept of a first-level hypergame in graph
form. This resolution is considered as being unstable because DMs may decide to escalate
the situation into future rounds to improve their position.
After North Sudan self-reimbursed by taking 23% of South Sudan’s oil, South Sudan
escalated the situation by stopping bumping the oil to Port Sudan using North Sudan
pipelines. Also, after Egypt nationalized the canal, an alliance of Britain, France, and
Israel undertook a surprise invasion of the Suez Canal to gain control (Shupe et al., 1980;
Wright et al., 1980; Fraser and Hipel, 1984). This outcome confirms the applicability of
the modeling and analysis techniques of a first-level hypergame in graph form
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Chapter 5
Second-Level Hypergame in Graph
Form
In a second-level hypergame, DMs are playing a di↵erent games and at least one DM
think that he or she is aware of the misperceptions of other DMs. The objectives of this
chapter are fourfold. Firstly, a key goal is to incorporate a second-level hypergame situation
into the framework of GMCR. Consequently, not only conflicts with complete information
can be modeled within GMCR, but also disputes caused by misperceptions among the
DMs. A second objective is to allow a DM to have a misperception about its options,
strategies, possible states, and preferences pertaining to the dispute. A third goal is to
design and analyze starting from the option stage rather than the traditional state level by
identifying di↵erent options for the misperceptions, and to investigate their consequences
on the possible states of the dispute. Finally, stability analysis procedures are designed
and implemented within the second-level hypergame in graph form, thereby, supporting
the calculation of the second-level hypergame equilibria. Chapter 5 is partially based on
the published extended abstract by Aljefri et al. (2016b)
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5.1 Second-Level Hypergame With n Decision
Makers in Graph Form
In a first-level hypergame, stakeholders are not entirely aware about the circumstances of
the dispute. All the information about the dispute such as the set of DMs, set of DMs’
options, the set of states, and each DM’s preferences over the set of possible states, are
perceived by each DM in a subjective fashion (Aljefri et al., 2014a,b, 2015, 2017a). In a
second-level hypergame, however, at least one DM comprehend that one or more DMs are
playing di↵erent subjective games, perhaps because of acquiring some extra information
about the situation or because of misleading the other DMs into perceiving what he or she
wants them to believe, whether it is true or not (Bennett, 1977, 1980; Takahashi et al., 1984;
Hipel et al., 1988; Wang et al., 1988, 1989; Leary, 1995). Therefore, this particular DM
attempts to picture what constitutes the subjective games of its adversaries. For example,
in a two-DM conflict, N = {i, j}, the structure of second-level hypergame reflects how
DM i sees the viewpoint of DM j with respect to the options and preferences of DM i in
the dispute.
The Suez Canal invasion in October 1956 is an example of a second-level hypergame
conflict (Shupe et al., 1980; Wright et al., 1980). After President Nasser of Egypt national-
ized the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, western countries started a three-month negotiation
with Egypt to regain some control over the Suez Canal. However, after negotiations with
Egypt reached a dead end, a coalition composed of Britain, France, and Israel launched an
unexpected attack on Egypt on October 29, 1956 to take back the canal. Egypt did not
anticipate a military intervention from the allied western countries on the Sinai peninsula
and the Suez Canal after the negotiations failed. Consequently, Egypt did not take any
mitigated action to defend itself against the allied attack of the western countries, and
Egypt was surprised when the attack occurred. The allied western countries were aware
of the misperception of Egypt and utilized this information to launch a successful stealthy
attack on Egypt. This situation is an example of the use of strategic surprise in a conflict
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situation.
To permit GMCR to model conflict situations having misperceptions among the par-
ticipating DMs in which at least one DM has knowledge of the subjective games of other
DMs, a new method for a second-level hypergame in graph form is proposed in this chap-
ter. The overall layout of a second-level hypergame with n-DM (n > 2) in graph form
is outlined in Figure 5.1. Similar to a first-level hypergame in graph form (Aljefri et al.,
2017a), the suggested graph model for a second-level hypergame analysis is composed of
three components: one to develop the universal set of states for a second-level hypergame,
another to model the subjective first-level hypergame of each DM, and a third to perform
stability analyses and calculate the equilibria for a second-level hypergame.
Beginning from the top with Step 1 in Figure 5.1, the universal set of states for a second-
level hypergame is designed in a procedure resembling the one conducted to formalize the
universal set of states for a first-level hypergame (Aljefri et al., 2017a). In particular, in
graph form, states are defined in option form by using the universal sets of options of the
DMs for a second-level hypergame. The universal set of options of a DM for a second-level
hypergame is defined by extending the universal set of options of a given DM for a first-
level hypergame to include not only options that are considered by the DM itself and its
adversaries, but also the courses of action of a DM that are considered by its adversaries as
assumed by any DM who assume knowledge of the di↵erent of perception among the DMs.
The union of the universal sets of options of all the DMs for a second-level hypergame
generates the universal set of options for the unified second-level hypergame. This unified
set of options is then utilized to produce the universal set of states for a second-level
hypergame. This set is used to lay out states in the subjective first-level hypergame of
each DM within a second-level hypergame situation.
In Step 2 of Figure 5.1, the modeling of a second-level hypergame begins by modeling the
subjective first-level hypergame of each DM, which can be formed in a similar way to a first-
level hypergame in graph form (Aljefri et al., 2017a). Because in a second-level hypergame
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Figure 5.1: Design of a Second-level Hypergame in the Graph Form
first-level hypergame is formed by a system of subjective games. The combination of the
subjective first-level hypergame of all the DMs generates the mathematical model of a
second-level hypergame.
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In Step 3 of Figure 5.1, the analysis module is further composed of each DM’s subjec-
tive first-level hypergame analyses and the overall second-level hypergame analyses. The
analysis of each DM’s subjective first-level hypergame is always initiated by analyzing the
subjective games of the adversaries by employing any of the standard GMCR stability con-
cepts. Consequently, the possible compromise resolutions in the subjective games of the
adversaries as seen by a given DM are identified. Next, the strategies of the adversaries are
isolated from their equilibrium states within their subjective games. These strategies are
referred to as a DM’s winning strategies. After that, one calculate the Cartesian product
of all of the opponents’ winning strategies. Finally, the stability of the states for a given
DM in its subjective game within its subjective first-level hypergame that are related to
the winning strategies of its adversaries are investigated. If the state is stable for a DM
in its subjective game, it is considered as an equilibrium in its subjective game and in its
subjective first-level hypergame. The analysis of the overall second-level hypergame starts
by first isolating each DM’s strategies out of the equilibrium states in its subjective game
within its subjective first-level hypergame. Next, one take the Cartesian product of all
DMs’ winning strategies to produce the possible equilibria for a second-level hypergame.
The outline of this section is as follows. First, the mathematical modeling of a second-
level hypergame with n-DM in graph form is presented in Section 5.1.1. In Section 5.1.2
the structures of the universal set of options of a DM for a second-level hypergame and the
design of the universal set of options for the entire second-level hypergame are proposed.
The modeling of the universal set of states for a second-level hypergame with more than
two DMs in graph form is discussed in Section 5.1.3. Finally, the analysis of a second-level
hypergame with n-DM in graph form is described in Section 5.1.4.
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5.1.1 Mathematical Modeling of a Second-Level Hypergame with
n Decision Makers
A second-level hypergame is a system which consists of subjective first-level hypergames,
each of which depicts the perception of a particular DM of the conflict circumstance. By
utilizing Eq. 3.1, a second-level hypergame H2 can be furnished as given below:
H2 = hH11 , H12 , ..., H1i , ..., H1ni (5.1)
For i 2 N , the subjective first-level hypergame of DM i, H1i , is expressed as shown below:
H1i = hGji : j 2 Nii (5.2)
where Gji is the subjective game of DM j as seen by DM i within H1i , and Ni ✓ N denotes
the set of DMs as perceived by DM i in H1i . Mathematically, Gji is defined as follows:
Gji = hNji, Sji, {Akji : k 2 Nji, j 2 Ni}, {%kji: k 2 Nji, j 2 Ni}i (5.3)
where Nji ✓ Ni is the set of DMs as perceived by first DM j and then by DM i. Sji is the
set of feasible states in Gji. Akji represents the set of state transitions available for DM k
from one state to another in Sji as perceived by DM j and then by DM i. %kji denotes
the preference relations of DM k over the states in Sji as perceived by DM j and then by
DM i. Note that if k = j, then Ajji and %jji are identical to Aji and %ji, respectively.
Aji and %ji represent the allowed state transitions of DM j and its relative preferences as
perceived by DM i, respectively.
Please note that if j = i, then Gii is identical to Gi, which as mentioned earlier represent
DM i’s actual subjective game.
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5.1.2 Universal Set of Options in a Second-Level Hypergame
with Two or More Decision Makers
As mentioned earlier, states in GMCR (Fang et al., 1993; Fang et al., 2003a,b) are defined
in option form by using the courses of action of the competing DMs (Howard, 1971).
Within this paradigm, complete information is always assumed among the DMs. Hence,
the DMs are assumed to correctly perceive the conflict situation, and thereby accurately
recognize the model parameters of other DMs in the conflict situation, such as options,
strategies, and preferences. Therefore, the dispute is represented by a single graph model.
Under a second-level hypergame (Bennett, 1977, 1980; Takahashi et al., 1984; Hipel et al.,
1988; Wang et al., 1988, 1989; Leary, 1995), however, the dispute is perceived by each DM
in a subjective fashion, and at least one DM possesses knowledge of the asymmetry of
the viewpoint among the DMs. Thus, the set of options for a focal DM can be extended
based on the perception (correct or incorrect) of the focal DM itself, its adversaries, and
its adversaries as perceived by the other DMs in the dispute. For instance, because of
misperception, a DM may consider some realistic and unrealistic options for itself in the
dispute (Aljefri et al., 2014a,b, 2015, 2017a). Similarly, the adversaries of a given DM
may correctly perceive, fail to perceive, and/or invent some options for a DM (Aljefri
et al., 2014a,b, 2015, 2017a). Moreover, a DM may be cognizant of the misperception
of its adversaries, and thereby try to perceive which options might be considered by its
adversaries, and mistakes may occur during this process (Bennett, 1977, 1980; Takahashi
et al., 1984; Hipel et al., 1988; Wang et al., 1988, 1989; Leary, 1995).
To consider all viable options for a DM in a second-level hypergame situation, the idea
of a universal set of options for the entire second-level hypergame with n DMs in graph
form is addressed in this subsection. In particular, the concept of a universal set of options
for the entire first-level hypergame in graph form (Aljefri et al., 2015, 2017a) is extended
to define options for a second-level hypergame in graph form. A course of action in the
universal set of options for a given DM in a second-level hypergame can be illustrated
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using the following classes (Aljefri et al., 2015, 2017a): (1) correctly perceived by the DM
itself, (2) misconceived by the DM itself, and (3) misconceived by its adversaries. Similar
to a first-level hypergame in graph form (Aljefri et al., 2015, 2017a), the identification of
the universal set of options for a given DM in a second-level hypergame is conducted by
an external analyst who is cognizant of the di↵erences in viewpoints among the competing
DMs (Aljefri et al., 2017a).
The set of DMs in a second-level hypergame is denoted by N = {1, 2, ..., i, ..., n}. For
i 2 N , let Ni ✓ N stand for the set of DMs as perceived by DM i within H1i . If Ni = N ,
then one concludes that DM i correctly recognizes all the DMs in the dispute, whereas, if
Ni 6= N , then one assumes that DM i misconceives the number of DMs participating in
the dispute.
A DM’s Set of Options Correctly Perceived by Itself
The set of options of a given DM that are correctly perceived by itself contains elements that
are real, free from any misunderstanding, and recognized by a given DM, and represent
its actual capability in the dispute (Aljefri et al., 2015, 2017a). However, because of
misperception, the adversaries of a given DM may fail to consider some of the actual
options of the DM (Aljefri et al., 2017a), perhaps because of incomplete information or
the attempt of a given DM to hide one or more of its actual options in the dispute. In
some real-life conflicts, a DM may be aware of the misperception of its adversaries, and as
a result, try to visualize what its adversaries know, and mistakes may occur during this
process.
Definition 5.1.2.1 (Set of Correctly Perceived Courses of Action of a Focal DM).
Choose i 2 N . The set of courses of action of DM i that are correctly considered by itself
is denoted by ORii . For j 2 N   {i}, let ORij symbolizes the set of actual options of DM i
that are recognized by DM j. Then, the actual real options of DM i that are considered by
itself and other DMs in N can be expressed as ORi = \nj=1ORij. For p 2 N   {i} and q 2 N ,
102
let ORipq denote the set of DM i’s actual options that are considered by DM p as seen by
DM q. Then, DM i’s actual options that are considered by its adversaries as perceived by
any DM q can be expressed as ([p2N {i} [q2N ORipq). It is assumed that ([j2NORij) ✓ ORii
and ([p2N {i} [q2N ORipq) ✓ ORii .
To provide good illustration about all the possible types of a DM’s options within the
second-level hypergame, the hypothetical examples that are depicted in Figures 5.2, 5.3,








Figure 5.2: DM i’s Correctly Recognized Courses of Action
The set of options of DM i that are correctly perceived by itself is illustrated in Fig-
ure 5.2. As can be seen, ORii includes four real options: x1, x2, x3, and x4. These courses of
action are within the control of DM i. However, because of the misperception of DM j, it
does not see some of the correctly perceived options of DM i. DM j correctly recognizes x1,
but not x2, x3, and x4. Therefore, in this research it is assumed that ORij ✓ ORii . Moreover,
DM i may assume knowledge of the misperception of DM j and, as a result, attempt to
perceive which of its correctly perceived options are recognized by DM j. It can be seen
that DM i assumes that DM j has recognized x1 and x2 in ORiji. DM i wrongly believes
that DM j perceives the option x2. Despite DM i’s mistaken belief, it will still assume
that DM j is aware of x1 and x2, but not options x3 and x4. Similar to ORij, it is assumed
that ORiji ✓ ORii .
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A DM’s Set of Options that are Misconceived by Itself
The second notion of options includes a DM’s courses of action that are misconceived by
itself. Similar to the case of a DM’s universal set of options for a first-level hypergame
(Aljefri et al., 2017a), two sets of options can represent DM i’s self-misperception: the
groups of options of DM i that are (1) imagined and (2) misunderstood by itself, symbolized
as OIii and O
M
ii , respectively. DM i cannot exercise any of the options in O
I
ii because it
does not possess them in reality. OMii is defined by the mapping function  i : O
R̄
i  ! OMii ,
such that for each option in OR̄i there is a misinterpreted option in O
M
ii . According to the
definition in Aljefri et al. (2017a), OR̄i represents the set of courses of action of DM i that
are valid in reality, but misunderstood by DM i because of its self-misperception.
Figure 5.3 shows an illustrative example of the set of options of DM i that are imagined
by itself. As can be seen, DM i imagined options x5 and x6. These two options cannot
be exercised in reality because DM i does not actually possess them. In a second-level
hypergame, DM i may imagine a course of action for itself because of its misperception or
its attempt to deceive its opponents by making them believe that it has some important









Figure 5.3: Options in OIii in Comparison with O
R
ii
A situation in which DM i misunderstands the meaning of its options is depicted in
Figure 5.4. It is clear that all elements in OR̄i are mapped to O
M
ii , but with a di↵erent
interpretation. x7 and x8 are respectively comprehended by DM i as x9 and x10. However,
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DM i underperceives x13 as it cannot visualize it. Note that these sets of options pertain
only to the self-misperception of DM i. Hence, they are not restrained by the awareness of
DM i of the misperception of its adversaries. Thus, their definitions and examples given










Figure 5.4: Options in OR̄i Misinterpreted by DM i in O
M
ii
A DM’s Set of Options that are Misconceived by Its Adversaries
Similar to the universal set of options of a given DM for first-level hypergame (Aljefri
et al., 2017a), the courses of action of a particular DM that are not considered by itself in
the dispute but are still assumed by its adversaries, or a particular DM thought that its
adversaries contemplated them, can be regarded as being either imagined or misunderstood
options. The sets of these options are formally defined below:
Definition 5.1.2.2 (Set of Options of a DM that are Imagined by Its Adver-
saries). Select i 2 N . For j 2 N   {i}, let OIij denote the set of options of DM i that are
imagined by DM j. For p 2 N   {i} and q 2 N , let OIipq be the set of options of DM i that
are imagined by DM p as perceived by DM q. Then, ([j2N {i}OIij) and ([p2N {i}[q2N OIipq)
designate the options of DM i that are imagined by its adversaries and by its adversaries













Figure 5.5: Courses of Action of DM i as Imagined by its Adversaries





The notation OIiji is used rather than the general form O
I
ipq to illustrate clearly the idea
of misperception that may occur in a second-level hypergame. It can be seen that OIij
includes x5, x7, and x11. These elements are considered by DM j in Gjj within H1j .
Further, by comparing the options in OIij with the option in O
I
iji, one can see that x5 is
common to both sets. In this situation, one can assume that DM i correctly captures
the misperception of DM j with respect to x5. Note that DM i can, in fact, incorrectly
picture the misperception of DM j. DM i fails to perceive x7 and x11 that are imagined by
DM j. Hence, DM i within the second-level hypergame framework can observe (correctly
or incorrectly) the misperceptions of its adversaries in a conflict situation. Moreover, by
investigating the elements in Figures 5.3 and 5.5, one can observe that x5 belongs to OIii,
OIij, and O
I
iji. In this case, one can assume that DM i is successful in deceiving DM j by
making it believe that DM i possesses x5, when in reality i does not hold it.
Definition 5.1.2.3 (Set of Options of a DM that are Misunderstood by Its Ad-
versaries). Select i 2 N . For j 2 N   {i}, the courses of action in ORii and OR̄i that are
misinterpreted by DM j are designated as the courses of action of DM i misunderstood by
DM j, symbolized as OMij . Then, the set of options of DM i that are misunderstood by all
of its adversaries is expressed as ([j2N {i}OMij ). For p 2 N   {i} and q 2 N , options in
ORii that are misinterpreted by DM p as perceived by DM q are contained in the set O
M
ipq.
























(b) Options in ORii Misunderstood by DM j as
Seen by DM i
Figure 5.6: Options of DM i that are Misunderstood by its Adversaries
adversaries as perceived by any DM q.
The sets of DM i’s options that are misunderstood by its opponents are illustrated in
Figure 5.6. Similar to the aforementioned cases, the notation OMiji in Figure 5.6b is used
rather than the general notation OMipq to clearly explain the concept. In Figure 5.6a, it
can be seen that OMij represents the options of DM i that are misunderstood in meaning
by DM j in Gjj within H1j . Further, O
M
iji denotes the courses of action of DM i that are
misunderstood by DM j as seen by DM i in Gji within H1i . By observing the elements in
the sets OMij and O
M
iji, one can conclude that DM i recognizes the misperception of DM j in
misunderstanding the meaning of x4 and thought it to be x12. This insightful information
may assist DM i in achieving a better result in the dispute. Moreover, as can be seen in
Figure 5.6b, DM i is not aware of the misperception of DM j in perceiving x10, since x10 is
unknown to i in Gii within H1i . Furthermore, by investigating the entries in Figure 5.6, one
can recognize that DM i is not correct in perceiving the misperception of DM j, because x3
is unknown to DM j, but DM i thought that DM j interpreted x3 as x14. Hence, within the
second-level hypergame framework in graph form, a DM can perceive the misperception of
its opponents correctly, incorrectly, or may be unaware of its opponents’ misperception.
The descriptions of di↵erent types of perceptions of options have now been formalized
for the case of n-DM. Therefore, one can now formally define the universal set of options
for a DM in a second-level hypergame. In particular, DM i’s universal set of options for a
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second-level hypergame is defined as follows and depicted in Figure 5.7.
Definition 5.1.2.4 (DM i’s Universal Set of Options in a Second-level Hyper-
game). Select i 2 N . Let Ö2i represent the universal set of options of DM i for a second-
level hypergame H2. Then, Ö2i = ([j2NORij)[OR̄i [([j2NOIij)[([j2NOMij )[([p2N {i}[q2N
























Figure 5.7: Universal Set of Options of DM i for Second-level Hypergame
Figure 5.7 shows the assumed relationships among the set of options of DM i that are
perceived by itself, perceived by its opponent DM j, and perceived by DM j as contem-
plated by DM i. These relations is identical to the general case notation. These assumed
relationships are listed below for the general case:
• ([j2N {i}ORij) ✓ ORii .
• ([p2N {i} [q2N ORipq) ✓ ORii .
• ([j2N {i}ORij) \ ([p2N {i} [q2N ORipq) 6= ; may or may not exist.
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• \j2NOIij 6= ; may or may not hold.
• ([j2NOIij) \ ([p2N {i} [q2N OIipq) 6= ; may or may not exist.
• ([j2N {i}OIij) \ OR̄i 6= ; may or may not hold.
• \j2NOMij 6= ; may or may not exist.
• ([j2NOMij ) \ ([p2N {i} [q2N OMipq) 6= ; may or may not be true.
• ([j2NORij) \ ([j2NOIij) = ([j2NORij) \ ([p2N {i} [q2N OIipq) = ([j2NORij) \ OR̄i =
OIii \ OR̄i = ([j2NOIij) \ ([j2NOMij ) = ([p2N {i} [q2N OIipq) \ ([p2N {i} [q2N OMipq) =
([p2N {i} [q2N OIipq) \ OR̄i = ([j2NOMij ) \ OR̄i = ([p2N {i} [q2N OMipq) \ OR̄i =
([p2N {i} [q2N OMipq) \ OMii = ;
Keep in mind that all courses of action in Ö2i are recognized by an external expert.
However, because the DMs in the second-level hypergame may have di↵erent perceptions,
some options in Ö2i may be known to them while others may not. For j 2 N , the set of
options of DM i that are unknown to DM j is expressed in the same way as performed in
first-level hypergame in graph form by Aljefri et al. (2017a), as OUij = Ö
2
i \(ORij [OIij [OMij ).
Further, for p 2 N   {i} and q 2 N , the set of options of DM i that are unknown to DM p
as perceived by DM q is defined as: OUipq = Ö
2
i \ (ORipq [ OIipq [ OMipq).
The universal set of options of other DMs for a second-level hypergame can be analo-
gously defined. The union of the universal sets of options of all the DMs for a second-level
hypergame mathematically defines the universal set of options for the entire second-level
hypergame Ô2 as follows:
Ô2 = [i2N Ö2i . (5.4)
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5.1.3 Universal Set of States in an n-Decision Maker Second-
Level Hypergame
Having now introduced the universal set of options for a second-level hypergame, a tech-
nique similar to that used for defining the universal set of states for first-level hypergame
by Aljefri et al. (2017a) is employed to construct the states in the universal set of states
for a second-level hypergame. This set of states includes the perception of a DM, the per-
ception of its adversaries, and the perception of adversaries as contemplated by the other
DMs about the conflict situation. According to the mathematical representation of option
form for which complete information is assumed (Howard, 1971; Fraser and Hipel, 1979;
Fang et al., 1993; Fang et al., 2003a,b), representative states in option form for an n-DM
second-level hypergame can be formed as follows:
Definition 5.1.3.1 (Universal Set of States for a Second-level Hypergame). Let
N = {1, 2, ..., i, ..., n}. For i 2 N , note that Ö2i = {oik̄ : k̄ = 1, 2, ...,mi} denotes the
universal set of options of DM i for a second-level hypergame, where oi
k̄
is the k̄th option of
DM i and mi =| Ö2i | is the total number of options in Ö2i . A course of action can either be
chosen or not by the DM controlling it. Therefore, the strategy of DM i can be expressed
by the mapping gi : Ö2i  ! {0, 1}. Recall that Ô2 = Ö21 [ Ö22 [ ... [ Ö2i [ ... [ Ö2n denotes




the number of elements in Ô2. Then, a state s in option form is a  -dimensional column
vector and is expressed by the mapping f : Ô2  ! {0, 1}, such that f(oi
k̄
) = either 0 or 1,
for i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n.
Keep in mind that a state is a vector in the structure (f(o11), ..., f(o
1
m1
), ..., f(on1 ), ...,
f(onmn))
T . Then, the set of mathematically feasible states for a second-level hypergame
is denoted by Ŝ2 = {s1, s2, ..., s2 }, where 2  is the total number of the mathematically
feasible states. Similar to the standard GMCR, some of the mathematically feasible states
in Ŝ2 are removed from the model because they are infeasible within four option conditions
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..., gs1n . Therefore, s1 = ((g
s1
1 )
T , (gs12 )
T , ..., (gs1i )
T , ..., (gs1n )
T )T .
States in a DM’s Subjective First-Level Hypergame
It was noted earlier that second-level hypergame is described by a system of subjective
first-level hypergames, each of which points out not only the perception of a particular
DM of the dispute, but also the perception of its adversaries about the conflict situation
as seen by a particular DM. For i 2 N , one should keep in mind that H1i = hGji : j 2 Nii.
To identify states in Gji, Ô2 must be partitioned based on the perception of DM j as
perceived by DM i into two collections: the groups of options that are (1) realized by DM j
as assumed by DM i, expressed as ([k2NjiORkji) [ ([k2NjiOIkji) [ ([k2NjiOMkji), where Nji
is the set of DMs as perceived by DM j and then by DM i, and (2) hidden to DM j in















ji, respectively. With the collections
of options defined above, one can now define the sets of recognizable and hidden states in
Gji as follows:
Definition 5.1.3.2 (Set of Recognizable States in Gji). Select i 2 N and j 2 Ni. Let
Sji ✓ Ŝ2 be the set of states perceived by DM j in Gji as seen by DM i in H1i . A state
s 2 Sji () there is a mapping f : Ô2 ! {0, 1} satisfying f(o) = 0 , 8 o 2 [k2NjiOUkji.
Definition 5.1.3.3 (Set of Hidden States in Gji). Choose i 2 N and j 2 Ni. Denote
by SHji ✓ Ŝ2 the set of states that are hidden to DM j in Gji as seen by DM i in H1i . A state
s 2 SHji () there is a mapping f : Ô2 ! {0, 1} satisfying 9 o 2 [k2NjiOUkji, f(o) = 1.
Similar to the case of a first-level hypergame with n DMs in graph form in Aljefri et al.
(2017a), the set of recognizable states of a DM in its subjective game within its subjective
first-level hypergame is further classified by an external expert or analyst into five distinct
classes of states. Note that in a second-level hypergame, the analysis of a DM subjective
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first-level hypergame always starts by analyzing its opponents’ games as seen by itself
within its own subjective first-level hypergame. After that, a DM utilizes this insightful
information to calculate the equilibrium states in its game within its subjective first-level
hypergame. Finally, second-level hypergame equilibria are calculated by evaluating all
DMs’ subjective games out of their subjective first-level hypergames. Therefore, within
second-level hypergame, the classification of states is limited to the subjective game of a
DM within its subjective first-level hypergame.
For i 2 N , the set of recognizable states of DM i, Sii, in Gii within H1i is divided as
follows: the group of states that are (1) correctly perceived by all DMs in the dispute,
denoted by SR; (2) correctly identified by DM i and perhaps by some of its adversaries but
not by all, represented by SPii ; (3) imagined by DM i, symbolized as S
I
ii; (4) misunderstood
in meaning by DM i, symbolized as SMii ; and (5) imagined and misunderstood by DM i,
denoted by SI,Mii . The definitions of the five classes of states are summarized in Table 5.1
for the case of n-DM second-level hypergame. These distinct sets assist the analyst in
classifying the second-level hypergame’s equilibria into meaningful categories to provide
better strategic insights about the hypergame situation. Also, these equilibria explore
the possible moves of a DM after observing others’ misperceptions in reality. For further
discussion about the classification of Sii in Gii, see Aljefri et al. (2017a) and the references
contained therein.
5.1.4 Analysis of a Second-Level Hypergame with n-DM in Graph
Form
Several techniques are accessible to analyze a second-level hypergame (Bennett, 1977, 1980;
Takahashi et al., 1984; Wang et al., 1988, 1989). In this research, the methods used in
Wang et al. (1988, 1989) are improved and applied within the framework of a second-level
hypergame in graph form to anticipate the equilibria of the situation under investigation.
Figure 5.8 shows the overall structure of a second-level hypergame analysis in graph form.
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Table 5.1: Partitioning of Sii in Gii within H1i
State Type Definition
SR A state s 2 Sii is correctly recognized by all DMs, that is,
s 2 SR ✓ Sii () there is a mapping f : Ô2 ! {0, 1}
satisfying f(o) = 0, 8 o 2 Ô2 \ ([i2NORi ).
SPii A state s 2 Sii is correctly perceived by DM i itself in Gii
and possibly by some of its adversaries but not by all, that
is, s 2 SPii () there is a mapping f : Ô2 ! {0, 1}
satisfying 9 o 2 [j2N(ORji\ORj ), f(o) = 1 and f(o
0
) = 0, 8 o0 2
Ô2 \ ([j2NORji).
SIii A state s 2 Sii is imagined by DM i in Gii, that is, s 2
SIii () there is a mapping f : Ô2 ! {0, 1} satisfying
9 o 2 [j2NOIji, f(o) = 1 and f(o
0
) = 0, 8 o0 2 Ô2\[([j2NOIji)[
([j2NORji)].
SMii A state s 2 Sii is misunderstood by DM i in Gii, that is, s 2
SMii () there is a mapping f : Ô2 ! {0, 1} satisfying 9 o 2
[j2NOMji , f(o) = 1 and f(o
0
) = 0, 8 o0 2 Ô2 \ [([j2NOMji ) [
([j2NORji)].
SI,Mii A state s 2 Sii is included in the imagined and misunderstood
scenarios of DM i in Gii, that is, s 2 SI,Mii () there is a
mapping f : Ô2 ! {0, 1} satisfying 9 o 2 [j2NOIji, f(o) = 1,
9 o0 2 [j2NOMji , f(o
0
) = 1, and f(o
00
) = 0, 8 o00 2 Ô2 \
[([j2NOIji) [ ([j2NOMji ) [([j2NORji)].
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The analysis is performed in two phases: (a) the analysis of the subjective first-level
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Figure 5.8: Stability Analysis Procedure for a Second-level Hypergame with n-DM in
Graph Form
Starting at the top part of Phase 1 of Figure 5.8, Step 1 is executed by investigating the
stability of states in Gji using any of the standard GMCR solution concepts. Therefore, the
equilibria in the subjective game of each DM other than DM i within H1i are anticipated.
In Step 2 of Phase 1 of Figure 5.8, the equilibria in each DM’s subjective game other
than DM i within H1i are utilized to identify the subjective equilibria in Gii. within Step
2, three stages need to be performed as follows:
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• For each j 2 Ni   {i}, isolate DM j’s strategies from its equilibrium states in Gji.
These strategies are to be called a DM’s winning strategies.
• Calculate the Cartesian product for all DMs’ winning strategies, for all j 2 Ni   {i}.
• In Gii, calculate the stability of states for DM i using GMCR solution concepts.
If a state is stable for DM i and its opponents’ strategies related to this state are
members of the set of strategies identified in stage 2 under a solution concept, the
state is an equilibrium in Gii and in H1i within this particular solution concept.
It can be seen from the bottom part of Figure 5.8, Phase 2 starts by isolating the
strategies of DM i from the equilibria in Gii. Then, second-level hypergame equilibria are
obtained by taking the ordered collections (Cartesian product) of all the strategy sets of
the DMs, each of which is obtained from the set of equilibria of a given DM in its subjective
game within its subjective first-level hypergame. Note, that if the strategies of the DMs
are obtained from their Nash equilibrium states, then the resulting Cartesian product is
called hyper Nash equilibria for a second-level hypergame.
Analysis of a DM’s Subjective First-Level Hypergame
For i 2 N , recall that H1i = hGji : j 2 Nii. As noted earlier, the analysis of H1i starts by
analyzing Gji based on a collection of stability definitions, each of which imitates di↵erent
possible human behavior under conflict. These stability definitions, formalized within the
paradigm of a first-level hypergame in graph form to ascertain the equilibrium states in the
subjective game of each DM (Aljefri et al., 2017a), are used to calculate the equilibrium
states in Gji. To furnished the stability analysis definitions in Gji for the case of n-DM,
the concepts of reachable list and unilateral improvement list by a group of DMs are put
forward below.
Let the set of DMs in Gji be Nji = {1, 2, ..., j, ..., nji}. Assume that H ✓ Nji, H 6= ;,
be any subgroup of players in Nji. For s1 2 Sji and k 2 Nji, let Rkji(s1) be the set of
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unilateral moves (UMs) of DM k beginning from s1. Also, let RHji(s1) symbolize the set
of all UMs from s1 by any number of DMs 2 H over a legal sequence of moves beginning
from s1. A sequence of moves by players in H is legal if no player makes two successive
moves. For s2 2 RHji(s1), let ⌦Hji(s1, s2) symbolize the set of all last players in H in
the legal sequences of moves from s1 to s2. Further, let R
+
Hji(s1) denote the set of all UIs
from s1 by any number of DMs 2 H over a legal sequence of moves beginning from s1.
For s2 2 R+Hji(s1), let ⌦+Hji(s1, s2) symbolize the set of all last players in H in the legal
sequences of UI from s1 to s2. The unilateral moves and the unilateral improvement list
by H ✓ Nji can now be defined as follows.
Definition 5.1.4.1 (Unilateral Moves by H ✓ Nji). Let s1 2 Sji. Then, RHji(s1) can
be defined as follows:
• If k 2 H and s2 2 Rkji(s1), then s2 2 RHji(s1) and k 2 ⌦Hji(s1, s2).
• If s2 2 RHji(s1), k 2 H, and s3 2 Rkji(s2), then
1. if |⌦Hji(s1, s2)|= 1 and k /2 ⌦Hji(s1, s2), then s3 2 RHji(s1) and k 2 ⌦Hji(s1, s3).
2. if |⌦Hji(s1, s2)|> 1, then s3 2 RHji(s1) and k 2 ⌦Hji(s1, s3).
The process ends when no new state s3 can be included in RHji(s1) and no di↵erences
occur from | ⌦Hji(s1, s2) |= 1 to | ⌦Hji(s1, s2) |> 1 for any s2 2 RHji(s1). Every
state in RHji(s1) is considered as a UM from s1 by H.
Definition 5.1.4.2 (Unilateral Improvement List by the Subgroup of DMs H ✓ Nji).
Let s1 2 Sji. A Unilateral Improvement List (UIL) R+Hji(s1) is built as shown below:
• If k 2 H and s2 2 R+kji(s1), then s2 2 R
+
Hji(s1) and k 2 ⌦+Hji(s1, s2).
• If s2 2 R+Hji(s1), k 2 H, and s3 2 R+kji(s2), then
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1. if | ⌦+Hji(s1, s2) |= 1 and k /2 ⌦+Hji(s1, s2), then s3 2 R+Hji(s1) and k 2
⌦+Hji(s1, s3),
2. if | ⌦+Hji(s1, s2) |> 1, then s3 2 R+Hji(s1) and k 2 ⌦+Hji(s1, s3).
The process ends when there is no new state s3 that can be included in R
+
Hji(s1) and
the condition | ⌦+Hji(s1, s2) |= 1 to | ⌦+Hji(s1, s2) |> 1 is not altered for any state
s2 2 R+Hji(s1). Every state in R+Hji(s1) is a UI starting from s1 by a subgroup of DMs
H.
If k = j, then remember that Rjji(s1) and R
+
jji(s1) are identical to Rji(s1) and R
+
ji(s1),
respectively. After the concepts of UM and UI for a group of DMs H are introduced,
the solution concepts of Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR can be formally defined within the
paradigm of a second-level hypergame as follows.
Definition 5.1.4.3 (Nash Stability). A state s1 2 Sji is Nash stable (Nash) for DM k




Definition 5.1.4.4 (SEQ Stability). A state s1 2 Sji is sequentially stable (SEQ) for
DM k 2 Nji in Gji () for each s2 2 R+kji(s1), 9 s3 2 R
+
(Nji {k})ji(s2) such that s3 -kji s1.
The group of all SEQ stable states for DM k in Gji is denoted by S
SEQkji
ji .
Definition 5.1.4.5 (GMR Stability). A state s1 2 Sji is general metarational stable
(GMR) for DM k 2 Nji in Gji () for each s2 2 R+kji(s1), 9 s3 2 R(Nji {k})ji(s2) such that
s3 -kji s1. The group of all GMR stable states for DM k in Gji is symbolized by SGMRkjiji .
Definition 5.1.4.6 (SMR Stability). A state s1 2 Sji is SMR stable for DM k 2 Nji
in Gji () for each s2 2 R+kji(s1), 9 s3 2 R(Nji {k})ji(s2) such that s3 -kji s1, and





The interrelationships among the aforementioned solution concepts were investigated
within the structure of the GMCR for which there are no misperceptions (Fang et al.,
1993). Here, the same properties of the solution concepts are studied within the structure
of the second-level hypergame in graph form, for which the findings are summarized in the
Venn diagram in Figure 5.9. The investigation reveals that the same relationships between
the solution concepts found in GMCR hold in the second-level hypergame in graph form.
Theorem 5.1.4.1. Let k 2 Nji and s1 2 Sji. If s1 2 S
Nashkji
ji for DM k in Gji, then
s1 2 S
SMRkji
ji for DM k in Gji; if s1 2 S
SMRkji
ji for DM k in Gji, then s1 2 S
GMRkji
ji for
DM k in Gji.
Proof. According to Definition 5.1.4.3, s1 is Nash for DM k if R
+
kji(s1) = ;. This condition




ji . Next, from
Definition 5.1.4.6, a state s1 2 S
SMRkji
ji () for each s2 2 R+kji(s1) 9 s3 2 R(Nji {k})ji(s2)
such that s3 -kji s1, and s4 -kji s1 8 s4 2 Rkji(s3). The condition for each s2 2 R+kji(s1)












Theorem 5.1.4.2. Let k 2 Nji and s1 2 Sji. If s1 2 S
Nashkji
ji for DM k in Gji, then
s1 2 S
SEQkji
ji for DM k in Gji; if s1 2 S
SEQkji
ji for DM k in Gji, then s1 2 S
GMRkji
ji for
DM k in Gji.
Proof. If s1 2 S
Nashkji







ji . Also, since R
+






Definition 5.1.4.7 (Equilibria in Gji). A state s1 2 Sji that is stable for all the DMs
in Gji under the same stability concept is an equilibrium in Gji according to that stability
definition. The set of all equilibrium states in Gji as seen by DM i is symbolized by Eji.













Figure 5.9: Characteristics of the Solution Concepts in Gji
it is considered as either Nash, SEQ, SMR, or GMR equilibrium in Gji. The sets of all
Nash, SEQ, SMR, and GMR equilibrium states are denoted, respectively, by ENashji , E
SEQ
ji ,
EGMRji , and E
SMR
ji ).
Once the set of equilibria in the subjective game of DM j as envisioned by DM i, Gji,
is identified, the equilibrium states in Gii within H1i can be determined (See Step 2 in
Figure 5.8). This can be achieved by investigating the stability of states for DM i, which
are related to its opponents’ winning strategies, obtained from Gji, for all j 2 Ni   {i}.
The set of Nash equilibrium states of DM i in Gii can be defined as follows:
Definition 5.1.4.8 (Nash Equilibria in the Actual Subjective Game of a DM).
For every j 2 Ni   {i}, one should recall that ENashji denotes the set of Nash equilibria in




2ji , ..., e
Nashji
"ji }, where "ji is the total number of














ji } constitute the




ji is the strategy of DM j as seen
by DM i that is obtained from the equilibrium state e
Nashji
1ji in Gji. Then, the Cartesian






for s1 2 Sii in Gii within H1i , let s1 = {(gs1i )T , (g
s1
Ni {i})
T}, where gs1i is DM i’s strategy
related to s1 and g
s1
Ni {i} is the opponents’ strategies associated with s1. Then, s1 is a Nash
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ji ). The set of
Nash equilibrium states of DM i in Gii within H1i is symbolized as E
Nash
ii .
The SEQ, GMR, and SMR equilibrium states of DM i in Gii can be analogously defined.
Analysis of the Overall Second-Level Hypergame Equilibria
In this phase, second-level hypergame equilibria are obtained. Similar to a first-level hy-
pergame in graph form (Aljefri et al., 2017a), this can be achieved by first identifying the
strategies of all the DMs obtained from the equilibrium states in their subjective games
within their subjective first-level hypergame. Then, the ordered collections (Cartesian
product) of the Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR strategies of all the DMs constitute the hyper
Nash, hyper SEQ, hyper GMR, and hyper SMR equilibria, respectively, for a second-level
hypergame. The hyper Nash equilibrium for a second-level hypergame in an n-DM model
is defined first.
Definition 5.1.4.9 (Hyper Nash Equilibrium for a Second-Level Hypergame). For
i 2 N , note that ENashii symbolizes the set of Nash equilibria in Gii within H1i . ENashii =
{eNashii1ii , e
Nashii
2ii , ..., e
Nashii
"ii

















ii is the strategy of DM i attained from the equilibrium e
Nashii
ii in Gii. The set





Keep in mind that the notation
Y
in Eq. 5.5 stands for the Cartesian product. Similar to
the first-level hypergame equilibria in graph form Aljefri et al. (2017a), the total number
of hyper Nash equilibria is "ii"jj. A hyper SEQ equilibrium state (HE2SEQ), a hyper GMR
120
equilibrium state (HE2GMR), and a hyper SMR equilibrium state (HE2SMR) for second-
level hypergame are analogously defined. HE2SEQ, HE2GMR, and HE2SMR can be defined
in a similar fashion.
5.2 Classification of Second-Level Hypergame
Equilibria
Based on the description of a first-level hypergame with n DMs in graph form in Alje-
fri et al. (2017a), the classification of the second-level hypergame equilibria is conducted
by an insightful specialist or analyst who is cognizant of the di↵erence in understanding
among the DMs. Hence, one can identify the equilibrium states that are understood by all
the DMs and those that are not. These equilibrium classes for a second-level hypergame
provide information about the sources of misperception that underly the dispute and the
possible reactions of the DMs after they become aware of their misperception in reality.
Similar to a first-level hypergame with two or more DMs in graph form, the groups of
equilibrium states addressed here are steady, unsteady, stealthy, unsteady stealthy, con-
tingent, unsteady contingent, self-contingent, and emergent hyper-equilibrium states for
second-level hypergame. The formal definitions of these classes of equilibria are summa-
rized here for a second-level hypergame with n-DM. For further discussion about these
distinct equilibrium classes, please refer to Aljefri et al. (2017a).
Definition 5.2.0.10 (Steady Hyper Nash (SHNash2) Equilibrium). A hyper Nash
equilibrium state for a second-level hypergame, s 2 HE2 Nash, is referred to as (SHNash2)
equilibrium i↵ s 2 SR and s 2 \i2NENashii .
Please notice that the superscript 2 in SHNash2 indicates that it is an equilibrium for a
second-level hypergame. A steady hyper SEQ (SHSEQ2) equilibrium, a steady hyper GMR
(SHGMR2) equilibrium, and a steady hyper SMR (SHSMR2) equilibrium for a second-level
hypergame can be similarly formalized.
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Definition 5.2.0.11 (Unsteady Hyper Nash (UHNash2) Equilibrium). A hyper
Nash equilibrium state for a second-level hypergame, s 2 HE2 Nash, is called a UHNash2
equilibrium i↵ s 2 SR and s /2 \i2NENashii .
An unsteady hyper SEQ (UHSEQ2) equilibrium, unsteady hyper GMR (UHGMR2)
equilibrium, and unsteady hyper SMR (UHSMR2) equilibrium for a second-level hyper-
game can be defined in a similar manner.
Definition 5.2.0.12 (Stealthy Hyper Nash (STHNash2) Equilibrium). A hyper
Nash equilibrium state for a second-level hypergame, s 2 HE2 Nash, is called an STHNash2
equilibrium i↵ 9 i 2 N, s 2 SPii \ ENashii .
A stealthy hyper SEQ (STHSEQ2) equilibrium, a stealthy hyper GMR (STHGMR2)
equilibrium, and a stealthy hyper SMR (STHSMR2) equilibrium for a second-level hyper-
game can be analogously formalized.
Definition 5.2.0.13 (Unsteady STHNash2 (USTHNash2) Equilibrium). A hyper
Nash equilibrium state for a second-level hypergame, s 2 HE2 Nash, is called a USTHNash2
i↵ s 2 SPii \ ENashii for at least one i 2 N .
An unsteady STHSEQ2 (USTHSEQ2) equilibrium, unsteady STHGMR2 (USTHGMR2)
equilibrium, and unsteady STHSMR2 (USTHSMR2) equilibrium for a second-level hy-
pergame can be defined in a similar manner.
Definition 5.2.0.14 (Contingent Hyper Nash (CHNash2) Equilibrium). A hyper
Nash equilibrium state for a second-level hypergame, s 2 HE2 Nash, is called a CHNash2
equilibrium () either s 2 \i2NSIii, s 2 \i2NSMii , or s 2 \i2NS
I,M
ii and s 2 \i2NENashii .
A contingent hyper SEQ (CHSEQ2) equilibrium, a contingent hyper GMR (CHGMR2)
equilibrium, and a contingent hyper SMR (CHSMR2) equilibrium for a second-level hy-
pergame can be defined in a similar way.
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Definition 5.2.0.15 (Unsteady CHNash2 (UCHNash2) Equilibrium). A hyper Nash
equilibrium state for a second-level hypergame, s 2 HE2 Nash, is called an UCHNash2
equilibrium () either s 2 \i2NSIii, s 2 \i2NSMii , or s 2 \i2NS
I,M
ii and s /2 \i2NENashii .
An unsteady contingent hyper SEQ (UCHSEQ2) equilibrium, unsteady contingent
hyper GMR (UCHGMR2) equilibrium, and unsteady contingent hyper SMR (UCHSMR2)
equilibrium for a second-level hypergame can be defined in a similar manner.
Definition 5.2.0.16 (Self-CHNash2 (SCHNash2) Equilibrium). A hyper Nash equi-
librium state for a second-level hypergame, s 2 HE2 Nash, is called an SCHNash2 equilib-
rium for the dispute i↵ there is a DM i 2 N such that s 2 (SIii [ SMii [ S
I,M




A self-CHSEQ2 (SCHSEQ2) equilibrium, self-CHGMR2 (SCHGMR2) equilibrium, and
self-CHSMR2 (SCHSMR2) equilibrium for a second-level hypergame can be defined in a
like-wise manner.
Definition 5.2.0.17 (Emergent Hyper Nash (EHNash2) Equilibrium). A hyper
Nash equilibrium state for a second-level hypergame, s 2 HE2 Nash, is called an EHNash2
equilibrium for the conflict i↵ s /2 [i2NSii.
An emergent hyper SEQ (EHSEQ2) equilibrium, emergent hyper GMR (EHGMR2)
equilibrium, and emergent hyper SMR (EHSMR2) equilibrium for a second-level hyper-
game are defined in a similar fashion.
5.3 Chapter Summary
A new methodology for SLHG with two or more DMs in graph form is put forward in this
chapter. The aim of this novel approach is to investigate a conflict situation having mis-
perceptions among the engaged DMs, with at least one DM being aware of the di↵erences
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in understanding among the participating DMs. The foundations of this encompassing
procedure is the development of the concept of a universal set of options, which is then
extended for designing a universal set of states for SLHG. This universal set of states for
SLHG is utilized to generate the states in a subjective FLHG for each DM. Consequently,
an expert or analyst can recognize the collection of states that are viewed across the sub-
jective FLHGs of all the DMs and those that are seen privately. This important feature
allows the expert to classify the SLHG equilibria into eight classes, each of which contains
information about the type of misperception that produced the conflict. For example, if
a state were found to be an equilibrium for SLHG, and also an equilibrium in the actual
subjective game of a given DM, but at least one of the adversaries of the DM is unaware of
the existence of the state in reality within its actual subjective game, then this state is de-
fined as a stealthy hyper equilibrium state for SLHG. This type of equilibrium constitutes
an example of the use of strategic surprise by a DM in a conflict situation. Hence, the new
approach of SLHG in graph form developed here is a truly general method for modeling
and analyzing conflict situations having asymmetry of perception among the DMs.
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Chapter 6
h-Level Hypergame (h > 1) in Graph
Form
In this chapter, misperceptions are incorporated into GMCR to express misunderstanding
for the most general situation. In particular, the idea of a first-level hypergame in graph
form descried in Chapter 3 (Aljefri et al., 2017a) and the notion of a second-level hypergame
in graph form provided in Chapter 5 are generalized to handle any h-level hypergames
having n-DM, where h > 1 and n > 2. To do this, the collections of options and states for
GMCR are expanded to include fictitious options and states for any level of hypergame.
These two sets capture all DMs’ perceptions about the conflict situation. Because of the
asymmetry of perception among DMs, some of the states in the universal set of states are
known to a particular DM while others may be hidden. Since the source of these states is
the universal set of states, an external analyst can formally distinguish between the states
that are considered by all the players and the states that are taken into account individually.
Moreover, a practical procedure for implementing hypergame stability analysis for an n-
DM hypergame at any level of perception is proposed to predict the resolutions of the
hypergame and to obtain valuable strategic insights. To investigate how DMs may behave
after they become aware of their misperceptions, a classification of hypergame equilibria is
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developed for any level of hypergame.
6.1 Methodology to Incorporate an h-Level
Hypergame with More Than Two DMs into the
Graph Model
Similar to a first- and a second-level hypergame in graph form (Aljefri et al., 2017a,b), the
suggested graph model for an h-level hypergame description includes three components:
one to produce the universal set of states for the h-level hypergame, another to construct
each DM’s (h  1)-level hypergame, and the last is to perform the hypergame analysis and
to predict the possible equilibria for a hypergame.
According to the representation of the option form for which there is no misinterpreta-
tion (Fang et al., 2003a,b), displaying scenarios for the h-level hypergame can be produced.
In particular, the set of all DMs’ options in the standard GMCR is modified to the uni-
versal set of options for the entire h-level hypergame. This set is a collection of individual
universal sets of options for the h-level hypergame, each of which describes a particular
DM’s options that are perceived (correct or fictitious) by either the focal DM itself or its
opponents at all levels of perception beginning from h̄ = 1 to h.
In the second part, the modeling of each DM’s subjective (h   1)-level hypergame is
developed. Each DM’s subjective hypergame consists of a group of games, each of which
characterizes not only a given DM’s viewpoint of the conflict situation but also the way
that particular DM sees the other DMs’ games. The universal set of states is used to lay
out states in each of the individual games.
In the last part, the hypergame analysis is conducted by first analyzing each DM’s
subjective hypergame and then predicting the overall hypergame equilibria. Because of
asymmetry of understanding among players, an equilibrium state for the h-level hypergame
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may be known by all DMs, unknown to some DMs, or unknown to all DMs.
A description of the universal set of options for the entire h-level hypergame for the case
of n-DM is provided in Section 6.1.1. Section 6.1.2 details the construction of the universal
set of the states for the h-level hypergame. Section 6.1.3 includes a description of a DM’s
subjective hypergame in graph form. Section 6.1.4 provides the mathematical definitions
of a given DM’s subjective hypergame. Finally, Section 6.1.5 discusses the technique used
to analyze the h-level hypergame in graph form using a range of solution concepts.
6.1.1 Universal Set of Options in an n-Decision Maker h-Level
Hypergame
To consider all perceived courses of action for a particular player in the h-level hypergame,
the idea of a universal set of options for a DM in an n-DM h-level hypergame is put forward.
The notions of the universal sets of options for the first- and second-level hypergames in
graph form (Aljefri et al., 2017a,b) are extended to define options for the h-level hypergame
in graph form. This set includes options for a particular DM that are considered by itself
and its opponents at all levels of perception. Three categories of options can define a given
DM’s universal set of options in the h-level hypergame: a DM’s set of courses of action
that are (1) correctly perceived, (2) imagined, and (3) misunderstood. Similar to a DM’s
universal sets of options for a first- and second-level hypergame (Aljefri et al., 2017a,b),
the identification and classification of a DM’s set of options in the h-level hypergame
are performed by an outside expert, also known as analyst, who knows the di↵erences of
perception among the players in a conflict setting.
Figure 6.1 portrays the logical structure of DM i’s set of options that are perceived by
itself and its opponents in the h-level hypergame. As can be seen, DM i’s set of options,
Oi is altered by the perceptions of three DMs, “i”, “j”, and “k”, at di↵erent levels of a
hypergame ranging from level 0 to level h. Oi is DM i’s set of options for a zero-level

















































































































































































Thus, the first subscript, i, is used to indicate to whom the set of options belongs. DMs’
interpretations of Oi can be di↵erent as a result of the asymmetry of perception among
them. For instance, in a first-level hypergame, Oi is separately perceived by each DM,
and misunderstandings may happen. Hence, Oii, Oij, and Oik stand for DM i’s sets of
options as perceived by itself, as seen by DM j, and as perceived by DM k, respectively.
The second subscript in Oik, for example, stands for the particular DM who views the
set Oi. In Oik, the order of DMs’ perception equals one. Recall that self-misperception
is permitted within the current research. Therefore, Oi 6= Oii whenever DM i makes a
mistake in perceiving its options in the dispute. For examples of the situations in which
a DM misperceives its options, the reader is referred to the work by Aljefri et al. (2017a),
and the references contained therein. In a second-level hypergame, at least one DM is
assumed to understand di↵erent perceptions among the players. Therefore, a DM is trying
to interpret how the other DMs view the conflict situation. For example, Oiji denotes
the set of DM i’s options that are perceived by DM j and then interpreted by DM i.
Oiji has a subscript of length three. The first subscript stands for the ownership of the
set, while the other two subscripts stand for the players who perceive Oi. Therefore, the
length of the subscript includes h sequences of DMs’ perception, and the total length of
the subscript is equal to h + 1. Depending on the level of a hypergame, the length of
the subscript is extended. It is worthwhile noting that the universal set of options for the
h-level hypergame must contain all sets of options considered from h̄ = 1 to h. The logical
structures of options in the hypergame of level h for DMs j and k as portrayed in Figure
6.1 can be constructed analogously. These options are utilized to mathematically define
states for a hypergame, which can then be used to model each DM’s subjective hypergame.
To simplify the notation, the concept of a string can be used as a part of the subscript.
Let w be an ordered string of DMs in a hypergame. Let w = i1i2i3...ih, where i1, i2,
i3,..., ih 2 N . The length of w is equal to h > 0. Also, let ⌃1, ⌃2, ⌃3, and ⌃h stand for the
sets of all order strings of DMs of lengths 1, 2, 3, and h, respectively. If the total number
of DMs in N is n, the total number of strings in ⌃h is nh. Then, the set of all strings of
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DMs from length 1 to length h is denoted by ⌃h⇤ and is defined as follows.
⌃h⇤ = ⌃1 [ ⌃2 [ ⌃3 [ ... [ ⌃h (6.1)
For example, the sets ⌃1, ⌃2, and ⌃3 for the case of 2-DM, N = {i, j}, are computed
as follows:
• ⌃1 = {i, j}
• ⌃2 = {ii, ij, ji, jj}
• ⌃3 = {iii, iji, jii, jji, iij, ijj, jij, jjj}
With the help of string w, various types of DM i’s option misperception can be gener-
alized for the case of n-DM hypergame at any length of DMs’ perception.
Remark 6.1.1.1. Similar to Remark 3.1.0.1, self-misperception is permitted within the
hypergame theory in graph form. That is, Oi 6= Oii whenever DM i misunderstands its
possible courses of action in the dispute. Moreover, it is assumed that a DM is not aware
of its misperception in a conflict situation. Hence, Oii = Oiii...i. Lastly, a DM is assumed
to hold its own perception about a given DM at any level of hypergame. That is, Oji = Ojji
A DM’s Set of Correctly Perceived Options
This group of options includes a given DM’s courses of action that are correctly considered
by itself. These options are not fictitious and are sensible to be implemented by the DM
who possesses them in a real-life situation. Here, one assumes that a DM is aware of theses
options. However, because of the other DMs’ misperception, some or all of these options
may be unknown to them. Since hypergame theory allows DMs to be aware of each other’s
misperception, they are trying to predict which collection of options is comprehended by
their opponents, but mistakes may occur.
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Definition 6.1.1.1 (DM i’s Set of Correctly Perceived Options). For i 2 N , let
the collection of options for DM i that are free from any misperception and known to itself
be denoted by ORii . For j 2 N   {i} recall that ORij ✓ ORii stands for the set of DM i’s
options that are assumed by DM j. Now, DM i’s options that are assumed by all DMs in
the dispute are expressed as ORi = \j2NORij (Aljefri et al., 2017a). For w, a sequence of
DMs, let ORiw stand for the set of DM i’s correct options that are correctly considered by w.
Note that ORiw ✓ ORii by definition. Then, the set of DM i’s correctly perceived options
that are considered by all sequences of DMs for the h-level hypergame is expressed as
([w2⌃h⇤ORiw). Because ORiw ✓ ORii and ⌃h⇤ contains all of the strings of DMs including ii,
([w2⌃h⇤ORiw) = ORii .
A DM’s Set of Imagined Options
A given DM’s option that is not in ORii but is assumed to exist by either the DM itself or
its opponents in the dispute is considered as an imagined course of action. As detailed by
Aljefri et al. (2017a), this option is not real, and implementing it in real life is not logical.
The set of these options is defined below for any order of DMs’ perception.
Definition 6.1.1.2 (DM i’s Set of Imagined Options). Choose i 2 N . Let OIii
and OIij be DM i’s sets of courses of action that are imagined by DM i itself or by any
j 2 N   {i} (Aljefri et al., 2017a). For w, a sequence of DMs, let OIiw symbolize the set
of DM i’s options that are imagined by the sequence of DMs w. Then, the collection of
DM i’s imagined options for the h-level hypergame is expressed as ([w2⌃h⇤OIiw).
A DM’s Set of Misunderstood Options
Definition 6.1.1.3 (DM i’s Set of Misunderstood Options). Choose i 2 N , and
denote by OR̄i the set of DM i’s courses of action that hold in reality, but are misunderstood
by DM i. Also, let OMii stand for the set of DM i’s options that are misunderstood by
131
itself. OMii is formed by the function  i : O
R̄
i  ! OMii , such that for each course of action
in OR̄i there is a misunderstood option in O
M





misinterpreted by w, a sequence of DMs, is symbolized as OMiw. Then, the set of DM i’s
misunderstood options for the h-level hypergame is represented by ([w2⌃h⇤OMiw).
After defining the sets of DM i’s correct options, imagined options, and misunderstood
options, one can formalize DM i’s universal set of options for the h-level hypergame as
given below:
Definition 6.1.1.4 (DM i’s Universal Set of Options in an h-level Hypergame).
For i 2 N , let Öhi stand for the universal set of options of DM i for an h-level hypergame
Hh. Then, Öhi = ([w2⌃h⇤ORiw) [ OR̄i [ ([w2⌃h⇤OIiw) [ ([w2⌃h⇤OMiw)
Remark 6.1.1.2. Recall that Oi symbolizes the set of DM i’s options for the graph model
with complete information. Because of DM i’s misperception, Oi is partitioned into two
sets, ORii and O
R̄
i . Keep in mind that O
R
ii includes i’s real courses of action that are known
to itself, but OR̄i has i’s real options that are unknown to it because of its misunderstanding,
as explained in detail by Aljefri et al. (2017a). Similar to a first-level hypergame in graph
form, the assumed option relationships are as follows:
• ([w2⌃h⇤ORiw) = ORii .
• ([w2⌃h⇤ORiw)\([w2⌃h⇤OIiw) = ([w2⌃h⇤ORiw)\([w2⌃h⇤OMiw) = ([w2⌃h⇤OIiw)\([w2⌃h⇤OMiw) =
;.
• OR̄i \ ([w2⌃h⇤OIiw) 6= ; may or may not exist.
• (\w2⌃h⇤OIiw) 6= ; may or may not hold.
• (\w2⌃h⇤OMiw) 6= ; may or may not hold.
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In a similar fashion, the other DMs’ universal set of options for the h-level hypergame
can be constructed. The collection of all DMs’ universal set of options defines the universal
set of options for the overall h-level hypergame as expressed below.
Ôh = [i2N Öhi (6.2)
Ôh is known to the analyst, the external expert. Based on a DM’s perception, options
in Ôh may be completely known or partially known to it. The analyst will utilize Ôh
to generate states for the overall hypergame. Based on this set of states, the expert can
construct each DM’s subjective hypergame and account for any type of misperception a
DM may encounter in a real-life situation.
6.1.2 Universal Set of States in an n-DM h-Level Hypergame
After defining Ôh, a method similar to the one formalized to define states for the standard
GMCR in Section 2.1 is implemented to generate the states for the overall hypergame. For
N = {1, 2, .., i, ..., n}, recall that Ôh = Öh1 [ Öh2 [ ... [ Öhi [ ... [ Öhn. For every i 2 N ,
Öhi = {oi1, oi2, ..., oik̄}, where k̄ = 1, 2, ...,mi and mi is the total number of options in Ö
h
i .
A course of action can either be implemented or not by the DM who owns it. A strategy
for a given player is determined when the player chooses which of its courses of action to
select or not. DM i’s strategy is represented by the mapping gi : Öhi  ! {0, 1}, such that





1, if DM i implements oi
k̄
0, otherwise
States are generated after all of the players in the dispute have chosen a strategy. Thus, a










1, if DM i implements oi
k̄
, for i = 1, 2, ..., n
0, otherwise
Each state is represented by a column vector in which the number of entries is equal







2 ), ..., f(o
n
mn))
T (Aljefri et al., 2017a). Let Ŝh be the universal
set of the states for the overall h-level hypergame. If the total number of options in
Ôh is  , the total number of states in Ŝh is equal to 2 . Note that for s 2 Ŝh, s =
((gs1)
T , (gs2)
T , ..., (gsi )
T , ..., (gsn)
T )T , where gsi is DM i’s strategy related to s. The analyst
knows all the states in Ŝh. The set of the states in each of the DMs’ subjective hypergames
is a subset of Ŝh.
6.1.3 Modeling of a Given DM’s Subjective Hypergame
As stated in Section 3.1.1, Hh = hHh 1i : 8i 2 N, h = 1, 2, 3, ...i. Each DM’s subjective
hypergame is constructed in a hierarchical fashion to illustrate not only a DM’s viewpoint
of the situation under investigation but also how it views the opponents’ perceptions of the
dispute. Each DM’s subjective hypergame is a system of subjective games, each of which
is constructed by the sets of perceived DMs, states, state transitions, and preferences.
Figure 6.2 shows the hierarchical structure of Hh 1i from level zero to level h   1.
As can be seen at the top of Figure 6.2, H0i includes only DM i’s subjective game
Gi = hNi, Si, {Aji : j 2 Ni}, {%ji: j 2 Ni}i that represents his viewpoint of the conflict
situation. In H1i , DM i is aware of the other players’ subjective games. That is, the DM
tries to perceive what the others’ games look like before making a decision. Hence, H1i
includes Gi and Gji, 8j 2 Ni   {i}. Note that in the hierarchical structure of Hh 1i , Gi is
always at the top of the branch and Gq...kji is at the bottom of the branch. Gq...kji stands
for the way DM i’s understands DM j’s perception about how DM k’s sees ... DM q’s
game. To simplify the notation, a string of DMs w can be used as a part of the subscript.
















Figure 6.2: Hierarchical Strucuture of Hh 1i in Graph Form
Definition 6.1.3.1 (String of Decision Makers in a Hypergame). Recall that w =
i1i2i3...ih is an ordered string of decision makers in a hypergame, where i1, i2, i3,..., ih
2 N , and ij 2 Nij+1ij+2...ih, where ij 6= ij+1. The length of w is equal to h > 1.
Remark 6.1.3.1. For example, if w = i, then the length of w is equal to 1 and i 2 N . If
w = kji, then the length of w = 3, and k 2 Nji and j 2 Ni. By using w, a string of DMs,
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a game at any level of perception can be constructed. For example, in Gji, one can replace
the subscript ji with the string w as Gw. If any DM k is perceived by w, then DM k’s game
as seen by w is denoted as Gkw, 8k 2 Nw. Keep in mind that Gw is always one level above
Gkw.
6.1.4 Mathematical Modeling of a DM’s Subjective Game within
Hh 1i
In Section 6.1.3 the hierarchical design of Hh 1i is provided as well as the concept of the
DMs’ ordered string. In this subsection, one can mathematically construct any of the
subjective games in Hh 1i . Similar to a graph model, each subjective game within H
h 1
i is
constructed by the perceived sets of DMs, states, state transitions, and preferences. For
any given string w, Gkw can be defined by 4-tuple as furnished below:
hNkw, Skw, {Aqkw : q 2 Nkw}, {%qkw: q 2 Nkw}i (6.3)
where, Nkw is the set of DMs as perceived by DM k and then by w, the string of DMs;
Skw ✓ Ŝh is the set of states perceived by DM k as contemplated by w; and Aqkw and %qkw
are the state transitions and the preference relations, respectively, of DM q as seen by k
and then by the string of DMs in w.
To formally define Skw, the universal set of options for the h-level hypergame Ôh must
be partitioned based on the perception of k as seen by w into two categories: (1) the group
of options recognized by DM k as assumed by the string of DMs in w and (2) the collection
of options unknown to DM k as perceived by w.




qkw denote the sets of DM q’s options that are correctly
perceived, imagined, and misunderstood, respectively, by DM k as contemplated by the
string of DMs in w. Then, the group of options that are known to DM k as perceived by
w can be expressed as ([q2NkwORqkw) [ ([q2NqkwOIqkw) [ ([q2NkwOMqkw). Also, the collection
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of options that are unknown to DM k as assumed by the string of DMs w can be formally
defined as [Ôh\(([q2NkwORqkw)[([q2NqkwOIqkw)[([q2NkwOMqkw))]. With the groups of options
mentioned above, the set of states Skw in Gkw can be defined formally as described below:
Definition 6.1.4.1 (Set of States in Gkw). Choose k 2 Nw. Let Skw ✓ Ŝh stand for the
set of states in Gkw as assumed by the string of DMs in w, where Ŝh is the universal set of
states for the h-level hypergame. Then, a state s 2 Skw () there is a mapping f : Ôh !
{0, 1} satisfying f(o) = 0 , 8 o 2 [Ôh \ (([q2NkwORqkw) [ ([q2NqkwOIqkw) [ ([q2NkwOMqkw))].
(Note that f(ó) = either 1 or 0, 8 ó 2 ([q2NkwORqkw) [ ([q2NqkwOIqkw) [ ([q2NkwOMqkw)).
6.1.5 Analysis of the h-Level Hypergame
Similar to a second-level hypergame in graph form (Aljefri et al., 2017b), the analysis of
the h-level hypergame is performed in two phases. In the first phase, one analyzes each
DM’s subjective hypergame to predict the equilibria perceived by each DM. In the second
phase, one combines all DMs’ subjective equilibria to ascertain the overall equilibria for
the h-level hypergame.
The Analysis of a DM’s Subjective Hypergame
As discussed in Section 6.1.3, a DM’s subjective hypergame is organized in a hierarchical
order to depict a particular DM’s di↵erent levels of perception. The hierarchical design of
DM i’s subjective hypergame, Hh 1i is shown in Figure 6.2. The analysis of H
h 1
i starts by
analyzing the games, Gq...kji, 8q 2 N...kji, at the bottom of the branch of Figure 6.2 as simple
games using standard GMCR solution concepts to identify the equilibria in Gq...kji. This
procedure is called Process 1. After that, one uses the equilibria in Gq...kji to identify the
equilibria in the games which are one level above Gq...kji. This method is called Process 2.
Note that Process 1 is performed once; whereas Process 2 is repeated as many times












Figure 6.4: The Use of w Between
Gji and Gkji
within Hh 1i . The stability analysis of either Process 1 or 2 achieved between Gi and Gji is
exactly identical to the one performed between Gji and Gkji. The string of DMs w is used
to illustrate the stability analyses of Process 1 and Process 2 that are performed among Gi
and Gji as Gw and Gjw, respectively, as illustrated in Figure 6.3. Also, it is used btween
Gji and Gkji as Gw and Gkw, respectively, as displayed in Figure 6.4. Gw is always one
level above Gjw. Until otherwise specified, it is assumed that there is no level of DMs’
perception beyond Gjw. In other words, there is no DM k perceived by DM j and then by
the string of DMs in w.
Process 1:
In this process, Gjw, 8j 2 Nw is analyzed as a simple game using the following solution
concepts: Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR to identify the equilibria in Gjw. Since these
solution concepts investigate each DM’s possible moves and counter moves in a conflict
situation according to specified rules, one must define first the concepts of uniliteral moves
(UM) and unilateral improvement moves (UI) based on DM j’s perception as contemplated
by a string of DMs in w.
Recall that the set of DMs in Gjw is Njw. Let H ✓ Njw be any any group of players.
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For s1 2 Sjw, let Rqjw(s1) and R+qjw(s1) be the sets of DM q’s UMs and UIs, respectively,
from the initial state s1 as seen by DM j and then contemplated by w, the string of DMs.
Also, let RHjw(s1) denote the possible moves available from s1 by any DMs in H via a legal
sequence of moves. Within a legal sequence of moves, a DM is allowed to move more than
once but not make two successive moves. For s2 2 RHjw(s1), let ⌦Hjw(s1, s2) stand for the
set of all last players in H in the legal sequences of moves from s1 to s2. Additionally, let
R+Hjw(s1) stand for the possible UIs available from s1 by any DMs in H via a legal sequence
of UIs. For s2 2 R+Hjw(s1), let ⌦+Hjw(s1, s2) denote for the set of all last players in H in
the legal sequences of UIs from s1 to s2. The sets RHjw(s1) and R
+
Hjw(s1) are defined as
follows.
The list of UMs by H ✓ Njw is defined as follows:
Definition 6.1.5.1 (Unilateral Moves by H ✓ Njw). For s1 2 Sjw, RHjw(s1) is induc-
tively defined as shown below:
• If q 2 H and s2 2 Rqjw(s1), then s2 2 RHjw(s1) and q 2 ⌦Hjw(s1, s2);
• If s2 2 RHjw(s1), q 2 H, and s3 2 Rqjw(s2), then
1. if |⌦Hjw(s1, s2)|= 1 and q /2 ⌦Hjw(s1, s2), then s3 2 RHjw(s1) and q 2
⌦Hjw(s1, s3).
2. if |⌦Hjw(s1, s2)|> 1, then s3 2 RHjw(s1) and q 2 ⌦Hjw(s1, s3).
The induction ends when there exist no s3 that can be included in RHjw(s1) and no
change occurs from | ⌦Hjw(s1, s2) |= 1 to | ⌦Hjw(s1, s2) |> 1 for any s2 2 RHjw(s1).
All the states in RHjw(s1) are UMs achieved by any number of DMs in H.
Definition 6.1.5.2 (Unilateral Improvement List by H ✓ Njw). For s1 2 Sjw,
R+Hjw(s1) is inductively constructed as follows:
• If q 2 H and s2 2 R+qjw(s1), then s2 2 R+Hjw(s1) and q 2 ⌦+Hjw(s1, s2);
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• If s2 2 R+Hjw(s1), q 2 H, and s3 2 R+qjw(s2), then
1. if | ⌦+Hjw(s1, s2) |= 1 and q /2 ⌦+Hjw(s1, s2), then s3 2 R+Hjw(s1) and q 2
⌦+Hjw(s1, s3),
2. if | ⌦+Hjw(s1, s2) |> 1, then s3 2 R+Hjw(s1) and q 2 ⌦+Hjw(s1, s3).
The induction finishes when no s3 can be included in R
+
Hjw(s1) and there are no
changes from | ⌦+Hjw(s1, s2) |= 1 to | ⌦+Hji(s1, s2) |> 1 for any s2 2 R+Hjw(s1). All
the states in R+Hjw(s1) are UIs initiating from s1 by any number of players in H.
Definition 6.1.5.3 (Nash Stability). A state s1 2 Sjw is Nash stable (Nash) for DM q




Definition 6.1.5.4 (SEQ Stability). s1 2 Sjw is sequentially stable (SEQ) for DM q
2 Njw in Gjw () for each s2 2 R+qjw(s1), 9 s3 2 R+(Njw {q})jw(s2) such that s3 -qjw s1.
The collection of all SEQ stable states for DM q in Gjw is represented as S
SEQqjw
jw .
Definition 6.1.5.5 (GMR Stability). s1 2 Sjw is general metarational stable (GMR)
for DM q 2 Njw in Gjw () for each s2 2 R+qjw(s1), 9 s3 2 R(Njw {q})jw(s2) such that
s3 -qjw s1. The group of GMR stable states for DM q in Gjw is denoted by SGMRqjwjw .
Definition 6.1.5.6 (SMR Stability). s1 2 Sjw is SMR stable for DM q 2 Njw in Gjw
() for each s2 2 R+qjw(s1), 9 s3 2 R(Njw {q})jw(s2) such that s3 -qjw s1, and s4 -qjw




The relations among the solution concepts mentioned above were studied within the
frameworks of GMCR (zero-level hyprgame) (Fang et al., 1993), the first-level hypergame
in graph form (Aljefri et al., 2017a), and the second-level hypergame in graph form (Aljefri
et al., 2017b). In this current research, the same relations of the solution concepts are
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examined within the paradigm of the h-level hypergame in graph form. The study shows
that the same links among the stability definitions found in GMCR, the first-level hyper-
game in graph form, and the second-level hypergame in graph form can be established for
the h-level hypergame in graph form.
Theorem 6.1.5.1. Select q 2 Njw and s1 2 Sjw in Gjw. If s1 2 S
Nashqjw
jw for DM q in Gjw,
then s1 2 S
SMRqjw
jw for DM q in Gjw; if s1 2 S
SMRqjw
jw for DM q in Gjw, then s1 2 S
GMRqjw
jw
for DM q in Gjw.
Proof. Based on Definition 6.1.5.3, s1 is Nash stable for DM q in Gjw if R
+
qjw(s1) = ;.





Next, according to Definition 6.1.5.6, s1 2 S
SMRqjw
jw () for each s2 2 R+qjw(s1) 9 s3 2
R(Njw {q})jw(s2) such that s3 -qjw s1, and s4 -qjw s1 8 s4 2 Rqjw(s3). The constraint
for each s2 2 R+qjw(s1) 9 s3 2 R(Njw {q})jw(s2) such that s3 -qjw s1 in Definition 6.1.5.5,
suggests that s1 2 S
GMRqjw









Theorem 6.1.5.2. For q 2 Njw and s1 2 Sjw in Gjw, if s1 2 S
Nashqjw
jw is Nash stable for
DM q in Gjw, it satisfies that s1 2 S
SEQqjw
jw . Also, if s1 2 S
SEQqjw
jw for DM q in Gjw, it
implies that s1 2 S
GMRqjw
jw for DM q in Gjw.











jw . Also, as can be seen from Definition 6.1.5.4, R
+
(Njw {q})jw(s2) ✓





Definition 6.1.5.7 (Nash Equilibria in Gjw). A state s1 2 Sjw that is Nash stable for
all the players in Gjw is Nash equilibrium in Gjw. The set of all Nash equilibrium states
is denoted by ENashjw .
Remark 6.1.5.1. Note that if a state s1 2 Sjw is SEQ, GMR, or SMR stable for all the
players in Gjw, then it is SEQ, GMR, or SMR equilbrium, respectively, in Gjw. The groups
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The subjective eqilibria in Gjw are utilized to calculate the equilibria in Gw. Recall that
Gw is always one level above Gjw. Hence, Process 2 is applied to ascertain the perceptual
resolutions in Gw. Note that Process 2 is an exclusive aspect of the hypergame, which is
sensitive to the level of DMs’ misperception. Within Process 2, four steps are taken to
ascertain the Nash equilibria in Gw:
1. Identify DM j’s Nash strategies from ENashjw , 8j 2 Nw   {w̄}, where w̄ is the first
element of the string of DMs w.
2. Calculate the Cartesian product of the sets of DMs’ Nash strategies for all DMs
j 2 Nw   {w̄}.
3. In Gw, identify the group of states in Sw that are related to w̄0s opponents’ Nash
strategies obtained from Step 2.
4. Calculate the Nash stability of the states in Sw for w̄ within Gw, that are related to
w̄0s opponents’ Nash strategies obtained from Step 2. If a state is found to be Nash
stable for w̄, it constitutes a Nash equilibrium in Gw
Remark 6.1.5.2. If w = i1i2i3 is an ordered string of DMs, then the first element in w is
denoted by w̄ = i1. Also, if w = i1, then w̄ = i1.
Definition 6.1.5.8 (Nash Equilibria in Gw). For j 2 Nw  {w̄}, recall that ENashjw sym-




2jw , ..., e
Nashjw
"jw },



















jw is the strategy of DM j as
viewed by w that is attained from e
Nashjw
1jw in Gjw. Then, all possible combinations of DMs’
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Nash strategies except for w̄, each of which is determined from the set of Nash equilbria





jw ). Now, for s1 2 Sw
within Gw, let s1 = ((gs1w )
T , (gs1Nw {w̄})
T )T , where gs1w is w’s strategy related to state s1 and
gs1Nw {w̄} is w̄
0s opponents’ strategies related to s1. Then, s1 is a Nash equilibrium for w in





jw ). The set of Nash equilibrium states
in Gw is symbolized as ENashw .
Remark 6.1.5.3. In a similar fashion one can calculate the sets of SEQ, GMCR, and SMR
equilibria in Gw, denoted as ESEQw , E
GMR
w , and E
SMR
w , respectively. Note that Process 2 is
iterated as many times as required until reaching DM i’s actual subjective game Gi, 8i 2 N .
The Overall Hypergame Analysis
Similar to the work detailed by Aljefri et al. (2017a) and Aljefri et al. (2017b), an overall
hypergame analysis for the h-level hypergame can be performed. The Nash equilibria,
HEhNash, for the h-level hypergame can be calculated by identifying DM i’s Nash strategies
from ENashi within Gi, 8i 2 N . Then, by taking the Cartesian product of all DMs’ Nash
strategies, HEhNash is determined.
Definition 6.1.5.9 (Hyper Nash Equilibrium for the h-level Hypergame). For i 2
























i } stand for




i is the strategy of DM i
collected from eNashi1i in Gi. The group of hyper Nash equilibria for the h-level hypergame





HEhSEQ, HEhGMR, and HEhSMR are formalized in a similar way.
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6.2 Classification of the h-Level Hypergame
Equilibria
Identical to a first- and a second-level hypergame in graph form (Aljefri et al., 2017a,b),
the classification of h-level hypergame equilibria is the final step in the investigation of
a dispute with misperception. It is performed by an external analyst who is conscious
of the di↵erences in understanding among the players. The analyst classifies the h-level
hypergame equilibria based on the following principles. First, the expert investigates if the
h-level hypergame equilibrium state is viewed as a possible state in a DM’s actual subjective
game. If yes, then, the expert checks if the state is also an equilibrium state in a DM’s
actual subjective game. Also, the analyst examines the source of misperception, option
misperceptions and/or preference misperception, that provoke the hypergame situation.
These investigations allow the expert to obtain more insightful conclusions than those
observed earlier in the published hypergame analysis (Bennett, 1977; Bennett and Dando,
1979; Bennett, 1980; Bennett et al., 1981; Takahashi et al., 1984; Wang et al., 1988, 1989).
To perform the classification of h-level hypergame equilibria, the set of states in a DM’s
actual subjective game must be classified as detailed in the work of Aljefri et al. (2017a)
and Aljefri et al. (2017b). Because a DM is not aware of its misunderstanding, the set of
states in a DM’s actual subjective game is partitioned by the analyst. For i 2 N , recall
that Gi = hNi, Si, {Aji : j 2 Ni}, {%ji: j 2 Ni}i represents DM i’s actual subjective game
and Si is the set of states perceived by DM i. According to di↵erent option misperceptions,
Si is grouped into five disjoint classes: the collection of states that are (1) free from any
misperception and known across all the players, SR, (2) correctly perceived by DM i and
maybe by some of its opponents but not by all, SPi , (3) imagined by DM i and perhaps by
its opponents, SIi , (4) misunderstood by DM i and possibly by its opponents, S
M
i , and (5)
imagined and misunderstood by DM i and probably by its opponents, SI,Mi . For a detailed
discussion of the five sets of states, the reader is referred to the work described by Aljefri
et al. (2017a) and Aljefri et al. (2017b). In Table 6.1, the five groups of states are defined
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Table 6.1: Partitioning of Si in Gi within Hh
Group Type Definition
SR A state s 2 Si ✓ Ŝh is correctly considered by all players,
i.e., s 2 SR ✓ Si () there is f : Ôh ! {0, 1} satisfying
f(o) = 0, 8 o 2 Ôh \ (\j2N ORij).
SPi A state s 2 Si ✓ Ŝh is correctly recognized by DM i and
perhaps by some of its competitors but not by all of them.
That is, s 2 SPi () there is f : Ôh ! {0, 1} fulfilling 9 o 2
[j2N(ORji\ORj ), f(o) = 1 and f(o
0
) = 0, 8 o0 2 Ôh\([j2NORji).
SIi A state s 2 Si is imagined by DM i in Gi, such that, s 2
SIi () there is f : Ôh ! {0, 1} satisfying 9 o 2 [j2NOIji,
f(o) = 1 and f(o
0
) = 0, 8 o0 2 Ôh \ [([j2NOIji) [ ([j2NORji)].
SMi A state s 2 Si ✓ Ŝh is misunderstood by DM i in Gi, that
is s 2 SMi () there is f : Ôh ! {0, 1} satisfying 9 o 2
[j2NOMji , f(o) = 1 and f(o
0
) = 0, 8 o0 2 Ôh \ [([j2NOMji ) [
([j2NORji)].
SI,Mi A state s 2 Si ✓ Ŝh is referred to as an imagined and mis-
understood state in Gi, such that, s 2 SI,Mi () there
is f : Ôh ! {0, 1} satisfying 9 o 2 [j2NOIji, f(o) = 1,
9 o0 2 [j2NOMji , f(o
0
) = 1, and f(o
00
) = 0, 8 o00 2 Ôh \
[([j2NOIji) [ ([j2NOMji ) [([j2NORji)].
within the framework of the h-level hypergame.
Identical to the first- and second-level hypergames in graph form, eight classes of the
hyper Nash equilibria are put forward in this section within an h-level hypergame in graph
form. For examples and a comprehensive discussion of the eight classes, see the research
explained by Aljefri et al. (2017a) and Aljefri et al. (2017b). Table 6.2 shows the definitions
of the eight classes of the hyper Nash equilibrium for the h-level hypergame as well as the
types of misperception associated with each category.
As can be seen in Table 6.2, a hyper Nash equilibrium state that is known to all DMs
as a correct scenario and predicted by them as a Nash equilibrium within their actual
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Table 6.2: Classification of the h-level Hypergame Nash Equilbria
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subjective game, is referred to as a steady hyper Nash (SHNashh) equilibrium for the
h-level hypergame. This equilibrium is free from any misperception. Please notice that
the superscript h in SHNashh indicates that it is an equilibrium for an h-level hypergame.
However, if at least one of the DMs misses predicting the hyper Nash equilibrium
state as a Nash equilibrium in its subjective game, then it is called an unsteady hyper
Nash (UHNashh) equilibrium for the h-level hypergame. The source of misperception
associated with this equilibrium state is preference misperception.
Next, a hyper Nash equilibrium state is referred to as a stealthy hyper Nash (STHNashh)
equilibrium for the h-level hypergame if (1) perceived by at least one DM as a correct sce-
nario, (2) unknown to the other DMs, and (3) predicted as a Nash equilibrium in all of
the DMs’ subjective games for which the state is recognized. This category occurs when
at least one of the DMs is unaware of some of its opponents’ correctly perceived options.
This equilibrium represents the intentional use of strategic surprise in a conflict situation.
However, if at least one of the DMs who is aware of the state in its subjective game does
not predict it as a Nash equilibrium, it is classified as an unsteady stealthy hyper Nash
(USTHNashh) equilibrium for the h-level hypergame.
Furthermore, if a hyper Nash equilibrium state is known to all DMs as a misperceived
state and predicted as a Nash equilibrium by all of them within their subjective games, it
is called a contingent hyper Nash (CHNashh) equilibrium for the h-level hypergame. The
sources of misperception, in this case, are preference misperception, and option mispercep-
tions (imagined and misunderstood). Nevertheless, if the state is not a Nash equilibrium
in at least one DM’s subjective game, it is known as unsteady CHNashh (UCHNashh) for
the h-level hypergame.
Moreover, a hyper Nash equilibrium state that is assumed by some DMs as a misper-
ceived state and unknown to the other DMs is referred to as a self-CHNashh (SCHNashh)
equilibrium for the h-level hypergame. Preference misperception and option misperceptions
are associated with this category.
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Finally, a hyper Nash equilibrium state that is unknown to all DMs in a hypergame is
referred to as an emergent hyper Nash (EHNashh) equilibrium for the h-level hypergame.
This state occurs when each DM chooses to exercise courses of action in the dispute that
are hidden to its opponents. That is, this state is a surprise to all DMs in the dispute.
In a similar fashion, the hyper SEQ, GMR, and SMR equilbria for the h-level hypergame
can be classified.
6.3 Chapter Summary
The research described in this chapter outlines a novel method for modeling and analyzing
a general hypergame of any level or number of DMs within the structure of a graph model.
The procedures are created in such a way that a DM can hold misperceptions about itself
and also its opponents. Moreover, it takes into account a DM’s di↵erent levels of perception.
It also contains generalized stability analysis methods to analyze any level of hypergame.
Finally, it provides definitions to classify the overall hypergame equilibria into eight classes,
each of which provides unique strategic insights about the source of misperceptions that
provoke the hypergame situation.
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Chapter 7
Strategic Analyses of the
Hydropolitical Conflicts Surrounding
the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance
Dam
7.1 Introduction
Globally, there are a number of international rivers on which large water resources devel-
opment facilities have been constructed in both upstream and downstream countries. The
Colorado River, for example, is an international river shared by the United States and
Mexico (MIT, 2014). This river has multiple storage facilities in both the upstream and
downstream countries with an international agreement that coordinates their operation.
What makes the Nile River situation unique is that, in the near future, two hydraulic dams,
the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and Aswan High Dam (AHD), each with
a su cient storage capacity to hold the annual flow of the Nile River, will be working
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without any international agreement to coordinate their operations (MIT, 2014). With
a length of 6,800 km, the Nile River is one of the longest river systems on earth and is
shared by 11 African countries: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, as shown on the
map in Figure 7.1. Disputes have arisen with the decline in water resources due to rapid
population increases, development growth in Nile Basin countries, inequitable allotment of
the Nile River water, and inequitable hydraulic development on the Nile River (Salman,
2013; Cascão and Alan, 2016).
The Nile Valley covers 3.18 million km2 of Eastern Africa, which represents approxi-
mately 10.3% of the total area (Craig, 1991). As can be seen in Figure 7.1, the Nile River
is fed by two main tributaries: the White Nile and the Blue Nile River. Lake Victoria,
which is located in east central Africa on the frontiers of Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania,
is the primary water source of the White Nile. This lake is the second largest freshwater
reservoir on earth. The Blue Nile River, on the other hand, is formed by Lake Tana in the
Ethiopian highlands. The White and Blue Niles converge in Sudan to form the Nile River,
which flows from south to north through Egypt and discharges into the Mediterranean
Sea. Some of the water from the Nile River is stored in Egypt by AHD in the artificial
Lake Nasser (Shahin, 1985). The White and Blue Niles, respectively, contribute 30% and
57% of the total water in the Nile River (Craig, 1991). The remaining 13% comes from a
number of small rivers.
The most recent conflict regarding the Nile Basin erupted on April 11, 2011, when
Ethiopia publicly announced the launch of its federal hydroelectric dam project, called
the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). As will be mentioned later, Ethiopia’s
ambition to build a hydroelectric dam in the Ethiopian highlands within the Blue Nile
River near the eastern Sudanese border, (see Figure 7.1), goes back to 1958. Ethiopia’s
unilateral decision to violate the 1929 and 1959 agreements and start constructing the dam
on the Blue Nile River without prior notification to or approval from Egypt and Sudan
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Figure 7.1: The Nile River Basin
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and Whittington, 2008; Cascão, 2012; Salman, 2013; MIT, 2014; Abdelhady et al., 2015;
Cascão and Alan, 2016).
Water disputes have been extensively studied during the last decades, and di↵erent
methods have been utilized to model and analyze them (Madani, 2010). For example, a
game theoretical approach, the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR), has been
utilized to study a generic version of the ongoing Jordan River dispute (Madani and Hipel,
2007) and the Nile River Basin conflict before the Egyptian revolution, which commenced
on January 25, 2011 (Madani et al., 2011). Within this technique, complete information
and common perception among the participating decision makers (DMs) are assumed.
There is a stream of articles in the literature that examined the conflict over GERD. For
instance, the potential scenarios of the hydroplitical game between Ethiopia, Sudan, and
Egypt over GERD were explored by Sammaan (2014). Moreover, Cascão and Alan (2016)
argued that the establishment of GERD will promote possible cooperation between the
Eastern Nile countries in light of the geopolitical and economic changes.
The purpose of this research is to investigate in depth the disputes between the Eastern
Nile countries – Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan – over GERD, in order to provide strategic
insights and predict resolutions. The hypergame method in graph form, which models
and analyzes real-world disputes under di↵erent levels of perception among the partici-
pating DMs (Aljefri et al., 2017a,b), will be used to study these conflicts. This technique
is designed to be applied when there are discrepancies in DMs’ perceptions of a dispute,
perhaps because of the asymmetry of knowledge or a misunderstanding of the actual en-
vironment of the conflict among the participating DMs. In this case, GMCR standard
solution concepts cannot be applied; hypergame stability analysis is introduced as a new
theoretical procedure that extends GMCR’s existing solution concepts to circumstances
when DMs have a di↵erent interpretation of the real-life conflict. The overriding purpose
of hypergame analysis in graph form is to foretell the possible equilibria of the dispute
when DMs are not playing the same game.
The GERD dispute since the Egyptian revolution of January 2011 is analyzed at three
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points in time: the conflict just before April 11, 2011, which involves the use of strategic
surprise by the Ethiopian government, the negotiation in early January 2014, and the
negotiation in late August 2014, as shown in Figure 7.2.


















































Figure 7.2: The Hydropolitical Conflict Timeline
The chapter is structured as follows. First, an overview of the Nile Basin treaties,
related initiatives, and Eastern Nile countries’ political and economic changes is provided.
Next, the modeling and analysis of the dispute just before April 11, 2011, the negotiation in
early January 2014, and the negotiation in late August 2014 are conducted. The conclusions
and key insights are discussed at the end of the chapter.
7.2 Background
In this section the historical Nile Basin treaties are reviewed first. Next, a discussion about
the Nile Basin Initiative is provided. Lastly, the geopolitical and economic changes in the
Eastern Nile countries are highlighted to understand the cause of the conflicts.
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7.2.1 Nile Basin Treaties
During the British colonial period, many agreements were made regarding the Nile River
water allotment among the countries of the Nile Basin. These protocols were designed
to protect Britain’s interest in downstream states, ensuring that both Egypt and Sudan
received a significant and sustainable flow of water from the Nile River, for agricultural
and industrial production (Odidi, 1994; Swain, 1997; Degefu, 2003; Madani et al., 2011;
Salman, 2013, 2016). However, these agreements resulted in inequitable rights regarding
the use of the Nile River water by the countries in the region.
The 1902 Nile treaty between the United Kingdom (UK) (on behalf of Sudan) and
Ethiopia aimed to establish a border between Ethiopia and Sudan. This agreement stip-
ulated that Ethiopia could not implement any hydraulic project in the Blue Nile River,
or Lake Tana, that would capture the natural flow of the Blue Nile River without first
reaching an agreement with Britain. Based on Ethiopia’s understanding of the agreement,
this country could use the water in Lake Tana and the Blue Nile River as long as it did
not stop the flow of water. Hence, Ethiopia did not interpret the UK’s understanding
of the agreement as being preventive to using the water in Lake Tana or the Blue Nile
River. Therefore, Ethiopia claimed that its understanding of the agreement was valid, and
continued to dispute the validity of the 1902 agreement (Odidi, 1994; Swain, 1997; Degefu,
2003; Madani et al., 2011; Salman, 2013, 2016).
After Egypt achieved its independence from UK in 1922, Britain (on behalf of Britain’s
colonies of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, and Sudan) signed the Nile Water agreement with
Egypt in 1929. None of the upstream countries except Ethiopia was independent at the
time. This agreement granted Egypt an annual flow of 48 billion cubic meters (BCM) of
the Nile River water, the right to develop any project on the Nile River without notifying
upstream countries, and the right to stop any hydraulic project by upstream countries that
would alter the flow of the Nile River. Moreover, due to Britain’s interest in Sudan, the
agreement granted Sudan an annual flow of 4 BCM of the Nile River water. The agreement
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thus left 32 BCM of Nile River water unallocated (Odidi, 1994; Swain, 1997; Degefu, 2003;
Madani et al., 2011; Salman, 2013, 2016).
After Sudan gained its independence in 1956, it requested to renegotiate the 1929
agreement with Egypt to gain access to additional water that would satisfy Sudan’s needs.
Therefore, in 1959, Egypt and Sudan signed the Nile River water treaty for full utilization
of the Nile River water. According to this agreement, the annual water allotments of
Egypt and Sudan increased from 48 BCM to 55.5 BCM and from 4 BCM to 18.5 BCM,
respectively. In addition, the agreement permitted Sudan to construct hydraulic projects
on the Nile River that could regulate its flow. Egypt maintained all the rights that were
given to it by the 1929 agreement. Upstream countries were prohibited from building any
hydraulic infrastructure and from using the Nile River water (Odidi, 1994; Swain, 1997;
Degefu, 2003; Madani et al., 2011; Salman, 2013, 2016).
The upstream countries did not accept either the 1929 or 1959 agreement, yet they
were unwilling to actively oppose them due to their political instability and poor economic
situations (Odidi, 1994; Swain, 1997; Degefu, 2003). Soon after the 1959 agreement had
been signed, Ethiopia criticized the agreement, stressing its sovereignty over the water in
Lake Tana and the Blue Nile River that flows in its territory (Odidi, 1994; Swain, 1997;
Degefu, 2003; Madani et al., 2011; Salman, 2013, 2016). Therefore, Ethiopia, with the
support of the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), investigated the possible
construction of hydropower dams on Ethiopia’s Blue Nile River between 1958 and 1965
(USBR, 1964; Swain, 1997; Blackmore and Whittington, 2008; Cascão and Alan, 2016).
The USBR decided to support Ethiopia after Egypt began building the AHD with huge
support from the Soviet Union (Shupe et al., 1980; Wright et al., 1980). The studies had
identified possible sites for constructing a hydropower dam and for implementing irrigation
projects. However, between 1958 and 1999, Ethiopia was unable to acquire the necessary
funds to implement the plans for these projects, due to its political instability, severe
poverty, and harsh civil war (USBR, 1964; Swain, 1997; Blackmore and Whittington, 2008;
Cascão and Alan, 2016; AfDB et al., 2016; Yihdego et al., 2016).
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With the absence of colonial powers in Africa, it became evident that both the 1929 and
1959 agreements were unsustainable. Believing in the unfair agreements between upstream
and downstream countries, the nations in the region began to establish a cooperative
institution that promoted fair use of the Nile River water in 1992. Their e↵orts resulted
in the formation of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in 1999, which is discussed in the next
subsection.
7.2.2 The Nile Basin Initiative
The NBI was launched in 1999 for the purpose of promoting sustainable development
through cooperative and fair allotment of the Nile River water among countries in the
region (Salman, 2013). This important initiative brought upstream and downstream coun-
tries together to investigate mutually beneficial projects in the Nile Basin. International
organizations such as the World Bank and United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
facilitated the establishment of the NBI. Indeed, the NBI was the first undertaking to
garner strong international support. It aimed to identify possible regional investment op-
portunities in di↵erent sub-regions of the Basin that would provide mutual benefits for the
countries therein. One of the first studies done by the NBI was conducted by the Joint
Multipurpose Project (JMP) of the Eastern Nile countries in 2008. This study concluded
that the Blue Nile River in the Ethiopian highlands provides a good investment opportu-
nity for developing a large hydroelectric dam that has mutual benefits for Egypt, Sudan,
and Ethiopia (Blackmore and Whittington, 2008). This proposed project was expected
to reduce the amount of water loss, manage floods, and improve agricultural production
in Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan (Brunnée and Toope, 2002; FAO, 2002; The World Bank,
2009).
Ethiopia, a country with huge ambitions to construct hydroelectric dams on the Blue
Nile River, viewed the project proposed by the JMP of the Eastern Nile countries as the
first real opportunity to construct such a dam on the Blue Nile River, with the benefit of
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jointly funding the project with the Eastern Nile countries, Egypt and Sudan, through the
Nile Basin Trust Fund (NBTF) and with substantial aid from the international community
(USBR, 1964; Blackmore and Whittington, 2008; Cascão and Alan, 2016). However, after
the JMP report was released in 2008, Egypt disputed the validity of the study and rejected
the proposals for building a dam on the Blue Nile River, because it believed that the dam
would reduce the volume of water reaching Egypt (Blackmore and Whittington, 2008;
Cascão, 2012; Salman, 2013; Cascão and Alan, 2016). Ethiopia and Sudan, on the other
hand, praised the findings, viewing the project as an excellent opportunity for power trade,
flood control, and irrigation projects that would benefit all the Eastern Nile countries.
Therefore, from 2008 to 2009, Ethiopia and Sudan tried to convince Egypt to cooperate
in the JMP of the NBI, but their e↵orts did not lead to any result. Until 2010, the NBI
was not a legally binding agreement. Thus, the parties could walk away from the initiative
without su↵ering any negative consequences.
To make the NBI a legally binding agreement for all Nile Basin countries, the parties
involved worked from 1991 to 2010 to draft a Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA).
The objectives of the CFA are to give the right to each Nile country to use the Nile River
water within its borders and to specify a number of factors that determine the equitable
utilization of the Nile River water among the countries of the region. However, the situation
of ratifying the CFA intensified when both Egypt and Sudan refused to sign the CFA of
the NBI in 2010 due to Article 14b regarding water security (Dahan, 2009; Nile Basin
Initiative, 2010). This article required all Nile Basin countries to have a fair use of the
Nile River water. Egypt and Sudan wanted the CFA to maintain their historical rights,
which had been granted to them by the 1929 and 1959 treaties. As a result, this window
of opportunity for Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt to engage in any mutually beneficial and
cooperative hydraulic projects was shut (Blackmore and Whittington, 2008; Cascão, 2012;
Salman, 2013; Cascão and Alan, 2016).
At this point, Ethiopia realized that the development of a hydraulic project within
the cooperative framework of the JMP through NBI would not be an option. Hence,
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Ethiopia returned to considering its national projects on its own and decided to construct
a hydroelectric dam on the Blue Nile River, as identified by the USBR in 1964, but larger
and with greater capacity (Blackmore and Whittington, 2008; Cascão, 2012; Salman, 2013;
Cascão and Alan, 2016). In April 2011, Ethiopia publicly announced the launching of its
federal hydroelectric dam project, GERD, on the Blue Nile River near the Sudanese eastern
border (see Figure 7.1). The economic and political changes occurring in all the Eastern
Nile nations allowed Ethiopia to commence the construction of this massive project, which
is the first of its kind for Ethiopia. These changes are discussed in the next subsection.
7.2.3 Eastern Nile Countries: Political and Economic Changes
The geopolitical and economic changes in the Eastern Nile countries set the stage for
building GERD. Egypt, for example, which had once been the most stable country in
Africa economically and politically, su↵ered from dramatic political instability due to the
Egyptian revolution, which began on January 25, 2011, and continued until the election of
President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi on June 8, 2014, as outlined in Figure 7.3. As a result of
the Egyptian revolution, Egypt’s key decision makers were changed more than four times,
with each having di↵erent views about the country’s internal and international policies
(Cascão and Alan, 2016).
Sudan also experienced significant political and economic transformations. The Com-
prehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was signed in 2005, granted South Sudan its
independence from Sudan on July 9, 2011, with South Sudan receiving 48% of Sudan’s
total oil revenue (Oil and Energy Trends, 2011; Aljefri et al., 2014b). To compensate for
this loss of oil revenue, Sudan worked to diversify its economy, focusing on investments in
agriculture and irrigation projects within the Blue Nile River. Thus, Sudan was supportive
of the construction of large hydroelectric dams on the Blue Nile River within the Ethiopian
highlands as proposed by the JMP of the Eastern Nile River countries. Sudan expected
that the proposed dams would grant it extra water that could be used for its ambitious
158
February 11, 2011 President Hosni Mubarak not in power. The Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces started to rule Egypt.
June 30, 2012 The Election of President Mohamed Morsi.
July 3, 2013 President Mohamed Morsi not in power. The President
of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, Adly Man-
sour, started to rule Egypt.
June 8, 2014 The Election of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
1
Figure 7.3: Egypt’s Recent Political Changes
agriculture and irrigation projects (Cascão and Alan, 2016; Yihdego et al., 2016).
Unlike other countries in the region, Ethiopia has enhanced its political stability during
the last two decades, improved its economy, attracted foreign investments, and conducted
business trade with China. According to the World Bank, Ethiopia was ranked as the
twelfth-fastest growing economy in the world in 2012 (The World Bank, 2013). As can be
seen in Figure 7.4, Ethiopia’s annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth increased from
6.1% in 2000 to 12.6% in 2010, slightly declining to 10.3% in 2014 (The World Bank, 2016).
In comparison, the world average GDP growth dropped from 4.3% in 2000 to 4.1% in 2010,
and further to 2.5% in 2014. These numbers clearly demonstrate that Ethiopia had one of
the fastest-growing GDPs in the world during this period . On the other hand, the annual
GDP growth in Egypt and Sudan was in line with the international trend (The World
Bank, 2016). The sustained development of Ethiopia’s agricultural and service sectors was
the primary reason for its GDP growth (CIA, 2016). These factors allowed Ethiopia to
commence construction of GERD in April 11, 2011 as a national project that was claimed
not to have any real foreign investments (Cascão and Alan, 2016).
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Figure 7.4: The Annual GDP Growth of the Eastern Nile Countries in Comparison With
Global Overall Annual GDP Growth
7.3 The Conflict just before April 11, 2011
The Eastern Nile countries’ conflicts over the construction of GERD took a critical turn
when Ethiopia publicly announced on April 11, 2011 its decision to build GERD on the
Blue Nile River without giving the downstream nations Egypt and Sudan, any prior no-
tification, and without gaining their approval (Blackmore and Whittington, 2008; Cascão,
2012; Salman, 2013; Cascão and Alan, 2016). GERD includes a reservoir that is estimated
to hold up to 70 BCM of water, and a power generation capacity of 6,000 megawatts.
As such, it is the largest hydraulic dam in Africa in terms of power generation capacity.
Ethiopia tendered the construction of the dam to an Italian company at a total cost of
US $4.7 billion and the project is expected to be completed in 2017. As of 2016, 70% of
the dam construction was completed (International Rivers, 2014; Abbas, 2016; Ministry
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of Water, Irrigation, and Electricity, 2016; Wheeler et al., 2016). The primary purpose of
the dam is claimed to be hydroelectricity generation. Ethiopia secured the financing of
the project locally by issuing diaspora bonds (Davison, 2011). International investors were
not motivated to fund the project with the Ethiopian government due to Egypt’s strong
opposition to any projects on the Blue or White Nile.
To avoid any direct and severe confrontation with Egypt, Ethiopia released its decision
to commence construction of GERD in the middle of the Egyptian revolution, which com-
menced on January 25, 2011 (Blackmore and Whittington, 2008; Cascão, 2012; Salman,
2013; Cascão and Alan, 2016). Although Ethiopia was adamant that it will implement the
project, with or without cooperation from Egypt and Sudan, the speech delivered by the
then Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, on April 11, 2011, emphasized that Egypt
and Sudan would benefit from the dam; and, as a result, invited them to co-fund it.
Both Egypt and Sudan expressed their mistrust and rejection of GERD. Egypt received
the news of Ethiopia’s unilateral decision to construct GERD while in the midst of a critical
political situation. As a result, significant courses of action such as political retaliation were
not considered. Instead, Egypt emphasized its historical water rights that had been granted
to it by the 1929 agreement and later by the 1959 accord (Blackmore and Whittington,
2008; Cascão, 2012; Salman, 2013; Cascão and Alan, 2016). Moreover, Egypt declared
that GERD would reduce the volume of water flow from the Blue Nile River to the Nile
River in Egypt, would reduce the hydroelectric capacity of AHD, and would turn some of
Egypt’s irrigated fields into desert. Hence, Egypt demanded that all research on GERD be
provided so that the negative implications of GERD on Egypt could be accurately assessed.
It is worth noting that the same concerns were raised by Egypt when, in 2008, the JMP of
the Eastern Nile countries proposed constructing a dam in the Ethiopian highlands within
the Blue Nile River (Ramadan et al., 2013; Arjoon et al., 2014; Whittington et al., 2014;
Cascão and Alan, 2016).
Sudan also rejected Ethiopia’s decision to start building GERD. The construction safety
of GERD was of prominent concern to Sudan as any breaking, slipping, or collapsing of
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the dam would topple and destroy many Sudanese villages and cities, including the capital
city of Khartoum (Arjoon et al., 2014; Whittington et al., 2014; Cascão and Alan, 2016).
Despite its strong opposition in 2011, Sudan had supported the construction of the dam
in the Ethiopian highlands within the Blue Nile River in 2008, when such a dam was
proposed by JMP of the Eastern Nile countries. Sudan backed JMP’s proposal due to its
overwhelming desire to obtain additional water for its ambitious irrigation and agriculture
projects that would enhance the state growth plan.
The Eastern Nile countries’ dispute over GERD encountered a special type of misper-
ception. In particular, Egypt and Sudan were unaware of Ethiopia’s intention to commence
GERD as announced on April 11, 2011 without any prior notification or approval, while
Ethiopia, on the other hand, was aware of Egypt and Sudan’s misperception (Blackmore
and Whittington, 2008; Cascão, 2012; Salman, 2013; Cascão and Alan, 2016). Therefore,
the structure of the second-level hypergame in graph form (SLHG) (Aljefri et al., 2017b)
is used to model and analyze the conflict just before April 11, 2011. The modeling of the
universal set of states for a second-level hypergame is first addressed.
7.3.1 Modeling the Universal Set of States for a Second-Level
Hypergame
The DMs and their courses of action for the hydropolitical conflict just before April 11,
2011 are given in Table 7.1. Note that three DMs are participating in the dispute over
GERD: Egypt (denoted by EGY), Sudan (denoted by SU), and Ethiopia (denoted by
ETH). As can be seen, Egypt has two options: (1) maintain the status quo by adhering
to the 1959 agreement or (2) agree to implement a cooperative hydraulic project within
JMP of the Eastern Nile countries. Sudan, on the other hand, has the same two options
as Egypt. Ethiopia, which is the only upstream country in this dispute, has three options:
(1) obey the 1959 agreement, (2) implement a cooperative hydraulic project with the
Eastern Nile countries within the framework of JMP, or (3) implement an independent
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national hydraulic project. In this conflict, Egypt and Sudan were unaware of Ethiopia’s
intention to construct the dam on the Blue Nile River, while Ethiopia was aware of this
misperception on Egypt and Sudan’s part. Hence, Ethiopia’s option to act independently
and start building a hydroelectric dam on the Blue Nile River was hidden from both Egypt
and Sudan and will not be considered in their subjective games (Aljefri et al., 2017a,b).
Table 7.1: DMs and Options in the Hydropolitical Conflict just before April 11, 2011
DM Options
Egypt (EGY) 1. Maintain the status quo of the 1959 treaty (Maintain)
2. Cooperate with hydraulic development (Cooperate)
Sudan (SU) 3. Maintain the status quo of the 1959 treaty (Maintain)
4. Cooperate with hydraulic development (Cooperate)
Ethiopia (ETH) 5. Obey the 1959 treaty (Obey)
6. Cooperate with hydraulic development (Cooperate)
7. Commence independently (Commence)
The options in Table 7.1 are used to mathematically define the universal set of states
for a second-level hypergame, Ŝ2. Since a DM can decide to select an option or not, there
are 27 = 128 mathematically possible states for this dispute. Some of the states in Ŝ2
are infeasible and need to be eliminated. Because Egypt and Sudan cannot maintain the
status quo of the 1959 agreement and implement a cooperative hydraulic project within the
NBI framework, options 1 and 2 as well as options 3 and 4 are mutually exclusive (Fang
et al., 1993; Kilgour and Hipel, 2005). The states in which Egypt and/or Sudan choose
these options together are removed from the model. This constraint removes 56 states.
Furthermore, Ethiopia cannot obey the 1959 agreement, implement a cooperative hydraulic
project, and commence an independent national project together since they are mutually
exclusive. Thus, this removes 18 states further. Moreover, the situation in which Ethiopia
takes no action is highly unlikely to ever be taken, the states containing this combination
of options are infeasible, thus removing 9 more states. Finally, the circumstance in which
Egypt and Sudan cooperate and Ethiopia obeys the 1959 agreement is infeasible, which
removes one additional state. Hence, for the dispute just before April 11, 2011, 26 states
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were found to be feasible as shown in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2: The Universal Set of States for a Second-Level Hypergame
DM Option States
EGY 1. Maintain N Y N N Y N N Y N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N
2. Cooperate N N Y N N Y N N N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y
SU 3. Maintain N N N Y Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y N N N N N N Y Y Y N N N
4. Cooperate N N N N N N Y Y N N N N N N Y Y Y N N N N N N Y Y Y
ETH 5. Obey Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
6. Cooperate N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N N
7. Commence N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Label 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
3
Each option or course of action in Table 7.2 is marked with a number and can be either
chosen (Y for yes) or not (N for no) by the DM who controls it. Each state in Table 7.2
accounts for a possible real-life scenario (Howard, 1971; Kilgour et al., 1987; Fang et al.,
1993; Kilgour and Hipel, 2005). These states are then used to formulate states in each
DM’s subjective first-level hypergame (Aljefri et al., 2017a,b). State 13 is the status quo
for the conflict, the state in which the conflict started just before April 11, 2011.
As mentioned earlier, SLHG is a structure consisting of subjective first-level hyper-
games, each of which represents not only a DM’s viewpoint of the conflict situation but
also its opinion on its opponents’ subjective games (Aljefri et al., 2017a,b). Mathemati-
cally, the structure of a second-level hypergame, H2, for the dispute just before April 11,
2011 is provided as follows:
H2 = {H1EGY , H1SU , H1ETH} (7.1)
where, H1EGY , H
1
SU , and H
1
ETH stand for Egypt’s, Sudan’s, and Ethiopia’s subjective first-
level hypergames, respectively. In the dispute between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia, it
has been noted that Egypt and Sudan share the same misperception about Ethiopia (i.e.,
unaware of Ethiopia’s intention to commence building a dam on the Blue Nile without
first reaching an agreement with Egypt and Sudan). Additionally, the investigation reveals
that both Egypt and Sudan correctly capture each other’s options and preferences in the
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dispute. These insightful results allow the authors to assume that Egypt’s subjective
first-level hypergame is identical to Sudan’s subjective first-level hypergame (i.e., H1EGY =
H1SU). Therefore, one can analyze H
1
EGY only and obtain both of Egypt and Sudan’s stable
strategies that are associated with the equilibrium states in H1EGY .
7.3.2 Stability Analysis and Equilibrium Results for Egypt’s and
Sudan’s Subjective First-Level Hypergame
Egypt’s subjective first-level hypergame H1EGY can be defined as follows.
H1EGY = {GEGY EGY , GSU EGY , GETH EGY } (7.2)
where, GEGY EGY , GSU EGY , and GETH EGY are Egypt’s, Sudan’s, and Ethiopia’s subjec-
tive games, respectively, as seen by Egypt. Egypt assumes that its subjective game is
the actual one for the dispute and all the engaging DMs see it in this manner. That is,
GEGY EGY = GSU EGY = GETH EGY . Therefore, one needs to analyze GEGY EGY only.
The set of feasible states in GEGY EGY is SEGY EGY = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15, 16, 17}. Note that some states in the universal set of states Ŝ2 are unknown to
Egypt. The states in which Ethiopia decided to act independently and chose to start build-
ing a hydroelectric dam on the Blue Nile River were unknown to Egypt. Therefore, the set
of hidden states in Egypt’s subjective game is SHEGY EGY = {18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26}.
Egypt will not consider these states in its subjective game (Aljefri et al., 2017a,b).
To conduct a stability analysis in GEGY EGY , states are put in the order of preference
for each DM as perceived by Egypt. DMs’ ordinal preferences are given in Table 7.3 and
explained as follows:
1. Egypt’s first preference is to do nothing while Sudan either maintains the 1959 agree-
ment or does nothing; and Ethiopia obeys the 1959 agreement. Egypt’s second pref-
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erence is to maintain the 1959 agreement to influence Ethiopia to follow the 1959
treaty. The least preferred scenarios for Egypt are when it cooperates under the
influence of Sudan and Ethiopia (Blackmore and Whittington, 2008; Cascão, 2012;
Salman, 2013; Cascão and Alan, 2016). As can be seen in Table 7.3, a line above or
below a group of states means that they are equally preferred. For example, states
15 and 11 are equally preferred for Egypt.
2. Sudan’s first preference is to engage in a cooperative water development project with
Egypt and Ethiopia and maintain an excellent relationship with both Egypt and
Ethiopia; second, Sudan prefers to boost its economy by establishing a cooperative
project with Ethiopia, regardless of its relationship with Egypt; third, to maintain
a strong relationship with Egypt and act according to Egypt’s desire. The least
preferred scenarios for Sudan are for it to cooperate and for both Egypt and Ethiopia
to choose to maintain the 1959 treaty (Blackmore and Whittington, 2008; Cascão,
2012; Salman, 2013; Cascão and Alan, 2016).
3. Ethiopia’s first preference is to cooperate with Egypt and Sudan with respect to
constructing a hydraulic project on the Blue Nile River. Ethiopia’s second preferences
are that Egypt and Sudan do nothing while Ethiopia goes ahead with the project.
The least preferred scenarios for Ethiopia are to obey the 1959 treaty. This would
prevent Ethiopia from constructing any project on the Blue Nile River and from
having fair use of the Blue Nile River water (Blackmore and Whittington, 2008;
Cascão, 2012; Salman, 2013; Cascão and Alan, 2016).
After ordering the states based on each DM’s preferences, one can analyze GEGY EGY
by using the standard GMCR solution concepts (Nash, 1950, 1951; Howard, 1971; Fraser
and Hipel, 1979, 1984; Fang et al., 1993; Aljefri et al., 2017a,b) to investigate DMs’ pos-
sible moves and counter moves for the purpose of identifying the subjective equilibria in
GEGY EGY . The decision support system GMCR II (Fang et al., 2003a,b) is used to perform
the analysis and predict the equilibrium states for the dispute.
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Table 7.3: Ranking of States for the DMs in the Conflict just before April 11, 2011 as Seen
by Egypt
DM States
Egypt 17 15 11 14 16 9 10 12 13 5 2 4 8 6 3 7 1
Sudan 11 17 15 1 16 5 13 9 2 10 7 8 12 6 3 4 14
Ethiopia 1 14 12 9 7 5 2 13 10 8 6 3 14 11 16 15 17
Most preferred Least preferred
8
DM’s individual stability results and the overall equilibria in GEGY EGY are furnished
in Table 7.4. Since states 2 and 5 are stable for all DMs under Nash, SEQ, GMR, and
SMR solution concepts, they are Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR equilibria for GEGY EGY .
States 2 and 5 are strong equilibria in GEGY EGY because they are resolutions within all
the solution concepts. States 9 and 17 are also strong resolutions because they constitute
states that are equilibria under SEQ and GMR. Moreover, states 6, 8, 10, and 13 are weak
equilibrium states for the dispute because they are resolutions under GMR and SMR, in
which a DM may have sanctions that are detrimental to itself.
Table 7.4: Stability Analysis and Equilibrium Results in GEGY EGY
States 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
EGY Nash NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
SEQ NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES
GMR NO YES NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SMR NO YES NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SU Nash YES YES YES NO YES YES NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES YES NO
SEQ YES YES YES NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES NO YES NO YES YES YES
GMR YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES NO YES YES YES
SMR YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES NO NO YES NO YES NO YES YES YES
ETH Nash YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
SEQ YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES
GMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES NO NO NO YES
SMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES NO NO NO YES
Equilibrium Nash / E / / E / / / / / / / / / / / /
SEQ / E / / E / / / E / / / / / / / E
GMR / E / / E E / E E E / / E / / / E
SMR / E / / E E / E / / / / E / / / E
7
Having identified the equilibrium states, one needs to determine Egypt and Sudan’s
strategies that are related to the equilibrium states in GEGY EGY . Normally, one obtains
each DM’s strategies from the equilibrium states in its subjective game. In this case, Egypt
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and Sudan’s strategies are obtained from GEGY EGY because H1EGY = H
1
SU .







g13EGY = (Y N)
T , its strategy related to states 6 and 17 is g6EGY = g
17
EGY = (NY )
T , and its
strategy related to state 9 is g9EGY = (NN)
T . Hence, one can determine Egypt’s set of
Nash strategies g⇤NashEGY as follows:
• g⇤NashEGY = {g2EGY , g5EGY } = {(Y N)T}.
Egypt’s sets of SEQ, GMR, and SMR strategies, g⇤SEQEGY , g
⇤GMR
EGY , and g
⇤SMR
EGY , respectively,
can be obtained analogously as follows:
• g⇤SEQEGY = {g2EGY , g5EGY , g9EGY , g17EGY } = {(Y N)T , (NN)T , (NY )T},
• g⇤GMREGY = {g2EGY , g5EGY , g6EGY , g8EGY , g9EGY , g10EGY , g13EGY , g17EGY } = {(Y N)T , (NY )T , (NN)T},
and
• g⇤SMREGY = {g2EGY , g5EGY , g6EGY , g8EGY , g13EGY , g17EGY } = {(Y N)T , (NY )T}.










SU = (Y N)
T , and its strategy
related to states 8 and 17 is g8SU = g
17
SU = (NY )
T . Sudan’s sets of Nash, SEQ, GMR, and




SU , and g
⇤SMR
SU , respectively, can be obtained as follows:
• g⇤NashSU = {g2SU , g5SU} = {(NN)T , (Y N)T}.
• g⇤SEQSU = {g2SU , g5SU , g9SU , g17SU} = {(NN)T , (Y N)T , (NY )T},
• g⇤GMRSU = {g2SU , g5SU , g6SU , g8SU , g9SU , g10SU , g13SU , g17SU} = {(NN)T , (Y N)T , (NY )T}, and
• g⇤SMRSU = {g2SU , g5SU , g6SU , g8SU , g13SU , g17SU} = {(NN)T , (Y N)T , (NY )T}.
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7.3.3 Stability Analysis and Equilibrium Results for Ethiopia’s
First-Level Hypergame
Ethiopia’s subjective first-level hypergame H1ETH is defined as follows.
H1ETH = {GEGY ETH , GSU ETH , GETH ETH} (7.3)
where, GEGY ETH , GSU ETH , and GETH ETH are Egypt’s, Sudan’s, and Ethiopia’s subjec-
tive games, respectively, as seen by Ethiopia.
Ethiopia correctly perceived the conflict situation and was aware not only of its own
subjective game but also those of Egypt and Sudan. Ethiopia knows that Egypt and
Sudan play the same game and have the same misperception about Ethiopia. Accordingly,
in this dispute, Ethiopia utilized this extra insight to its benefit. Also, Ethiopia knows
that GEGY ETH = GSU ETH = GEGY EGY .
Analysis of H1ETH starts by first analyzing GEGY ETH by using a range of GMCR
solution concepts of human behavior under conflict. That is, the set of equilibrium states
in GEGY ETH is calculated and DMs’ strategies that are associated with the equilbrium
states are determined. Second, in GETH ETH , one identifies the states associated with
Egypt’s and Sudan’s strategies arising from the equilibrium states in GEGY ETH . If a
state is stable for Ethiopia according to the particular solution concept in GETH ETH , it
constitutes an equilibrium in GETH ETH . These equilibrium states also comprise resolutions
for H1ETH (Aljefri et al., 2017a,b). Note that the equilibrium states in GEGY EGY and
Egypt’s and Sudan’s strategies related to the equilibrium states in GEGY EGY are the same
for GEGY ETH and GSU ETH . Hence, one only needs to model and analyze Ethiopia’s
subjective game GETH ETH .
The modeling of GETH ETH starts by identifying the set of feasible states as perceived
by Ethiopia in its subjective game, denoted by SETH ETH . Because Ethiopia correctly
captured the conflict situation, it perceived all the states in Ŝ2. Hence, SETH ETH =
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Ŝ2 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26}. How-
ever, based on Ethiopia’s perception, SETH ETH is partitioned into two disjoint sets: the
group of states that are correctly perceived by Ethiopia as well as Egypt and Sudan (Aljefri
et al., 2017a,b), denoted as SR = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17}; and the
collection of states that are correctly perceived by only Ethiopia and hidden to Egypt and
Sudan, expressed as SPETH ETH = {18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26} (Aljefri et al., 2017a,b).
Egypt’s and Sudan’s preferences as perceived by Ethiopia are identical to their prefer-
ence in GEGY EGY . Ethiopia’s preferences as perceived by itself are explained as follows
(Blackmore and Whittington, 2008; Cascão, 2012; Salman, 2013; Cascão and Alan, 2016).
Ethiopia’s first preferences are to implement an independent water development project
on the Blue Nile River. Of course, Ethiopia wishes to do so as Egypt and Sudan decide
to take no action. However, Ethiopia is adamant about building a dam on the Blue Nile
River and, as a result, would also prefer to pursue its water development even if Egypt and
Sudan maintain the 1959 agreement. The second preferences for Ethiopia are to cooperate
with Egypt and Sudan regarding building a mutually beneficial water development project
on the Blue Nile River, whereas the least favored situations for Ethiopia are to obey the
1959 agreement. Maintaining the status quo means that Ethiopia cannot build a dam on
the Blue Nile River and continues to have an unfair share of the Blue Nile River water.
Table 7.5 shows the ranking of states from most to least preferred for Egypt, Sudan, and
Ethiopia as perceived by Ethiopia in GETH ETH . Because Ethiopia correctly understands
the conflict situation and was also aware of Egypt’s and Sudan’s misperception, Egypt’s and
Sudan’s preference relationships in Table 7.5 are identical to their preference relationships
as presented in Table 7.3.
To identify the equilibria in GETH ETH , the group of states that are related to Egypt’s
and Sudan’s winning strategies obtained from the equilibrium states in Table 7.4 needs to
be checked for stability. Note that all the states in SETH ETH are related to Egypt’s and
Sudan’s winning strategies. Therefore, Ethiopia’s individual stability analysis needs to be
carried out over all the states in SETH ETH . The results of Ethiopia’s individual stability
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Table 7.5: Ranking of States for the DMs in the Conflict just before April 11, 2011 as Seen
by Ethiopia
DM States
Egypt 17 15 11 14 16 9 10 12 13 5 2 4 8 6 3 7 1
Sudan 11 17 15 1 16 5 13 9 2 10 7 8 12 6 3 4 14
Ethiopia 18 22 19 21 23 25 20 24 26 17 15 11 14 16 9 10 12 13 5 2 4 6 3 7 1 8
Most preferred Least preferred
10
analysis and equilibrium results in GETH ETH are presented in Table 7.6.
Table 7.6: Ethiopia’s Individual Stability Analysis and Equilibrium Results in GETH ETH
States 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
EGY g Nash YES NO NO NO YES NO NO YES NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO
g SEQ YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
g GMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
g SMR YES YES YES NO YES YES NO YES NO YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES
SU g Nash YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO
g SEQ YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
g GMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
g SMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
ETH Nash NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SEQ NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
GMR NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SMR NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Equilibrium Nash / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / E / / E / / / /
SEQ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / E E E E E E E E E
GMR / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / E E E E E E E E E
SMR / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / E E / E E E E E
29
As can be seen in Table 7.6, states 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26 are Nash stable
for Ethiopia as no unilateral improvements (UIs) are available for Ethiopia, beginning
from these states and moving to any other more preferred states. These states are also
stable under SEQ, GMR, and SMR by definition (Nash, 1950, 1951; Howard, 1971; Fraser
and Hipel, 1979, 1984; Fang et al., 1993; Aljefri et al., 2017a,b). The other states are
unstable for Ethiopia because there is at least a UI from them from which Egypt and
Sudan have no deterrent sanctioning moves. For example, Ethiopia can move from state
12 to a more preferred state 21. Egypt and Sudan are not aware of state 21; as a result,
they have no credible deterrent. Therefore, Ethiopia will take advantage of Egypt and
Sudan’s misperception and move to state 21.
As mentioned earlier, if a state that is individually stable for Ethiopia in GETH ETH
under a particular solution concept and Egypt’s and Sudan’s strategies related to that
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state are found to be stable under the same stability definition in GEGY ETH , then the
state is considered as an equilibrium in GETH ETH within that specific solution concept.
For example, states 19 and 22 are individually stable for Ethiopia in GETH ETH under
Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR solution concepts. Also, Egypt’s and Sudan’s strategies
related to states 19 and 22 are found to be stable in GEGY ETH under all the solution
concepts. Thus, states 19 and 22 are Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR equilibria in GETH ETH .
Furthermore, by investigating the data in Table 7.6 one can see that states 18 and 21 are
SEQ and GMR equilibria in GETH ETH . Additionally, states 20, 23, 24, 25, and 26 are SEQ,
GMR, and SMR equilibria in GETH ETH . Keep in mind that GEGY ETH = GEGY EGY .
Having identified the equilibria in GETH ETH , one needs to determine Ethiopia’s strate-
gies that are associated with these equilibrium states. Ethiopia’s strategy related to states















ETH = (NNY )
T . Ethiopia’s sets of Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR strate-













ETH} = {(NNY )T}. In the next section, the stability analysis and
equilibrium results for the second-level hypergame are put forward.
7.3.4 Stability Analysis and Equilibrium Results for the Second-
Level Hypergame just before April 11, 2011
The overall equilibria for a second-level hypergame can be determined by taking the Carte-
sian product of Egypt’s and Sudan’s strategies that are related to the equilibrium states in
GEGY EGY within H1EGY with Ethiopia’s strategies that are associated with the equilibrium
states in GETH ETH within H1ETH . The results are furnished in Table 7.7. As can be seen,
states 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26 are found to be possible equilibrium states for
the second-level hypergame. States 19 and 22 are Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR equilibria
for the second-level hypergame because Egypt’s, Sudan’s, and Ethiopia’s strategies linked
with states 19 and 22 are stable under the same solution concepts. These two states are
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the strongest resolutions to the dispute because they are resolutions under all four of the
solution concepts. Further, states 20, 23, 25, and 26 are equilibria under SEQ, GMR, and
SMR solution concepts for the conflict. Finally, states 18, 21, and 24 are found to be SEQ
and GMR equilibria for the dispute because DMs’ strategies related to these states are
stable under SEQ and GMR solution concepts.
These equilibrium states are classified as steady stealthy hypergame equilibria for a
second-level hypergame because they (1) are only recognized by Ethiopia, (2) constitute
resolutions in GETH ETH , and (3) are unknown states to both Egypt and Sudan (Aljefri
et al., 2017a,b). A steady stealthy hyper equilibrium state for a second-level hypergame
demonstrates the planned use of a strategic surprise by at least one DM in a conflict
situation (Aljefri et al., 2017a,b).
Historically, state 22, the steady stealthy hyper Nash equilibrium state, comprised the
equilibrium of the conflict. State 22 is the situation in which both Egypt and Sudan decide
not to cooperate with Ethiopia regarding building a dam on the Blue Nile River and to
maintain their historical right, as granted to them by the 1959 treaty. It also represents
the circumstance in which Ethiopia violated the agreement and surprisingly announced
its decision to build a hydraulic dam within the Blue Nile River in the Ethiopian heights,
without any prior notification or approval from Egypt.
The evolution of the conflict just before April 11, 2011 is outlined in Table 7.8. As can
be seen, the actual historical evolution of the dispute began by moving from state 13, the
status quo of the dispute, on the left to the final resolution, state 22, on the right. Recall
that in 2010 both Egypt and Sudan refused to sign the CFA and emphasized their historical
water shares as provided under the 1959 agreement. At the same time, Ethiopia lost hope
of developing a hydraulic project within a cooperative framework with Egypt and Sudan.
Due to Egypt and Sudan’s misperception, state 13 is predicted by them as a possible final
resolution of the dispute on April 11, 2011 as can be seen in their games GEGY EGY and
GSU SU , respectively, that state 13 is a GMR and SMR equilibrium. Egypt and Sudan
underestimated Ethiopia’s capability to individually build a dam on the Blue Nile River.
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Table 7.7: Equilibrium Results for the Second-Level Hypergame
Winning Strategy
EGY Stability YN YN YN NN NN NN NY NY NY
Nash YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
SEQ YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
GMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SMR YES YES YES NO NO NO YES YES YES
Winning Strategy
SU Stability NN YN NY NN YN NY NN YN NY
Nash YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO
SEQ YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
GMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Winning Strategy
ETH Stability NNY NNY NNY NNY NNY NNY NNY NNY NNY
Nash YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SEQ YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
GMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
States 19 22 25 18 21 24 20 23 26
Second-Level Nash HE HE / / / / / / /
Hypergame SEQ HE HE HE HE HE HE HE HE HE
Equilibrium GMR HE HE HE HE HE HE HE HE HE
SMR HE HE HE / / / HE HE HE
Classification Nash STHNash STHNash / / / / / / /
of the SEQ STHSEQ STHSEQ STHSEQ STHSEQ STHSEQ STHSEQ STHSEQ STHSEQ STHSEQ
Second-Level GMR STHGMR STHGMR STHGMR STHGMR STHGMR STHGMR STHGMR STHGMR STHGMR
Hypergame Equi-
libria
SMR STHSMR STHSMR STHSMR / / / STHSMR STHSMR STHSMR
1
2
As a result, both Egypt and Sudan were faced with a strategic surprise when Ethiopia
announced its decision, on April 11, 2011, to construct a massive hydroelectric dam on the
Blue Nile River as a national project. Ethiopia was aware of Egypt and Sudan’s political
instability and announced its decision at a very critical time for both countries. While
Egypt received the news of GERD in the midst of the Egyptian revolution, Sudan became
aware of Ethiopia’s decision when South Sudan was about to receive its independence from
Sudan.
After Egypt and Sudan became aware of their misperception, the intensity of the conflict
174









DM Option Status Quo Equilibrium State
EGY 1. Maintain Y Y
2. Cooperate N N
SU 3. Maintain Y Y
4. Cooperate N N
ETH 5. Obey N N
6. Cooperate Y N











between the Eastern Nile countries declined. In May 2011, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan
agreed to establish an international panel of experts (IPoE) for the purpose of assessing the
engineering and construction plans for the dam. The board consisted of 10 experts: two
specialists from each country and four international experts. The IPoE was given one year
to conduct its study and was required to submit its report to the three countries by May
2013. The possible confrontation between the Eastern Nile countries over the release of
the IPoE’s report is addressed in the investigation of the negotiation between the Eastern
Nile countries during the third tripartite meeting of the ministers of water resources that
took place from January 4 to 5, 2014, which will be furnished in the next section (IPoE,
2013; Cascão and Alan, 2016; Tawfik, 2016; Wheeler et al., 2016).
7.4 The Conflict just before January 4, 2014
On May 28, 2013, Ethiopia diverted the natural flow of the Blue Nile River in order to start
building the GERD structure. Egypt expressed its disapproval of Ethiopia’s actions and
asked the country to halt construction until the IPoE’s report had been released (Cascão
and Alan, 2016; Tawfik, 2016; Wheeler et al., 2016). A few days later, on May 31, 2013, the
175
IPoE published its report, which recommended that Ethiopia conduct in-depth studies on
the impacts of the GERD project. It also suggested that Ethiopia modify the structural
measures of the dam to ensure that its foundation would be stable and safe. Further
information about the IPoE’s recommendations can be found in IPoE (2013). Egypt and
Sudan reacted di↵erently to the release of the IPoE’s report.
Sudan, a country that would benefit significantly from the dam, publicly announced
its approval of GERD. Sudan supported the construction of GERD for economic but not
for political reasons. Therefore, it clearly stated that it would act as a mediator between
Egypt and Ethiopia to try to bridge the gap between them (Sudan Tribune, 2013, 2014;
Cascão and Alan, 2016; Tawfik, 2016; Wheeler et al., 2016).
Egypt, which from June 24, 2012 to July 2013 was under the leadership of the former
president Mohammed Morsi, disputed the validity of the IPoE’s report and stressed the
water security granted to it by the 1959 agreement (IPoE, 2013; Cascão and Alan, 2016;
Tawfik, 2016; Wheeler et al., 2016). The meeting led by the former president Mohammed
Morsi in June 2013 recommended deterring Ethiopia from constructing the dam by threat-
ening to use military power there (Ahramonline, 2013). However, Ethiopia stressed its
good relationships with its neighboring countries and clearly stated that it would not go to
war with Egypt over GERD (IPoE, 2013; Cascão and Alan, 2016; Tawfik, 2016; Wheeler
et al., 2016).
From November 2013 to January 2014, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan held three tripar-
tite ministerial meetings in the Sudanese capital city of Khartoum. The purpose of the
meetings was to negotiate how to implement the IPoE’s recommendations. Egypt proposed
forming an international expert committee to conduct the studies suggested by the IPoE
(Cascão and Alan, 2016; Tawfik, 2016; Wheeler et al., 2016). It also suggested halting
the construction of GERD until the investigations had been completed. Ethiopia, on the
other hand, rejected Egypt’s request, stating that the IPoE recommended that Ethiopia
have the authority to conduct the studies without suspending the construction of GERD.
As a result of the strong disagreement between Egypt and Sudan, the negotiation process
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between the Eastern Nile countries stopped after the third meeting from January 4 to
5, 2014, yet the construction of GERD continued (Cascão and Alan, 2016; Tawfik, 2016;
Wheeler et al., 2016).
Before the January 2014 negotiation, DMs are completely aware of each other’s options
and preferences. Therefore, the structure of a zero-level hypergame in graph form, H0
(Aljefri et al., 2017a), which models and analyzes real-life disputes under the assumption
of complete information, is utilized to model and analyze the hydropolitical conflict.
7.4.1 Decision Makers, Options, and States for the Conflict just
before January 4, 2014
The DMs and courses of actions for the hydropolitical dispute just before January 4, 2014
are given in Table 7.9. As can be seen, Egypt has three options: (1) accept the IPoE’s rec-
ommendations, (2) request Ethiopia to modify GERD based on Egypt’s recommendations,
or (3) require Ethiopia to amend GERD based on Egypt’s reduced terms. Sudan, which
decided in this dispute to act as a third party, has one single course of action: to act or not.
Ethiopia, which is the only upstream country in this dispute, has three options: (1) accept
modification of GERD based on the IPoE’s recommendations, (2) accept modification of
GERD based on Egypt’s conditions, or (3) accept modification of GERD based on Egypt’s
reduced terms. The descriptions of these courses of actions are shown in Table 7.9.
Each option in Table 7.9 can be either selected (Y for Yes) or not selected (N for No) by
the DM who possesses it. Therefore, the total number of mathematically possible states for
this dispute is 27 = 128 states. Some of these states are infeasible and need to be removed
from the model. Egypt’s options are mutually exclusive since it cannot choose more than
one of its three options at a time. This removes 64 states. Similarly, Ethiopia can only
modify GERD based on one recommendation. Hence, the situations in which Ethiopia
accepts modification of GERD based on more than one recommendation are infeasible.
This removes 32 states. Hence, for this dispute, 32 states are found to be feasible as shown
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DM Option Choice Description
Egypt 1. Accept the IPoE’s recommendations Y
Allows Ethiopia to proceed with the construction of the GERD based
on the IPoE’s recommendations.
N Disputes the validity of the IPoE’s report.
2. Request Ethiopia to modify the GERD
based on Egypt’s recommendations
Y
Demands that Ethiopia halts the construction of GERD and requests
an international committee to conducts the studies recommended by
the IPoE.
N The option is not taken.
3. Require Ethiopia to amend the GERD
based on Egypt’s reduced terms
Y
Permits Ethiopia to continue building the GERD while the interna-
tional committee conducts the studies.
N The option is not taken.
Sudan 4. Act Y
Acts as a third party to mediate between Egypt and Ethiopia for
reconciliation.
N Does not act.
Ethiopia
5. Accept modifications to the GERD based
on the IPoE’s recommendations
Y
Proceeds with building the GERD and modifies the project based on
the IPoE’s requirements.
N Continues building the GERD based on Ethiopia’s original plans.
6. Accept modifications to the GERD based
on Egypt’s conditions
Y
Stops building the GERD and allows an international committee to
conduct the IPoE’s recommendations.
N Continues building the GERD based on Ethiopia’s original plans.
7. Accept changing the GERD based on Egypt
reduced terms
Y
Continues building the GERD and allows an international committee
to conduct the IPoE’s recommendations.
N Continues building the GERD based on Ethiopia’s original plans.
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in Table 7.10.
7.4.2 Stability Analysis and Equilibrium Results for the Dispute
just before January 4, 2014
To conduct a stability analysis for H0, states are put in order of preference for each DM.
The ranking of states from most to least preferred for Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia is given
in Table 7.11. Note that a line above or below a group of states means that they are equally
preferred. Based on the preference statements below, states are ranked with respect to each
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Table 7.10: Set of Feasible States for the Conflict just before January 4, 2014
DM Option States
EGY 1. IPoE’s Terms N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N
2. EGY’s Terms N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N
3. EGY’s Reduced Terms N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y
SU 4. Act N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y
ETH 5. Accept IPoE Terms N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
6. Accept EGY Terms N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N
7. Accept EGY Reduced Terms N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
2
2
DM in this dispute.
1. Egypt first preference is to request Ethiopia to stop construction of GERD and to
modify it based on Egypt’s requirements. Next, Egypt prefers that Ethiopia modify
GERD based on its reduced terms. These terms would allow Ethiopia to continue
building GERD until the international committee had completed its studies. After
that, Egypt prefers that Ethiopia modify GERD based on the IPoE’s recommenda-
tions. The least preferred scenarios for Egypt are when it does nothing and Ethiopia
continues building GERD based on Ethiopia’s original plans.
2. Sudan prefers, first, to act as a third party to facilitate a deal between Egypt and
Sudan. Sudan’s second preferences are not to interfere as long as Egypt and Ethiopia
continue to negotiate a resolution to GERD. The least preferred scenarios for Sudan
are when it decides not to act and both Egypt and Ethiopia halt the negotiation
process.
3. Ethiopia’s first preference is to modify the construction of GERD based on the IPoE’s
recommendations; its second, to continue with construction of GERD based on its
original plans; and its third, to modify GERD founded on Egypt’s reduced terms. The
least preferred scenarios for Ethiopia are when it modifies GERD based on Egypt’s
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original terms. That means, Ethiopia halts construction of the dam and allows an
international committee to conduct the studies recommended by the IPoE’s report.
Table 7.11: Ranking of States for the DMs in the Conflict just before January 4, 2014
DM States
Egypt 23 19 31 27 24 20 22 18 21 17 32 28 30 26 29 25 15 11 16 12 14 10 13 9 3 7 8 4 6 2 5 1
Sudan 14 15 16 22 23 24 30 31 32 10 11 12 18 19 20 26 27 28 6 7 8 13 21 29 2 3 4 9 17 25 5 1
Ethiopia 14 10 13 9 16 12 15 11 1 5 2 6 8 4 7 3 32 28 31 27 30 26 29 25 23 19 24 20 22 18 21 17
Most preferred Least preferred
2
7
After ordering the states based on each DM’s preferences, one can analyze H0 using
the standard GMCR solution concept. GMCR II (Fang et al., 2003a,b) is used to perform
the analysis and predict the equilibria for the dispute. The results are shown in Table 7.12.
As can be seen, state 15 comprises the strong equilibrium for the conflict because it is a
resolution under Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR. States 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 16 are weak
equilibria for the dispute because they comprise resolutions under GMR and SMR.
Historically, state 15 comprised the equilibrium of the conflict. State 15 is the situation
in which Egypt request Ethiopia to stop GERD and form an international committee of
experts to conduct in-depth studies about the GERD construction safety. It also repre-
sent the situation in which Ethiopia rejects Egypt’s demand and continues building GERD
taking into account the original IPoE’s recommendations. Hence, the negotiation process
between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia stops as a result of their failure to achieve an agree-
ment, and Ethiopia continues building GERD based on the IPoE’s recommendations. The
negotiation process between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan stopped from January 2014 to
August 2014 (IPoE, 2013; Cascão and Alan, 2016; Tawfik, 2016; Wheeler et al., 2016).
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Table 7.12: Stability Analysis and Equilibrium Results for the Negotiation in January 2014
States 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
EGY Nash NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO
SEQ NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO
GMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SU Nash NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
SEQ NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
GMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
ETH Nash YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SEQ YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
GMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Equilibrium Nash \ \ \ \ \ \ E \
SEQ \ \ \ \ \ \ E \
GMR E E E E E E E E
SMR E E E E E E E E
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Table 7.13: Evolution of the Conflict just before January 4, 2014
DM Option Status Quo Transitional State I Transitional State II Equilibrium
EGY 1. IPoE’s Terms N N N N
2. EGY’s Terms N Y Y Y
3. EGY’s Reduced Terms N N N N
SU 4. Act N N Y Y
ETH 5. Accept IPoE’s Terms N N N Y
6. Accept EGY’s Terms N N N N
7. Accept EGY’s Reduced Terms N N N N
Label 1 3 7 15
3
The evolution of the conflict in early January 2014 is outlined in Table 7.13. As can
be seen, the dispute started by moving from state 1, the status quo of the dispute, on
the left via a transitional state, state 3, to another transitional state, state 7, to the final
resolution, state 15, on the right. Egypt disputed the validity of the IPoE’s report and
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requested Ethiopia to halt construction of GERD, and also form an international committee
of experts to conduct in-depth analysis on the dam. To bridge the gap between Ethiopia
and Egypt, Sudan acted as a third party to try to find a solution to the problem around
the negotiation table. However, after three rounds of fruitless negotiations, Egypt and
Ethiopia failed to reach an agreement. As a result, the negotiation process stopped and
Ethiopia continued to build GERD based on the IPoE’s recommendations. In the next
section, one can see how the negotiation process continued after President Abdel Fattah
el-Sisi was elected on June 8, 2014 and began handling the case of GERD (IPoE, 2013;
Cascão and Alan, 2016; Tawfik, 2016; Wheeler et al., 2016).
7.5 The Conflict just before August 25, 2014
The negotiations between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan resumed after the election of Egyp-
tian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi on June 8, 2014. In a meeting held in Khartoum on
August 25, 2014, the Eastern Nile countries agreed to form an international committee
of experts to conduct the studies recommended by the IPoE (IPoE, 2013; Cascão and
Alan, 2016; Tawfik, 2016; Wheeler et al., 2016). Furthermore, the three nations nomi-
nated experts from their own countries to supervise the international committee’s work.
In this agreement, Egypt decided to drop its request to stop construction of GERD until
the studies had been concluded, and Ethiopia accepted the formation of an international
committee to conduct these investigations. This agreement facilitated the signing of a
Declaration of Principles (DoP) (Ahramonline, 2015) among the Eastern Nile countries in
March 2015. This disclosure provides some general guidelines on how to operate GERD
after its construction is completed in 2017. The modeling and analysis of the conflict just
before August 25, 2014 is given in the next section.
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7.5.1 Modeling and Analyzing the Conflict just before August
25, 2014
The dispute between the Eastern Nile countries in August 2014 is a continuation of their
negotiation that occurred in January 2014 (Matbouli et al., 2013). For two conflicts to
be connected, the equilibrium state in the first round must be the status quo for the new
round. State 15, the equilibrium state for the dispute that took place in January 4, 2014,
was the status quo for the conflict just before August 25, 2014. Therefore, the parameters
of the conflict that remained the same are the DMs and their options as shown in Table 7.9.
However, DMs’ preferences over the states, in Table 7.11, are changed because the DMs
change their objectives. Their new preference statements are explained below:
• In this dispute, Egypt shows some willingness to cooperate with Ethiopia by dropping
its request to stop construction of GERD. Hence, Egypt’s first preference is to request
Ethiopia to modify GERD based on Egypt’s reduced terms; its second, for Ethiopia
to modify the project based on its original terms. The least preferred scenarios for
Egypt are when it does nothing or requests Ethiopia to modify GERD based on the
IPoE’s terms, and Ethiopia decides to continue building GERD (IPoE, 2013; Cascão
and Alan, 2016; Tawfik, 2016; Wheeler et al., 2016).
• Ethiopia has also shown some eagerness to cooperate with Egypt in this dispute.
In particular, it has displayed some willingness to accept Egypt’s reduced terms.
Therefore, Ethiopia’s first preference is to accept modification of the construction of
GERD based on Egypt’s reduced terms; and second, to modify the building of GERD
based on the IPoE’s original report. The least preferred scenarios for Ethiopia are
when it decides to modify GERD based on Egypt’s original conditions (IPoE, 2013;
Cascão and Alan, 2016; Tawfik, 2016; Wheeler et al., 2016).
• Sudan continued to act as a third party without any change in its preferences.
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Based on the above preference statements, states are ranked from most to least preferred
with respect to each DM as shown in Table 7.14. A range of solution concepts are used to
investigate the dispute and predict the possible compromise resolutions for the conflict. For
this analysis, a decision support system, GMCR II, was used to perform the calculations.
The results are depicted in Table 7.15. As can be seen, state 32 comprises the strong
equilibrium for the conflict because it is a resolution under Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR.
States 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31 comprise weak equilibria for the dispute because they
are resolutions under GMR and SMR.
Table 7.14: Ranking of States for the DMs in the Conflict just before August 25, 2014
DM States
Egypt 32 28 30 26 29 25 23 19 31 27 24 20 22 18 21 17 15 11 16 12 14 10 13 9 3 7 8 4 6 2 5 1
Sudan 14 15 16 22 23 24 30 31 32 10 11 12 18 19 20 26 27 28 6 7 8 13 21 29 2 3 4 9 17 25 5 1
Ethiopia 32 28 31 27 30 26 29 25 14 10 13 9 16 12 15 11 1 5 2 6 8 4 7 3 23 19 24 20 22 18 21 17
Most preferred Least preferred
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Historically, state 32 comprised the equilibrium of the conflict. State 32 is the situation
in which both Egypt and Ethiopia agree to cooperate, with Egypt requesting Ethiopia to
modify GERD based on Egypt’s reduced terms to which Ethiopia agrees.
The evolution of the conflict that occurred in August 2014 is outlined in Table 7.16. As
can be seen, the dispute began by moving from state 15, the status quo of the dispute and
the equilibrium state for the conflict in early January 2014, on the left, via a transitional
state, state 31, to the final resolution, state 32, on the right. The conflict evolved after
both Egypt and Ethiopia showed some willingness to cooperate and solve the conflict.
Egypt reduced its terms by allowing Ethiopia to continue building GERD simultaneously
with the international committee of experts conducting their in-depth studies. Ethiopia,
on the other hand, agreed to form an international committee of experts to conduct the
studies and continued building GERD. As a result of this understanding between Egypt
and Ethiopia, the Eastern Nile countries signed the DoP in March 2015.
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Table 7.15: Stability Analysis and Equilibrium Results for the Negotiation on August 25,
2014
Table 1: My caption
States 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
EGY Nash NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
SEQ NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
GMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SU Nash NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
SEQ NO NO YES NO YES YES YES YES
GMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
ETH Nash YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SEQ YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
GMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SMR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Equilibrium Nash \ \ \ \ \ \ \ E
SEQ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ E
GMR E E E E E E E E
SMR E E E E E E E E
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Table 7.16: Evolution of the Conflict just before August 25, 2014
DM Option Status Quo Transitional State I Equilibrium
EGY 1. IPoE’s Terms N N N
2. EGY’s Terms Y Y N
3. EGY’s Reduced Terms N N Y
SU 4. Act Y Y Y
ETH 5. Accept IPoE’s Terms Y N N
6. Accept EGY’s Terms N N N
7. Accept EGY’s Reduced Terms N Y Y
Label 15 31 32
2
7.6 Chapter Summary
The overall evolution of the Eastern Nile countries’ disputes over GERD is depicted in
Table 7.17. As can be seen, the conflict over the Nile River water intensified when Ethiopia
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publicly announced, on April 11, 2011, the beginning of construction on GERD on the Blue
Nile River without giving Egypt and Sudan prior notification. Egypt and Sudan were not
aware of Ethiopia’s intention to build GERD independently; as a result, they encountered
a strategic surprise in the dispute. However, after both Egypt and Sudan became aware
of their misperception, they expressed their rejection of Ethiopia’s decision and requested
Ethiopia to respect their respective historic water rights that had been granted to them
by the 1959 agreement. Egypt and Sudan took no aggressive deterrent actions to halt
Ethiopia from continuing construction of GERD. Instead, they agreed with Ethiopia to
form the IPoE for the purpose of studying the adverse impacts of GERD on Egypt and
Sudan. The three countries agreed to give the IPoE one year to conduct its analysis and
also permitted Ethiopia to continue building GERD. However, after the release of the IPoE
report in May 2013, Egypt disputed the validity of the report and requested Ethiopia to
stop construction of GERD. Furthermore, Egypt asked for an international committee
of experts to conduct an in-depth analysis regarding the negative impacts of the dam.
Because Egypt and Ethiopia could not reach an agreement, the negotiations between them
stopped, but the construction of GERD continued as shown in the second column in Table
7.17. The situation improved during the negotiation in August 25, 2014 when Egypt and
Ethiopia agreed to form an international committee of experts to conduct some studies on
GERD without stopping the construction of the dam. This scenario is depicted in the far
right column of Table 7.17. This agreement facilitated the signing of the DoP in March
2015.
The analysis of the hydropolitical conflict between the Eastern Nile countries over
GERD provided the following insights. Firstly, river agreements that allocate unfair al-
lotment among riparian states may create conflict (Tir and Stinnett, 2011). Recall that,
in 2010, Egypt and Sudan refused to sign the CAF due to the possible implications of
this agreement on the volume of water each country would receive from the Nile River.
Secondly, powerful states, militarily, economically, and politically, may influence the ne-
gotiations process in their own interest (Priscoli and Wolf, 2009). Since 1959, Egypt has
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Table 7.17: Overall Evolution of the Eastern Nile Countries’ Dispute from April 11, 2011
to August 25, 2014
DM Option Just Before April 11, 2011 Just Before January 4, 2014 Just Before August 25, 2014
EGY 1. Maintain the 1959 Treaty Y N N
2. Cooperate N N N
3. IPoE’s Terms N N N
4. EGY’s Terms N Y N
5. EGY’s Reduced Terms N N Y
SU 6. Maintain the 1959 Treaty Y N N
7. Cooperate N N N
8. Act N Y Y
ETH 9. Obey the 1959 Treaty N N N
10. Cooperate N N N
11. Commence Independent Y Y Y
12. Accept the IPoE’s Terms N Y N
13. Accept EGY’s Terms N N N
14. Accept EGY’s Reduced Terms N N Y
4
controlled all the negotiations regarding the use of the Nile River water to its favor. It has
also prevented any upstream countries from conducting any water resources development
on the Nile River. Thirdly, geopolitical and economic changes in countries may be the rea-
son for a new era of collaboration. As explained earlier, GERD was a cause of political and
economic change in the Eastern Nile countries. These changes meant the GERD project
became a reality, and cooperation between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan was the only way to
move forward. Because of the tumultuous geopolitical changes in Egypt, the government
was not ready to capably address the conflict over GERD. If Egypt wanted to prevent
GERD from becoming a reality, it should have stopped the progress of the GERD project
at its earlier stages. Ethiopia, on the other hand, utilized Egypt’s political instability and
made significant progress on the construction of GERD. Hence, it became impossible for
Egypt to prevent Ethiopia from removing GERD after Ethiopia had already completed
more than 60% of the construction as of 2016. The fourth lesson that can be obtained
from the case presented in this paper is the important role of the utilization of strategic
surprise by a DM to achieve better results. The 2011 dispute was modeled as a second-
level hypergame because Egypt and Sudan did not anticipate that Ethiopia would start
building GERD without prior notification and Ethiopia was aware of Egypt and Sudan’s
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misperception in this respect. The historical equilibrium state for the 2011 dispute, state
22, was predicted under the definition of the stealthy hyper Nash equilibrium state for a
second-level hypergame (Aljefri et al., 2017b). This definition demonstrates the intended
use of strategic surprise by Ethiopia to achieve results in the conflict. This equilibrium is
considered to constitute unstable equilibrium because, as one saw in the analysis of the
2011 conflict, Egypt and Sudan challenged the resolution after they became aware of it.





8.1 Summary of Contributions
A new and encompassing approach is developed for systematically incorporating hyper-
games within the framework of the graph model for any finite number of DMs and any level
of perception. The methodology allows for a given DM to have misunderstandings not only
about one or more of its opponents, but also about itself. Within this flexible approach,
each DM perceives the set of DMs, states, state transitions, and preferences in a subjective
way that reflects the DM’s viewpoint of the situation under investigation. This technique
provides definitions to categorize the overall hypergame equilibria into eight classes, each of
which provides a unique strategic insight about the sources of misperceptions that provoke
the hypergame situation. The key contributions to incorporate misperception into GMCR
are explained below.
1. A first-level hypergame for the case of two- and n-DM disputes is developed in Chap-
ter 3 to handle conflict situations having misperceptions among the participating
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DMs. Specifically,
• The concept of a universal set of options for a first-level hypergame is introduced
to capture all possible (correct or incorrect) options within first-level hypergame
situations.
• The idea of a universal set of options for a first-level hypergame is extended to
define the universal set of states for a first-level hypergame. These states cover
all possible scenarios for a conflict situation, both real and factitious.
• The mathematical modeling of each DM’s subjective game as well as the overall
first-level hypergame in graph form are developed.
• Formal definitions are developed to classify the universal set of states for a first-
level hypergame based on a DM’s perception into two groups: (1) recognizable
states, and (2) hidden states. Hidden states are those states that are not con-
sidered by a DM in its subjective game. Recognizable states, on the other hand,
are those states that are considered by a DM in its subjective game. Further-
more, definitions are developed to partition a DM’s recognizable set of states
into five groups based on the type of option perception. These five classes are
used in the analysis of the overall first-level hypergame.
• The four basic stability definitions for the standard graph model – Nash, SEQ,
GMR, and SMR – are generalized to calculate the stability of states in each
DM’s subjective game within the first-level hypergame.
• An overall first-level hypergame stability analysis procedure in graph form is
developed to calculate the first-level hypergame equilibria.
• Definitions are designed and implemented to categorize the first-level hypergame
equilibria into eight classes to provide unique strategic insights about the sources
of the misperceptions that cause the hypergame situation.
2. In Chapter 4, two real-life case studies are investigated within the architecture of a
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first-level hypergame in graph form. In particular,
• The 2011 conflict between North and South Sudan over South Sudanese oil ex-
ports is modeled and analyzed as a first-level hypergame in graph form. Because
of the realistic design of the new first-level hypergame in graph form, the author
obtained valuable strategic insights about why the dispute evolved into another
round after reaching the equilibrium state.
• The 1956 Suez Canal nationalization dispute between Egypt and Britain/the
US partnership is modeled and analyzed as a first-level hypergame. The au-
thor contributed new strategic insights beyond those found earlier in the first
published work by Shupe et al. (1980) which were also reported in the book of
Fraser and Hipel (1984).
3. A second-level hypergame for the case of n-DM disputes is developed in Chapter
5 to handle conflict situations having misperceptions among the participating DMs
and at least one DM possessing knowledge of the other DMs’ misperceptions. More
specifically,
• The concepts of universal sets of options and states for a first-level hypergame
are extended to define the universal sets of options and states for a second-level
hypergame.
• The mathematical modeling of a second-level hypergame in graph form is de-
veloped.
• Definitions to partition the universal set of states for a second-level hypergame
into two sets based on a DM’s perception are developed.
• Stability analysis procedures are developed to analyze each DM’s subjective
first-level hypergame within the second-level hypergame in graph form.
• Stability analysis procedures are developed to analyze the overall second-level
hypergame.
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• The classification of a first-level hypergame equilibria is extended to categorize
the second-level hypergame equilibria into eight classes.
4. In Chapter 6, first-level hypergame in graph form is extended to accommodate any
level of DMs’ perception in real-life conflicts. In particular,
• The concepts of the universal sets of options and states for a first-level hyper-
game are extended to any h level of DMs’ perception.
• The structure of a DM’s subjective hypergame is developed in a hierarchical
fashion.
• The mathematical modeling of each DM’s subjective game as well as the overall
hypergame are developed in graph form.
• A stability analysis method is developed to analyze each DM’s subjective hy-
pergame.
• An overall stability analysis procedure is introduce to analyze the overall hy-
pergame.
• The overall hypergame equilibria are classified into eight groups as done for the
first-level hypergame.
5. In Chapter 7, an application to a real-world conflict is investigated within the struc-
ture of a hypergame in graph form. In particular, a second-level hypergame stability
analysis is carried out on the 2011 conflict among Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan over
the unexpected construction of GERD by the Ethiopian government. The author em-
ploys the second-level hypergame stability definitions for an n-DM graph model. This
analysis predicts a strong equilibrium, which is a stealthy hyper Nash equilibrium
for the dispute. It demonstrates the significant utilization of strategic surprise by
the Ethiopian government to achieve a firm outcome in the dispute. Because Egypt
and Sudan underestimated Ethiopia’s capability to independently build a dam on the
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Blue Nile River, they faced strategic surprise when Ethiopia announced its decision,
on April 11, 2011, to construct a massive hydroelectric dam on the Blue Nile River as
a national project. Also, because Ethiopia was aware of Egypt and Sudan’s misper-
ception as well as their political instability, it was successful in launching the GERD
project without any harsh response from Egypt and Sudan. The categorization of
the overall second-level hypergame equilibria assists the author in obtaining valuable
strategic insights about this dispute.
8.2 Future Work
The hypergame method in graph form constitutes a comprehensive approach for modeling
and analyzing misperceptions within the structure of GMCR. In fact, a hypergame ex-
pressed in graph form, introduced in this dissertation, is a fresh concept and may therefore
be combined with recent expansions within the paradigm of GMCR. A number of ideas
for future research are listed below:
• Learning within the Hypergame Approach in Graph Form: The eight classes of the
overall hypergame equilibria could be initially studied to identify learning situations
that will increase a DM’s ability to correct its perception, and thereby take appro-
priate actions in the process of making an informed decision.
• Matrix Representation of the Hypergame Analysis in Graph Form: Xu et al. (2009)
developed a matrix representation of GMCR’s stability definitions for utilization
in computer coding. A hypergame could be formulated using matrix methods for
possible software development.
• Robustness of the Hypergame Equilibria: Matbouli et al. (2015) developed a concept
that measures the robustness of equilibria in the standard GMCR. This concept
can be appropriately revised for employment in hypergame theory in graph form to
investigate if the overall hypergame equilibria are final or temporary.
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• Inverse Hypergame Analysis in Graph Form: Kinsara et al. (2015a) developed an
inverse GMCR technique to identify DMs’ preferences at a given desired outcome.
This technique can be used as a negotiation support tool. Currently, the inverse
GMCR approach assumes common perception among the engaging DMs. Since many
real-life situations possess misperceptions among the participating DMs, it is useful
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